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Editor’s Note 
 
 Thank you for downloading the first digital 
edition of the PACE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SPORTS 
& ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM.  As you scroll 
through the pages of this issue, you may notice the 
Forum has a new look.  Recognizing the significant 
advancements in technology that have revolutionized 
the legal field in the past few years, the Volume 4 
Editorial Board sought to update and adapt the Fo-
rum to be accessible digitally, formatting the issue 
for tablets and e-readers.  As you read, take ad-
vantage of clickable Tables of Contents and links to 
online sources throughout the issue. 
 This year marks the fourth anniversary of 
PIPSELF, as the Forum is known colloquially to the 
Pace community.  In four short years, PIPSELF has 
grown considerably, thanks to the dedication and de-
termination of past and present Editorial Boards.  
From the inaugural volume, featuring compositions 
compiled by and prepared for publication solely by 
the four founding members, the journal has ex-
panded to feature a fully staffed Editorial Board and 
a roster of Associate Editors. 
The staff of PIPSELF has worked diligently 
this year selecting and preparing innovative and en-
gaging articles concerning emerging issues in the 
fields of intellectual property, sports, and entertain-
ment law for this issue, and we look forward to pub-
lishing our second issue this spring.    We encourage 
our readers to feel welcome to send comments and 
feedback: e-mail us at pipself@law.pace.edu or visit 
our Twitter @PIPSELF. 
—  Danielle Meeks 
Editor-in-Chief 
Volume 4 
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Abstract 
In today’s difficult economic times, state gov-
ernments are more hard pressed than ever to come 
up with new sources of revenue to at least stay reve-
nue neutral. Leave it to the perpetually money-
hungry State of New York to come up with this gem 
of an idea for generating tax revenues: In 2005, the 
New York State Department of Taxation and Fi-
nance attempted to impose sales tax on a nightclub’s 
offering of exotic dancing to its customers. This re-
sulted in one nightclub instigating a legal challenge 
to the state’s attempt to impose sales taxes on exotic 
dancing. This resulted in the matter of 677 New 
Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals Tri-
bunal, which was ultimately decided by the New 
York Court of Appeals in October 2012. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In today’s difficult economic times, state gov-
ernments are more hard pressed than ever to come 
up with new sources of revenue to at least stay reve-
nue neutral.  Leave it to the perpetually money-hun-
gry State of New York to come up with this gem of an 
idea for generating tax revenues: In 2005, the New 
York State Department of Taxation and Finance at-
tempted to impose sales tax on a nightclub’s offering 
of exotic dancing to its customers.  This resulted in 
the matter of 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New 
York Tax Appeals Tribunal, ultimately decided by 
the New York Court of Appeals in October 2012, 
where one nightclub instigated a legal challenge to 
the state’s attempt to impose sales taxes on exotic 
dancing.1 
 
I. THE FACTS 
 The plaintiff corporation operated an adult en-
tertainment establishment called Nite Moves (“the 
club”).2  Nite Moves is an adult juice bar “where pa-
trons may view exotic dances performed by women in 
various stages of undress.”3 Revenue is generated 
from four sources: 
 
general admission charges, which entitle 
patrons to enter the club, mingle with the 
dancers and view on-stage performances, 
as well as any table or lap dances per-
formed on the open floor; ‘couch sales,’ 
                                                             
1 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals 
Tribunal, 979 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 
422 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 13-38).  
2 677 New Loudon Corp v. State of New York Tax Appeals 
Tribunal, 925 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).  
3 Id. 
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representing the fee charged when a 
dancer performs for a customer in one of 
the club’s private rooms; register sales 
from the nonalcoholic beverages sold to 
patrons; and house fees paid by the danc-
ers to the club.4 
 
 During a 2005 audit, the Division of Taxation 
(“the Division”) audited the club and determined that 
the club’s door admission fees and private dance fees 
were subject to New York State sales taxes, which 
the Division alleged that the club did not pay.5  Thus, 
the Division assessed the club’s unpaid sales taxes in 
the amount of $124,921.94.6  Needless to say, the 
club did not agree with Division’s assessment, and 
challenged the Division in court.  Unfortunately for 
Nite Moves, the New York Appellate Division ruled 
in favor of the Division of Taxation.7  The Appellate 
Division found, among other things, that the Division 
of Taxation had a rational basis for subjecting the 
club’s exotic dancing to the sales tax,8 that the club 
failed to meet its burden of proof that it qualified for 
a sales tax exemption,9 and most importantly, that 
exotic dancing is not a choreographed, artistic per-
formance that merits exemption from the sales tax.10 
 
II. THE ISSUE 
 According to New York State Tax Law, the 
state will impose a tax on admissions fees in excess 
                                                             
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 692. 
8 Id. at 690. 
9 Id. at 691. 
10 Id. at 691-92. 
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of ten cents on:  
 
the use of any place of amusement in the 
state, except charges for admission to race 
tracks, boxing, sparring or wrestling 
matches or exhibitions which charges are 
taxed under any other law of this state, or 
dramatic or musical arts performances, or 
live circus performances, or motion picture 
theaters, and except charges to a patron for 
admission to, or use of, facilities for sport-
ing activities in which such patron is to be a 
participant, such as bowling alleys and 
swimming pools.11  
 
 Thus, the central issue that the New York 
Court of Appeals had to decide was whether exotic 
dancing was in fact a choreographed, artistic activity 
that qualified for exemption from the New York 
State sales tax.  The club contended that its dance 
activity was in fact choreographed performances that 
should be exempt from taxation while the Division 
contended that the club’s activities were well within 
the statutory definition of a taxable place of amuse-
ment.  The statute defines places of amusement as 
“any place where any facilities for entertainment, 
amusement, or sports are provided.”12 
 
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
 In a 4-3 decision,13 the New York Court of Ap-
                                                             
11 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1105(f)(1) (Consol. 2012) (emphasis added). 
12 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(d)(2) (Consol. 2012). 
13 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals 
Tribunal, 979 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2012). Judges Ciparick, 
Graffeo, Pigott and Jones concur in the judgment. Judge Smith 
wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Judge Lippman and 
Judge Read. 
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peals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision,14 
holding that exotic dancing is not a choreographed, 
artistic event thus subject to the New York State 
sales tax.  In its majority opinion, the court first not-
ed the Division’s legislative history showed wide lati-
tude in defining those entertainment activities which 
are subject to taxation. 
  
The Legislature expansively defined places 
of amusement that are subject to this tax to 
include “any place where any facilities for 
entertainment, amusement, or sports are 
provided.” The tax, therefore, applies to a 
vast array of entertainment including at-
tendances at sporting events, such as base-
ball, basketball or football games, collegiate 
athletic events, stock car races, carnivals 
and fairs, amusement parks, rodeos, zoos, 
horse shows, arcades, variety shows, magic 
performances, ice shows, aquatic events, 
and animal acts. Plainly, no specific type of 
recreation is singled out for taxation..15 
 
Therefore, if one accepts the premise that lap danc-
ing is indeed a form of “entertainment,” then it would 
logically follow, according to the majority, that exotic 
dancing is included in the non-exhaustive listing of 
taxable entertainment activity. 
 However, in relying on the legislative intent, 
the court also noted that the Legislature created a 
specific exception for certain forms of entertainment.  
Thus, if an entertainment activity fell within the def-
inition of “dramatic or musical arts” performances, 
then the venue that provided the performances 
                                                             
14 677 New Loudon Corp., 979 N.E.2d at 1122.  
15 Id. 
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would be exempt from having to collect and pay New 
York sales tax.  “[W]ith the evident purpose of pro-
moting cultural and artistic performances in local 
communities, the Legislature created an exemption 
that excluded from taxation admission charges for a 
discrete form of entertainment – ‘dramatic or musical 
arts performances.’”16 
 The majority’s second point in its opinion was 
that the club’s entertainment activities did not qual-
ify for the tax exemption.  This is because the court 
agreed with the Appellate Division and thus believed 
that the club did not meet its burden of proof that its 
exotic dance routines qualified as artistic choreo-
graphed performances.17  The majority believed the 
club’s evidence supporting its position was faulty for 
two reasons. 
Firstly, the club’s expert witness, who was a 
cultural anthropologist who researched the field of 
exotic dancing, never saw any of the dances per-
formed at the club herself.18  “Petitioner’s expert, by 
her own admission, did not view any of the private 
dances performed at petitioner’s club and, instead, 
based her entire opinion in this regard upon her ob-
servations of private dances performed in other adult 
                                                             
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1123 (“In order for petitioner to be entitled to the 
exclusion for “dramatic or musical arts performances,” it was 
required to prove that the fees constituted admission charges 
for performances that were dance routines qualifying as 
choreographed performances. Petitioner failed to meet this 
burden as it related to the fees collected for the performances in 
so-called “private rooms”; none of the evidence presented 
depicted such performances and petitioner’s expert’s opinion 
was not based on any personal knowledge or observation of 
“private” dances that happened at petitioner’s club.”). 
18 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals 
Tribunal, 925 N.Y.S.2d 686, 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).  
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entertainment venues.”19 Consequently, the Division 
completely discredited the club’s expert, and deter-
mined the performances to be taxable.20 
 In my opinion, the expert witness certainly 
should have exercised some due diligence (and some 
common sense) and personally seen some of the 
club’s dance routines herself.  However, just to play 
Devil’s Advocate here, we should consider the fol-
lowing: (1) the expert was a cultural anthropologist 
by profession;21 (2) she extensively researched the 
field of exotic dancing;22 and (3) she had witnessed 
similar dance routines at other venues.23  Therefore, 
this is a person with both the academic training and 
practical experience who could make an informed 
judgment as to whether the club’s routines were in 
fact choreographed dances. 
 Secondly, the court upheld the Appellate Divi-
sion’s finding that the club’s exotic dance routines 
were not choreographed performances.  The Appel-
late Division determined that this type of dancing 
does not rise to the level of a choreographed perfor-
                                                             
19 Id. at 691. 
20 Id. (“Although petitioner argues that the detailed 
testimony of its expert was more than sufficient to discharge 
its burden on this point, the Tribunal essentially discounted 
this testimony in its entirety, leaving petitioner with little 
more than the Nite Moves DVD to demonstrate its entitlement 
to the requested exemption.”); see also 19 N.Y.3d at 1060. (“The 
Tribunal articulated a rational basis for discrediting her: it 
found her testimony was compromised by her opinion that the 
private performances were the same as the main stage 
performances despite the fact that she neither observed nor 
had personal knowledge of what occurred in the private 
areas.”). 
21 Id. at 690. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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mance that requires formalized training.  “The rec-
ord reflects that the club’s dancers are not required 
to have any formal dance training and, in lieu there-
of, often rely upon videos or suggestions from other 
dancers to learn their craft.”24 
In my opinion, this suggests that both the ma-
jority and the Appellate Division strongly believe 
that any idiot (male or female) could walk into any 
nightclub, apply for a position as an exotic dancer, 
and get the job.  I defy any of those self-appointed 
critics to try it themselves and see if they could pull 
it off. If any of them can (and I absolutely doubt it!!!), 
then I will retract everything I have written here and 
shut up. 
 
IV. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
 Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion hits the ma-
jority hard with his assertion that the majority is 
imposing its own moral judgment on what kind of 
dancing is taxable.  He makes quite clear that alt-
hough he finds exotic dance personally unappealing, 
it is grossly unfair to subject it to taxation solely on 
that basis. 
 
Like the majority and the Tribunal, I find 
this particular form of dance unedifying — 
indeed, I am stuffy enough to find it dis-
tasteful. Perhaps for similar reasons, I do 
not read Hustler magazine; I would rather 
read the New Yorker. I would be appalled, 
however, if the State were to exact from 
Hustler a tax that the New Yorker did not 
have to pay, on the ground that what ap-
pears in Hustler is insufficiently “cultural 
and artistic.” That sort of discrimination on 
                                                             
24 Id. at 691. 
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the basis of content would surely be uncon-
stitutional. It is not clear to me why the 
discrimination that the majority approves 
in this case stands on any firmer constitu-
tional footing.25  
 
 Judge Smith takes exception to the majority’s 
splitting dance activity into what it deems acceptable 
versus what it deems objectionable.  “The majority, 
and the Tribunal, have implicitly defined the statu-
tory words ‘choreographic . . . performance’ to mean 
‘highbrow dance’ or ‘dance worthy of a five-syllable 
adjective.’”26  This lends itself to the possibility that a 
performance of the Joffrey Ballet at New York’s Lin-
coln Center is completely safe from taxation, whereas 
a striptease in a low rent bar on the wrong side of 
town is taxable.  How fair is that?  In Judge Smith’s 
opinion, a dance is a dance is a dance – period.  “The 
people who paid these admission charges paid to see 
women dancing.  It does not matter if the dance was 
artistic or crude, boring or erotic.  Under New York’s 
Tax Law, a dance is a dance.”27  I believe Judge 
Smith is spot on with his analysis.  Whether it is tap 
dancing, ballet dancing, ballroom dancing, salsa 
dancing, Dancing with the Stars, or even exotic danc-
ing in this case, the operative word in all those titles 
is still dance. 
 Next, Judge Smith rips apart the majority’s 
conclusion that exotic dancing is not choreography.  
He noted that the actual tax regulation included the 
word “choreography” within the definition of “musi-
                                                             
25 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals 
Tribunal, 979 N.E.2d 1121, 1125 (N.Y. 2012) (Smith, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted).  
26 Id. at 1124 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
27 Id. (emphasis added).  
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cal arts” that would be exempt from the tax.28  Thus, 
as long as the entertainment in question involved 
choreographed routines, it would be exempt from the 
sales tax – irrespective of its tastefulness. 
 
V.  WHAT IS DANCE AND WHAT IS  
CHOREOGRAPHY, THEN? 
 According to Dictionary.com, dance is defined 
as “to move one’s feet or body, or both, rhythmically 
in a pattern of steps, especially to the accompani-
ment of music.”29  Dictionary.com also defines chore-
ography as “the technique of representing the vari-
ous movements in dancing by a system of notation.”30 
 Choreography requires both practice and pre-
cision.  In order to successfully complete any dance 
routine, the person or persons involved must get 
their timing down, be physically coordinated, and 
most importantly, have the talent and ability to be 
successful.  In Judge Smith’s eyes, this point is 
equally applicable irrespective of the type of dance 
performance.  “It is undisputed that the dancers 
worked hard to prepare their acts, and that pole 
dancing is actually quite difficult. . . .”31  If even pole 
dancing requires actual talent, this blows apart the 
majority’s presumption that anybody can do exotic 
dancing.  Why?  Even exotic dancing requires 
rhythm, timing, coordination, and practice.  Not eve-
ryone has the ability to dance; dancing is a special-
                                                             
28 Id. 
29 Dance, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/dance (last visited Mar. 
2, 2014). 
30 Choreography, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/choreography (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
31 677 New Loudon Corp., 979 N.E.2d at 1124. 
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ized skill. 
 
VI.  SIMILAR ACTIVITIES TREATED DISSIMILARLY: 
ARKANSAS WRITERS’ PROJECT, INC. V. RAGLAND 
 The issue of differentiating between similar 
activities is not new.  Obviously no one knows if the 
United States Supreme Court will step in to decide if 
there is a constitutionally impermissible distinction 
between nude dancing and other types of dancing.  
 In Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 
Commissioner of Revenue of Arkansas, the Court ex-
amined the constitutionality of an Arkansas sales tax 
that was imposed on some publications but not oth-
ers.32  The tax was imposed on all sales of tangible 
personal property.33  However, the state allowed sev-
eral exemptions to the tax, including newspapers, 
and certain other publications related to sports, reli-
gion, and trade or professional journals.34  
 The Arkansas Times (“the Times”) was a 
monthly general interest magazine.  “The magazine 
includes articles on a variety of subjects, including 
religion and sports.”35  The state, after an audit, as-
sessed taxes on the Times.36  The Times agreed to 
pay the assessment and future taxes on the condition 
that it could renew its challenge to the Arkansas tax 
                                                             
32 Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 
(1987). 
33 Id. at 224. 
34 Id. (“These include ‘[g]ross receipts or gross proceeds 
derived from the sale of newspapers,’ § 84-1904(f) 
(newspaper exemption), and ‘religious, professional, 
trade and sports journals and/or publications printed and 
published within this State . . . when sold through 
regular subscriptions.’ § 84-1904(j) (magazine 
exemption).”). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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exemption if there were any future court rulings or 
changes in the tax law that would justify such a chal-
lenge.37 
 Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided 
Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Commissioner, in 
which it invalidated a Minnesota use tax on “the cost 
of paper and ink products consumed in the produc-
tion of a publication.”38  The Court struck down the 
tax on the grounds that the tax and exemption 
scheme was targeted at the press.  In other words, 
the taxing scheme in that case put an impermissible 
burden on publishers to pay the use tax while it was 
never imposed on any other business in the state of 
Minnesota.  
 
We have long recognized that even regu-
lations aimed at proper governmental con-
cerns can restrict unduly the exercise of 
rights protected by the First Amendment.  
A tax that singles out the press, or that tar-
gets individual publications within the 
press, places a heavy burden on the State to 
justify its action. Since Minnesota has of-
fered no satisfactory justification for its tax 
on the use of ink and paper, the tax violates 
the First Amendment, and the judgment be-
low is Reversed.39 
 
                                                             
37 Id. at 225 (“Appellant initially contested the assessment, 
but eventually reached a settlement with the State and agreed 
to pay the tax beginning in October 1982. However, appellant 
reserved the right to renew its challenge if there were a change 
in the tax law or a court ruling drawing into question the 
validity of Arkansas’ exemption structure.”). 
38 Minneapolis Star v. Minn. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 575, 577 
(1983). 
39 Id. at 592 (citation omitted). 
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 Back in Arkansas, the Times, relying on the 
Minneapolis Star case, brought a lawsuit against the 
state to get a refund of all the sales taxes it had paid 
since October 1982.40  The litigation went all the way 
to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which denied the 
Times’ petition and upheld the tax.41  The U.S. Su-
preme Court, however, reversed the Arkansas court 
and struck down the tax on the ground that, even ab-
sent a discriminatory motive, this tax was unconsti-
tutional because it was imposed on some Arkansas 
publishers, but not others.  
 
On the facts of this case, the fundamental 
question is not whether the tax singles out 
the press as a whole, but whether it targets 
a small group within the press. While we 
indicated in Minneapolis Star that a genu-
inely nondiscriminatory tax on the receipts 
of newspapers would be constitutionally 
permissible, the Arkansas sales tax cannot 
be characterized as nondiscriminatory, be-
cause it is not evenly applied to all maga-
zines. To the contrary, the magazine ex-
emption means that only a few Arkansas 
magazines pay any sales tax; in that re-
spect, it operates in much the same way as 
did the $100,000 exemption to the Minneso-
ta use tax. Because the Arkansas sales tax 
scheme treats some magazines less favora-
bly than others, it suffers from the second 
type of discrimination identified in Minne-
apolis Star. Indeed, this case involves a 
more disturbing use of selective taxation 
than Minneapolis Star, because the basis on 
which Arkansas differentiates between 
                                                             
40 Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc., 481 U.S. at 225. 
41 Id. at  226. 
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magazines is particularly repugnant to 
First Amendment principles: a magazine’s 
tax status depends entirely on its content. 
‘[A]bove all else, the First Amendment 
means that government has no power to re-
strict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’42 
 
 The bottom line, obviously, is that if a taxing 
authority is going to impose a tax, it should be uni-
formly imposed on all within the jurisdiction.  It cer-
tainly would not look good if the state of New York 
were to grant a sales tax exemption to the Wall 
Street Journal, generally accepted to be an upscale 
publication, but not the Weekly World News, a publi-
cation (and I use that term loosely as applied to it 
here) that I believe does not let little things like ac-
curacy and veracity get in the way of a good, atten-
tion grabbing headline.  Some of the notorious head-
lines the Weekly World News is rather infamous for 
include the following: “Earth to Collide with Nibiru 
on December 21, 2012!,”43 “Sean Penn to Replace 
Chavez,”44 “Dennis Rodman Named Leader of North 
Korea,”45 “Super Bowl Blackout – Joe Biden Did 
                                                             
42 Id. at 229 (quoting Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92, 95 (1972)) (citation omitted). 
43 Frank Lake, Earth to Collide with Nibiru on December 21, 
2012!, WEEKLY WORLD NEWS, Dec. 20, 2012, 
http://weeklyworldnews.com/aliens/42896/earth-to-collide-with-
nibiru-on-decembe-21-2012/. 
44 Frank Lake, Sean Penn to Replace Chavez, WEEKLY WORLD 
NEWS, Mar. 6, 2013, 
http://weeklyworldnews.com/headlines/55101/sean-penn-to-
replace-chavez/.  
45 Tap Vann, Dennis Rodman Named Leader of North Korea, 
WEEKLY WORLD NEWS, Mar. 4, 2013, 
http://weeklyworldnews.com/headlines/55030/dennis-rodman-
named-leader-of-north-korea/. 
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It!,”46 or my favorite, “Bigfoot Kept Lumberjack as 
Love Slave.”47 
 Even if one does not hold the Weekly World 
News in the highest esteem, it would be grossly un-
fair to impose a tax on it merely because it is a bit 
lowbrow.  Yet, this is the very same thing the New 
York State Department of Taxation and Finance is 
doing by excluding nude dancing from the generic 
definition of “choreographed dance” for tax purposes. 
 
VII. IS NUDE DANCING REALLY ENTITLED TO FIRST 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION?  YES, BUT… 
 Supreme Court jurisprudence has given nude 
dancing First Amendment protection.  In fact, the 
court noted that activities that are protected by the 
First Amendment included nudity.  For example, in 
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, the Court rec-
ognized that nude dancing was expressive speech 
within the First Amendment.48  
 
Nor may an entertainment program be pro-
hibited solely because it displays the nude 
human figure. “[N]udity alone” does not 
                                                             
46 Tap Vann, Super Bowl Blackout – Joe Biden Did it!, 
WEEKLY WORLD NEWS, Feb. 4, 2013. 
http://weeklyworldnews.com/headlines/54471/super-bowl-
blackout-joe-biden-did-it/. 
47 K. Thor Jensen, Tabloid Headlines We Wish Were Real, 
UGO (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.ugo.com/web-culture/tabloid-
headlines-we-wish-were-real-bigfoot-kept-lumberjack 
(displaying picture of the headline “Bigfoot Kept Lumberjack as 
Slave”); Steve Mandich, A Year in the Life of Bigfoot, BIGFOOT IS 
REAL, http://www.stevemandich.com/otherstuff/bigfootyear.htm 
(last updated Jan. 13, 2011) (describing the October 30, 2001 
story “Bigfoot Kept a Lumberjack as a Slave” as “a Tacoma 
lumberjack held captive by Bigfoot for three months came to 
call the beast ‘Wookums.’”).  
48 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
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place otherwise protected material outside 
the mantle of the First Amendment. . . . 
Furthermore, as the state courts in this 
case recognized, nude dancing is not with-
out its First Amendment protections from 
official regulation.49 
 
 In two later cases, however, the Court upheld 
public indecency statutes.  In upholding the statutes, 
the court mentioned that nude dancing was within 
the very limited purview of the First Amendment, 
but the plurality opinion in both cases also men-
tioned that their First Amendment protections are 
neither unlimited nor absolute.  
First, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., a 1991 
case, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an Indiana 
statute outlawing public nudity.50  The statute here 
required that exotic dancers wear pasties and a G-
string while performing.51  Even then, the Court rec-
ognized that nude dancing still had First 
Amendment protection, albeit limited.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, probably not a fan of nude dancing, 
stated in the opinion: “[n]ude dancing of the kind 
sought to be performed here is expressive conduct 
within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, 
though we view it as marginally so.”52 
 Nine years later, in 2000, the Court decided 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M.53  Here, the Court looked at an 
Erie, Pennsylvania statute that provided the follow-
ing:  
 
                                                             
49 Id. at 66. 
50 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
51 Id. at 563. 
52 Id. at 566. 
53 City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
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1. A person who knowingly or intentionally,  
 in a public place:  
 a. engages in sexual intercourse 
b. engages in deviate sexual intercourse 
as defined by the Pennsylvania 
Crimes Code 
 c. appears in a state of nudity, or 
d. fondles the genitals of himself, herself 
or another person commits Public In-
decency, a Summary Offense. 
2. “Nudity” means the showing of the hu-
man male or female genital [sic], pubic 
area or buttocks with less than a fully 
opaque covering; the showing of the fe-
male breast with less than a fully opaque 
covering of any part of the nipple; the ex-
posure of any device, costume, or cover-
ing which gives the appearance of or 
simulates the genitals, pubic hair, na-
tal cleft . . . .54 
 
 In Pap’s A.M., Justice O’Connor wrote the plu-
rality opinion, in which she reinforced the Barnes 
Court’s rationale that nude dancing is entitled to on-
ly limited First Amendment protection.  “Being ‘in a 
state of nudity’ is not an inherently expressive con-
dition.  As we explained in Barnes, however, nude 
dancing of the type at issue here is expressive con-
duct, although we think that it falls only within the 
outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.”55  
As a result of these two cases, the Court places nude 
dancing, allegedly expressive speech, on a much low-
er pedestal than, say, political speech or commercial 
speech.  
                                                             
54 Id. at 283 n.* (quoting Ordinance 75-1994, codified as 
Article 711 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Erie). 
55 Id. at 289. 
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 Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist never 
defined exactly how “marginal”56 First Amendment 
protection for nude dancing really is, and Justice 
O’Connor never gave a definitive description of her 
“outer ambit”57 of First Amendment protection for 
nude dancing, either.  Justice O’Connor also men-
tions in Pap’s A.M. that society has a much greater 
interest in protecting political speech than exotic 
dancing, which she considers akin to being an un-
wanted stepchild.  
 
And as Justice Stevens eloquently stated 
for the plurality in Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 70 (1976), “even 
though we recognize that the First Amend-
ment will not tolerate the total suppression 
of erotic materials that have some arguably 
artistic value, it is manifest that society’s 
interest in protecting this type of expression 
is of a wholly different, and lesser, magni-
tude than the interest in untrammeled po-
litical debate,” and “few of us would march 
our sons and daughters off to war to pre-
serve the citizen’s right to see” specified an-
atomical areas exhibited at establishments 
like Kandyland.58 
                                                             
56 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566. 
57 Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289; see also Kevin Case, “Lewd and 
Immoral”: Nude Dancing, Sexual Expression, and the First 
Amendment, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1185, 1201 (2006) (“Like 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Barnes, she provided no explanation 
for why nude dancing was banished to the ‘outer ambit,’ 
although she, like Justice Souter in Barnes, quoted the passage 
from American Mini Theatres about society’s interest in 
protecting sexual expression being of a ‘wholly different, and 
lesser, magnitude’ than the interest in protecting political 
speech.”). 
58 Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 294. 
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 Can this possibly be true?  Is “unfettered polit-
ical debate” that important in helping society where 
we would otherwise be hopelessly lost without it?  
Does Justice O’Connor really believe we would prefer 
to send our sons and daughters off to war to preserve 
the First Amendment rights of political office holders 
to lie to their constituents on a daily basis?59  To each 
his own, I suppose.  In my opinion, if Justice 
O’Connor were that concerned about societal harm, I 
would suggest to her that professional liars (who I 
will call “politicians”) routinely inflict much more 
harm on society than exposing certain body parts ev-
er could. 
 
IIX. JUDICIAL ANTIPATHY TOWARDS NUDITY 
 From the day that Adam and Eve realized that 
they were naked in the Garden of Eden,60 nudity has 
always been a hot topic, especially in the legal world.  
Yet, as the Barnes and Pap’s A.M. cases have shown, 
the Court, at best, has given a lukewarm endorse-
ment to the proposition that nude dancing (no matter 
how distasteful) is a form of expressive speech.  This 
type of speech, allegedly under the umbrella of First 
Amendment protection, is deemed not really worthy 
of strict scrutiny analysis that other forms of pro-
                                                             
59 See, e.g., Bill Haltom, The Constitutional Right to Lie, 43-
NOV TENN. B.J. 32 (2007) (“Let’s face it, my fellow Americans. 
Lying politicians are as American as apple pie.”). 
60 Genesis 3:8-11 (“Then the man and his wife heard the sound 
of the LORD God as he was walking in the garden in the cool of 
the day, and they hid from the LORD God among the trees of the 
garden.  But the LORD God called to the man, ‘Where are you?’ 
He answered, ‘I heard you in the garden, and I was afraid 
because I was naked; so I hid.’  And he said, ‘Who told you that 
you were naked? Have you eaten from the tree that I 
commanded you not to eat from?’”). 
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tected speech would be given. 
 Why exactly do courts hesitate to give nude 
dancing full protection under the First Amendment?  
Could it be that there might be some deep-seated, 
patriarchal cultural mindset that would suggest that 
the nude female body is “evil,” and somehow some-
thing to be afraid of?  And perhaps the only way to 
suppress the evilness is for courts to make sure that 
the nude female form does not gain access to legal 
protection (free speech, taxation, equal protection 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution, and who knows what 
else)?  
 There is at least one paradigm61 that does sug-
gest a judicial aversion to the nude female form that, 
I believe, is completely devoid of any rational basis 
(how ironic).  
  
What is it about the nude female body that 
inspires irrationality, fear, and pan-
demonium, or at least inspires judges to 
write bad decisions? In City of Erie v. Pap’s 
A.M. and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the 
Supreme Court’s “nude dancing” cases, the 
Court accepted and acted upon culturally 
entrenched views of the nude female form: 
that the female body is a site of unreason; 
that it is barely intelligible; that it is invit-
ing yet dangerous; and that it causes may-
hem, disease, and destruction. This view of 
the seductive, dangerous, writhing woman, 
so powerful that she is inextricable from the 
wreckage she causes, has a long and fever-
ish history in Western culture, be it the Bi-
                                                             
61 See generally Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls! The Supreme 
Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1109 
(2005). 
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ble, great literature, or pulp movies. This 
time she has caused more trouble: She has 
wreaked havoc in the First Amendment.62 
 
 Evidently, there does not seem to be a similar 
judicial hysteria when it comes to male nudity.  As-
suming the above quote is true, this must mean that 
exposed male genitalia is not nearly as dangerous, 
potentially attractive, and simultaneously fear in-
ducing as female genitalia.  Thus, women looking at 
a nude, gyrating male body would not result in male 
prostitution, female-on-male rape, or the decline in 
real estate values in neighborhoods where nude male 
entertainment would be available.  
Surely, there are images of male virility em-
bodied in certain celebrities, for example, that would 
inspire naked animal lust in the female heart as 
well.  I would assume male figures like Brad Pitt, 
George Clooney, Denzel Washington, Mel Gibson or 
even the Rat Pack (Frank Sinatra, Dean Martin, 
Sammy Davis, Jr. and Peter Lawford) in their prime 
would inspire similar lustful thoughts in the female 
gender.  The above examples of male libido notwith-
standing, the male body is obviously not nearly as 
sexy or dangerous in the minds of middle-aged to el-
derly judges.  
 
The courts have implicitly recognized that 
without some coherent limiting principle, 
all sorts of businesses could adopt sexu-
alized branding, making gender-specific sex 
appeal a qualification for nurses, sec-
retaries and even lawyers. Although such a 
rule would also allow employers to sex-
ualize male employees, and might seem su-
                                                             
62 Id. 
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perficially equal, it would not be in practice. 
Because more business owners are male 
and prevailing gender norms encourage 
men to commodify women, there would be a 
stronger demand for female sexuality than 
male sexuality, just as movie audiences ap-
pear to prefer to see female nudity more 
than male nudity.63 
 
 That said, does the exposure of female body 
parts really lead to all this lawlessness the Pap’s 
A.M. Court so greatly fears?  Can an exposed pair of 
breasts or an uncovered vagina really lead to the end 
of civilization as we know it?  We shall soon see… 
 
A. The Ridiculous, Illogical “Secondary Effects” 
Rationale of Pap’s A.M. 
In Pap’s A.M., the plurality opinion relied 
quite heavily on the so-called secondary effects re-
sulting from full nudity in live entertainment.  The 
City of Erie, in enacting its ban on public nudity, jus-
tified its ordinance on the premise that live, nude en-
tertainment automatically leads to criminal activity. 
 
The preamble to the ordinance states that 
“the Council of the City of Erie has, at 
various times over more than a century, 
expressed its findings that certain lewd, 
immoral activities carried on in public 
places for profit are highly detrimental to 
the public health, safety and welfare, and 
lead to the debasement of both women and 
men, promote violence, public intoxication, 
prostitution and other serious criminal 
                                                             
63 Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing; Reconciling 
Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 36-37 (2007). 
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activity.64 
 
Admittedly, I am hard pressed to come to that con-
clusion.  Actually, I see several logical flaws in the 
Court’s attempt to justify its secondary effects argu-
ment.  
 First, this reasoning assumes that anyone who 
goes into a strip club will automatically lose his wits 
and self-control, get drunk, get into fights, do drugs, 
and solicit a prostitute (at best) or commit rape (at 
worst).  Although I am not a fan of strip clubs myself, 
I have gone to strip clubs several times in my young-
er days.  At no time thereafter did I feel the need to 
commit any crime as the involuntary after-effect of 
going into a strip club.  If anything, I was just plain 
bored.  I have to believe that common sense would 
suggest that most people do not cave in to some irre-
sistible primal impulse to engage in criminality 
and/or debauchery after seeing a live nude perfor-
mance. In my view, this argument is very weak, at 
best. 
 The next logical flaw in the Court’s justifica-
tion was that the City of Erie wanted to place limita-
tions on live nude entertainment in response to an 
increase in such establishments. 
 
In the preamble to the ordinance, the city 
council stated that it was adopting the reg-
ulation for the purpose of limiting a recent 
increase in nude live entertainment within 
the City, which activity adversely impacts 
and threatens to impact on the public 
health, safety and welfare by providing an 
atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual 
harassment, public intoxication, prostitu-
                                                             
64 City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 297 (2000). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
New York’s Taxable Lap Dancing 
27 
tion, the spread of sexually transmitted dis-
eases and other deleterious effects.65 
 
Taking this argument at face value, this seems to 
suggest that if nude entertainment were available at 
a private office party in an upscale neighborhood (as 
opposed to the seedy areas where strip clubs pre-
sumably operate), the perceived incidences of vio-
lence, prostitution, drunkenness and the like would 
be at a much lower rate. This does not make any log-
ical sense to me.  Prostitution, for example, is defined 
as “the act or practice of engaging in sexual in-
tercourse for money.”66  Where is it written in stone 
that nude dance clubs are automatic training 
grounds for prostitutes?  Yes, it is true that some 
strippers are also prostitutes.67  There are some who 
will trade sex for drugs.68  There are some who work 
at high-end “escort” services who serve wealthy, in-
fluential clients (former New York Governor Eliot 
Spitzer, for example).69  The point here is that these 
                                                             
65 Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 290. 
66 Prostitution, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/prostitution  (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2014). 
67 See, e.g., Daily Mail Reporter, Former Prostitute and 
Stripper BACK in the Classroom (But This Time She’s Only 
Teaching Adults), MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2013, 8:20 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2187698/Melissa-Petro-
Former-prostitute-stripper-BACK-classroom-time-shes-
teaching-adults.html. 
68 See, e.g., Jan Skutch, Savannah Doctor Accused of Trading 
Drugs for Sex with Strippers, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Jan. 31, 2013, 
7:59PM), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/crime-courts/2013-
01-31/savannah-doctor-accused-trading-drugs-sex-strippers. 
69 Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, Spitzer is Linked to 
Prostitution Ring, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/nyregion/10cnd-
spitzer.html. 
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bad acts can happen anywhere, and I would not be so 
quick to assume that nude entertainment automati-
cally leads to the dark side of the human condition. 
 The third logical flaw in the Court’s secondary 
effects rationale exposes the weakest point of them 
all: the idea of requiring female dancers to wear past-
ies and a G-string would miraculously eliminate the 
secondary effects (which would include raising the 
neighborhood property values; the Court never both-
ered to try to explain how that could be possible).  
Perhaps that idea might be plausible if the pasties 
had barbed wire in front and back, and the G-string 
was actually a cast iron chastity belt.  This logic (or 
lack thereof) further assumes that if I for example 
wanted to meet a prostitute for the weekend and 
smoke crack with her after having sex, I would lose 
that desire the very second I saw a female dancer 
wearing pasties and a G-string.  No matter how 
strong my “cravings” might be, they would automati-
cally disintegrate as soon as I saw covered-up body 
parts.  This idea is just laughable; if I wanted it bad 
enough, I can certainly find it.  Needless to say, (but 
I will) I think the absolute stupidity of the Court’s 
reasoning speaks for itself here, and I can certainly 
understand the original premise70 regarding the fear 
of the nude female body that can result in some court 
decisions (such as this one) that are just asinine! 
 
Aside from the potential implications of 
Pap’s A.M., the fact remains that applying 
the secondary effects doctrine in the context 
of nude dancing to justify public nudity 
laws like the Erie ordinance simply fails to 
pass the laugh test. Compliance typically 
requires nothing but pasties and a G-string. 
                                                             
70 Adler, supra note 61, at 1109.  
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How much of an effect can this possibly 
have on the harmful secondary effects that 
cities like Erie assert? Will the mere mask-
ing of a nipple with a dime-sized circle of la-
tex magically send prostitutes elsewhere, 
eliminate assaults, reduce AIDS, and re-
store property values? The premise is ludi-
crous. Justice O’Connor attempts to re-
spond to this obvious flaw in her secondary 
effects analysis by arguing that cities 
should have latitude to ‘experiment’ with 
solutions to such serious problems. Some 
experiments, however, are more justified 
than others. Perhaps Justice O’Connor 
should have applied the same ‘common 
sense’ that she so approved of when discuss-
ing a municipality’s burden in showing sec-
ondary effects.71 
 
CONCLUSION 
 As ridiculous as it sounds, consider the follow-
ing: In New York City, the sales tax rate (as of this 
writing) is 8.875 per cent.72  Now that the New York 
Court of Appeals has ruled in favor of the Depart-
ment of Taxation and Finance, this now means that 
the next time someone goes into a strip club and 
wants to give a ten dollar tip to an exotic dancer, it 
will not be enough; he will have to give a tip of ten 
dollars and eighty nine cents.  If we carry this sce-
nario to its logical conclusion, the dancer could con-
ceivably wedge the ten-dollar bill into her G-String. 
But then, where does she put the other eighty-nine 
                                                             
71 Case, supra note 57, at 1211.  
72 NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF TAX & FIN., ST-810, QUARTERLY 
SALES AND USE TAX RETURN FOR PART-QUARTERLY (MONTHLY) 
FILERS 3 (2013), 
http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/st/st810.pdf.  
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cents?  Might she need to have a change purse or 
coin sorter somehow attached to her costume?  In 
addition, this could raise the possibility that she may 
claim the coin sorter as an itemized deduction on her 
federal tax return for work related clothing.73 
 On July 5, 2013, Nite Moves filed a petition 
with the United States Supreme Court to review the 
Court of Appeals’ decision.74  My prognostication at 
the time was that the currently conservative Court 
would most likely hide behind its secondary effects 
illogic and uphold the New York tax. Unfortunately, 
things did not make it that far.  On October 17, 2013, 
the United States Supreme Court denied Nite Moves’ 
petition for certiorari.75  Now that this is the final 
disposition of the issue, I have a suggestion where 
Nite Moves could provide nude entertainment and 
still qualify for the sales tax exemption. 
My suggestion is this: Nite Moves could give 
nude performances of Shakespeare plays (Macbeth, 
Hamlet, King Lear, Taming of the Shrew, etc.  They 
could even throw in a nude interpretation of Ocean’s 
Eleven.76).  The hook would still be live nude enter-
tainment, and I think such a performance would be 
well within both the spirit (and more important) the 
letter of the law.  I doubt that anyone from the Divi-
sion could convincingly (let alone coherently) argue 
that Shakespeare is not art.  As the old adage sug-
gests, “where there’s a will, there’s a way.”  Thus, as 
                                                             
73 I.R.C. § 162 (2012). 
74 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals 
Tribunal, 979 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 
2013 WL 3458158 (U.S. Jul. 5, 2013) (No. 13-38). 
75 677 New Loudon Corp. v. State of New York Tax Appeals 
Tribunal, 979 N.E.2d 1121 (N.Y. 2012), petition denied, 134 
S.Ct. 422 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 13-38).  
76 OCEAN’S ELEVEN (Warner Brothers, 1960). 
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long as such a performance is planned and done right 
within the rules of New York State tax law, not even 
a G-string could get in the way. 
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Abstract 
 This Article examines the preliminary injunc-
tion standard in pharmaceutical patent infringement 
actions pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Prior to 
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C. in 2006, federal courts applied a presumption 
of irreparable harm when a patent holder established 
a likelihood of success on the merits. While the eBay 
Court abrogated the presumption of irreparable 
harm in permanent injunctions, courts have been 
unclear as to application of eBay on preliminary in-
junctions. This Article will further examine prelimi-
nary injunctions in Hatch-Waxman actions in the 
District of New Jersey since eBay in 2006 and argue 
that courts still tacitly apply the irreparable harm 
presumption. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In 2010, sales of prescription drugs in the 
United States totaled over $300 billion.1  In the same 
year, sales of generic drugs were valued at $78 bil-
lion.2  Six of the world’s ten largest pharmaceutical 
companies are based in the United States.3  Approxi-
mately eighty percent of the world’s research in bio-
technology and pharmaceuticals are conducted by 
                                                             
1 Brittany Hart, Pharmaceutical Sales Top $300 Billion in 
2010, DAYTON BUS. J. (Apr. 19, 2011, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/news/2011/04/19/pharmaceu
tical-sales-top-300-billion.html.  
2 The Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States, 
SELECTUSA, http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-
snapshots/pharmaceutical-industry-united-states (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2014). 
3 Pharmaceutical Industry, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/index.html (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
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American pharmaceutical companies.4  In other 
words, the drug business is big business in America. 
 The pharmaceutical industry can be roughly 
divided into two categories; brand name manufactur-
ers, also called “innovator companies,” and generic 
manufacturers.5  Generic drugs are bioequivalent6 
versions of brand name medication and present sig-
nificant savings to consumers.7  The development 
cost of a generic drug is much lower in comparison to 
that of a brand name drug.8  The process of research 
and clinical trials for a new drug usually takes ten to 
fifteen years and can cost an innovator company up-
wards of $800 million.9  Brand name medications are 
protected by patents and the process in which ge-
neric drugs enter the market is governed by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.10 
 The Hatch-Waxman Act was passed with the 
                                                             
4 The Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States, supra 
note 2. 
5 See Greater Access to Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm14354
5.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
6 Christopher J. Kochevar, Note, Reforming Judicial Review 
of Bioequivalence Determinations, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2040, 2042 
(2012) (“‘[B]ioequivalence’ [is] an approximation of identity 
between a generic drug and an approved innovator product.”). 
7 Greater Access to Generic Drugs, supra note 5. (“[T]he 
average price for a prescription for a brand-name drug is 
$84.20, while the average price for a generic drug prescription 
is $30.56.”). 
8 Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and 
Sustainability: How to Achieve the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-
Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SC. & 
TECH. 441, 447 (2008). 
9 Id. at 482. 
10 Greater Access to Generic Drugs, supra note 5. 
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intention to give innovator companies additional in-
centives to develop new drugs while giving the 
American consumer savings by expanding the ge-
nerics market.11  Since the enactment of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, the market share held by generic drugs 
has increased from under twenty percent in 1984 to 
nearly eighty percent in 2010.12 
 This Article will discuss the preliminary in-
junction factors as applied when an innovator com-
pany seeks to enjoin a generic maker from releasing 
a competing product during the course of litigation 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Specifically, this Ar-
ticle will argue that the presumption of irreparable 
harm, which was abrogated by the Supreme Court in 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., still exists even if 
the presumption is not explicitly applied.  Part I will 
briefly discuss Federal jurisdiction in patent matters.  
Part II will discuss the four preliminary injunction 
factors and its development in patent law, including 
eBay and its subsequent line of cases.  Part III will 
explain the historical context which led to the pas-
sage of the Hatch-Waxman Act and discuss in detail 
the process by which a generic drug is approved for 
market.  Part IV will be a survey of pharmaceutical 
patent cases before the District of New Jersey since 
the eBay decision in 2006.  This Article will conclude 
by arguing that the presumption of harm still ex-
ists,13 how a tacit application of the presumption is 
permissible under current law, and propose that 
                                                             
11 See infra Part III.B. 
12 Liu, supra note 8, at 456; Karen von Koeckritz, Generic 
Drug Trends –What’s Next?, PHARMACY TIMES (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/issue/2012/April20
12/Generic-Drug-Trends-Whats-Next-. 
13 This Article will only discuss the presumption of harm as it 
exists within the District of New Jersey. 
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Congress amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to allow for 
the presumption of harm in preliminary injunction 
determinations. 
 
I.  FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN PATENT MATTERS 
 Federal courts have original and exclusive ju-
risdiction in all matters “arising under any Act of 
Congress relating patents, . . . copyrights and trade-
marks.”14  Patents have been within the ambit of 
Federal jurisdiction since the earliest days of the 
Republic.15  In 1982, Congress created the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as 
one of the provisions of the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act.16  The legislation gave the Federal Circuit 
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the district 
courts in patent cases.17  As a result, the new Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction in patent matters was much 
broader than that of one of the courts it replaced, the 
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(CCPA).18  Previously, the CCPA only had jurisdic-
                                                             
14 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). 
15 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8;  see also 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02(1)(a)(i) (2013) (“Section 17 of the 
Patent Act of 1836 conferred jurisdiction without regard to 
amount over ‘all actions, suits, controversies, and cases arising 
under any law of the United States, granting or confirming to 
inventors the exclusive right to their inventions or 
discoveries.’”). 
16 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
17 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012); see also Joseph R. Re, Brief 
Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit Under § 1295(a)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 651, 654 
(2001). 
18 AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 6-7 (2002), available at 
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tion over appeals from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.19  Prior to the creation of the Fed-
eral Circuit, patent suits filed in the district courts 
were appealed to the regional circuit courts.20  Cur-
rently, circuit splits do not exist in patent law be-
cause all patent appeals are reviewed by the Federal 
Circuit.21 
 
II.  THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD: 
PAST AND PRESENT 
 Congress has given courts power to “grant in-
junctions in accordance to the principles of equity” in 
patent cases.22  Courts use the traditional four equi-
table factors to determine whether a preliminary in-
junction is proper.23 
 The first factor, likelihood of success on the 
merits, undergoes a two-step analysis in patent in-
                                                                                                                             
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2951F5BA-25A3-457D-
B4B2CA99691EE6F1_Publication.pdf. 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 630 
F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980). 
21 Cf. Erin V. Klewin, Note, Reconciling Federal Circuit 
Choice of Law with eBay v. MercExchange’s Abrogation of the 
Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Copyright Preliminary 
Injunctions, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2118-23 (2012) (noting 
that in copyright matters, also affected by the holding in eBay, 
the Federal Circuit only has jurisdiction in pendant matters 
and applies regional circuit law in those cases). 
22 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
23 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 
1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, 
Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (“(1) a reasonable 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if an 
injunction is not granted; (3) a balance of hardships tipping in 
its favor; and (4) the injunction’s favorable impact on the public 
interest.”). 
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fringement cases.24  The plaintiff must establish that 
the defendant has infringed on the patent.25  First, 
the court determines the scope of the patent claims.26  
Then, the allegedly infringing product is compared to 
see if it lies within the scope of the patent.27  Under 
the doctrine of equivalents, a product may still be in-
fringing if it performs in the same manner to achieve 
the same results as the original invention.28 
Further, the plaintiff must also establish that 
the patent can withstand the defendant’s claim of in-
validity.29  Typically, defendants allege that the pa-
tented product is obvious, meaning the patent is in-
valid under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).30  Courts employ a 
four factor analysis in determining obviousness.31  
The courts have also acknowledged that new inven-
                                                             
24 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Arch. Resources, Inc., 
279 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Amazon.com, 239 
F.3d at 1351). 
25 Id. 
26 Aventis Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 411 F.Supp.2d 490, 
494 (D.N.J. 2006) (quoting Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1351). 
27 Id. 
28 Syntex Pharm. Int’l, Ltd. v. K-Line Pharm., Ltd., 721 
F.Supp. 653, 660-61 (D.N.J. 1989) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. 
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)). 
29 See Tate, 279 F.3d at 1365 (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott 
Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451). 
30 Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 532 
F.Supp.2d 666, 674 (D.N.J. 2007) aff’g, 566 F.3d 399 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012). 
31 Id. (citing PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 
491 F.3d 1342, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (“Factual determinations 
that are relevant to the obviousness inquiry are: (1) the scope 
and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary 
skill in the art; and (4) secondary considerations or objective 
indicia of non-obviousness.”). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
Reports of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated 
41 
tions are often built upon prior innovations.32  The 
Supreme Court has, on occasion, upheld patents com-
prised of knowledge of prior patents when the new 
patent aimed to solve a problem previously not ap-
parent.33 
The second factor, irreparable harm, also 
called irreparable injury, is defined as “[a]n injury 
that cannot be adequately measured or compensated 
by money.”34  In other words, an injury is irreparable 
if money damages at the conclusion of a trial are in-
sufficient to make the plaintiff whole.35  Professor 
Donald Chisum notes that courts have been incon-
sistent in irreparable harm determinations and “tend 
to find irreparable injury when the plaintiff makes a 
strong case of validity and infringement and to find 
no such injury when plaintiff makes only a weak 
case.”36  This inconsistency will be discussed in depth 
further in this Article.37 
The balance of hardships generally weighs in 
favor of the innovator company in Hatch-Waxman 
litigation.  When a generic is released, the innovator 
company suffers harm through price erosion and loss 
of market share.38  Courts have been reluctant to 
weigh the factor in favor of defendants since any loss 
suffered by a generic maker incurred during the du-
ration of the suit would simply be sales “time-
                                                             
32 Id. (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-
20 (2007)). 
33 Id. (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 419). 
34 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009). 
35 7 CHISUM, supra note 15, at § 20.04(1)(e). 
36 Id. 
37 See infra Part IV. 
38 See infra text accompanying notes 153-54. 
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shifted” into the future.39  Thus, the balance of hard-
ships rarely weigh in favor of the generic maker.40 
Likewise, in Hatch-Waxman litigation, the 
public interest will generally weigh in favor of the 
plaintiff.41  Innovator companies often advance the 
argument that the public interest is served when the 
patent rights are enforced to exclude generic makers 
during the patent’s term of exclusivity.42  Further, 
they also argue that profits generated during the ex-
clusivity period fund research benefiting newer 
medications.43  Generic makers will often argue that 
the public interest is best served when the public has 
access to lower cost medication.44  However, the Fed-
eral Circuit has been clear that the enforcement of 
patent rights outweighs the public’s access to more 
affordable medication.45 
                                                             
39 Albany Molecular Research, Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc., 
No. 09-4638 (GEB-MCA), 2010 WL 2516465, at *11 (D.N.J. 
June 14, 2010). 
40 King Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 08-5973 (GEB-DEA), 
2010 WL 1957640, at *1, 6 (D.N.J. May 17, 2010) (explaining 
that when a prior TRO enjoining the defendant from releasing a 
generic was dissolved when the plaintiff’s authorized generic 
maker released their version early, the court weighed the 
balance of the hardships in favor neutrally because the 
defendant’s exclusivity period as the first generic maker under 
the Hatch-Waxman Act had been encroached upon, and denied 
the preliminary injunction). 
41 See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 
1364, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The Hatch-Waxman Act does not 
“encourage or excuse the infringement of infringing valid 
pharmaceutical patents.”).  
42 Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (Novartis 
I), No. 05-CV-1887 (DMC), 2007 WL 2669338, at *15 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 6, 2007). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1382 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok 
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A.  The Presumption of Irreparable 
Harm Prior to eBay 
Soon after its establishment, the Federal Cir-
cuit held that a plaintiff is entitled to a presumption 
of irreparable harm when it establishes a likelihood 
success on the merits.46  The court further elaborated 
in a subsequent case that the presumption is derived 
“in part from the finite term of the patent grant, for 
patent expiration is not suspended during litiga-
tion.”47  The value of the patent is based on exclusiv-
ity and monetary damages are insufficient to make 
up for lost exclusivity.48 
However, the Federal Circuit also held that 
presumption of irreparable harm was a rebuttable 
presumption.49  The Reebok case illustrates an in-
stance when the presumption of irreparable harm 
was rebutted through evidence.50  In November 1992, 
Reebok began manufacturing and selling the SHAQ I 
shoe and heavily promoted the shoe with basketball 
great Shaquille O’Neal.51  Over a year later in De-
cember 1993, a patent was issued protecting the de-
sign of the shoe.52  As soon as the patent was issued, 
Reebok served a complaint on J. Baker alleging that 
their Olympian shoe infringed on the design of the 
                                                                                                                             
Int’l, Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (“Selling a lower 
priced product does not justify infringing a patent.”). 
46 7 CHISUM, supra note 15, at § 20.04(1)(c)(iii)(e)(i) (citing 
Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Corp., 718, F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 
1983)). 
47 Id. (quoting H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 
820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. (quoting Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 
679, 681 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
50 Reebok Int’l v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
51 Id. at 1554. 
52 Id. 
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SHAQ I.53  J. Baker had been manufacturing and 
selling the Olympian shoe since July 1993.54 
The district court denied Reebok’s motion to 
enjoin J. Baker from selling their remaining inven-
tory of the Olympians.55  The Federal Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s decision because J. Baker 
presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presump-
tion that Reebok would suffer irreparable harm.56  J. 
Baker had established that Reebok had discontinued 
the SHAQ I in favor a newer shoe, the SHAQ II.57  
The court reasoned that future purchasers of the 
Olympians “would not likely confuse that shoe” with 
the SHAQ I because Reebok had ceased all manufac-
ture and promotion of the shoe.58  Because J. Baker 
only had a limited supply of the Olympians, any 
harm Reebok would have suffered could be suffi-
ciently compensated by money damages.59  Thus, J. 
Baker was successful in rebutting Reebok’s presump-
tion of harm and the district court properly denied a 
preliminary injunction to Reebok.60  However, Ree-
bok is the exception rather than the rule; plaintiffs 
who establish a likelihood of success on the merits 
often succeed in enjoining the infringing party.61 
 
B. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
 It is commonly understood that the holding in 
                                                             
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 1558. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1559. 
61 See supra text accompanying note 36; see also discussion 
infra Part IV. 
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eBay eliminated the presumption of irreparable 
harm in preliminary injunction determinations.62  
However, the issue before the Supreme Court in 
eBay was a permanent injunction and neither pre-
liminary injunctions nor the presumption of irrepa-
rable harm were explicitly mentioned.63  
 MercExchange patented a process that “facili-
tate[d] the sale of goods between private individuals 
by establishing a central authority to promote trust 
among participants” in an online marketplace.64  
eBay and Half.com, its subsidiary, had been negotiat-
ing with MercExchange to purchase its technology 
but the talks broke down.65  After the cessation of the 
negotiations, MercExchange filed a patent infringe-
ment suit against eBay.66 
 A jury found at trial that MercExchange’s pa-
tent was valid, eBay had infringed on their patent, 
and awarded damages to the plaintiff.67  However, 
the district court denied permanent injunctive relief 
to MercExchange.68  The Federal Circuit reversed, 
citing to its general rule that courts will issue a per-
                                                             
62 See, e.g., Ortho McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 
03-4678 (SRC), 2009 WL 2182665, at *9 (D.N.J. July 22, 2009) 
(“[T]he Court is of the view that the presumption of irreparable 
harm did not survive the Supreme Court’s decision in [eB]ay.”) 
(citation omitted); Klewin, supra note 21, at 2129-30. 
63 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 
(2006). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.; Miranda Jones, Note, Permanent Injunction, a Remedy 
by Any Other Name is Patently Not the Same: How eBay v. 
MercExchange Affects the Patent Right of Non-Practicing 
Entites, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1035, 1054-55 (2007) 
(explaining the dispute arose from MercExchange alleging that 
eBay’s “Buy it Now” feature infringed their patents). 
67 eBay, 547 U.S. at 390-91. 
68 Id. 
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manent injunction “once infringement and validity 
have been adjudged.”69 
 Justice Thomas enunciated that courts should 
not depart from traditional notions of equity without 
legislative authorization.70  Justice Thomas further 
cited to specific language in 35 U.S.C. § 283 revealing 
the legislative intent not to stray from equitable 
principles.71  Having rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
general rule favoring permanent injunctions, the 
case was remanded for proceedings consistent with 
the traditional four part analysis for injunctive re-
lief.72  When the matter was remanded to the lower 
courts eBay refused to settle.73  By 2008, eBay had 
purchased the patent and related technologies from 
MercExchange.74 
 
C.  Confusion and Clarity After eBay 
 The Supreme Court was not clear as to wheth-
er its holding in eBay applied to the irreparable harm 
presumption in preliminary injunctions.75  The Fed-
eral Circuit did not bring clarity when it sidestepped 
                                                             
69 Id. at 393-94 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 
401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
70 Id. at 391-92. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 394. 
73 Ina Steiner, eBay v MercExchange Patent War: It’s Over, 
ECOMMERCEBYTES.COM (Feb. 28, 2008), 
http://www.ecommercebytes.com/cab/abn/y08/m02/i28/s00. 
74 Id. 
75 eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (“We hold only that the decision 
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the 
equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such 
discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional 
principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other 
cases governed by such standards.”). 
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the irreparable harm presumption in one of its first 
patent decisions post-eBay.76  In Abbott, the court va-
cated a preliminary injunction and reversed the dis-
trict court’s irreparable harm determination.77  The 
court reasoned that Abbott was not entitled to a find-
ing of irreparable harm on the basis that Abbott 
failed to establish the first factor.78  While acknowl-
edging the holding of eBay, the Federal Circuit was 
not clear as to the survival of the irreparable harm 
presumption.79  Without offering additional reasons 
as to why Abbott was denied a finding of irreparable 
harm, the Federal Circuit did not fully decouple the 
first two preliminary injunction factors.80  
 The Federal Circuit sidestepped the presump-
tion of harm issue for a second time in Sanofi-
Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.81  Apotex argued that the 
trial court erred in applying the presumption of ir-
reparable harm contrary to the holding in eBay.82  
The Federal Circuit reasoned that Sanofi had estab-
lished irreparable harm and declined to rule on the 
                                                             
76 See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006). 
77 Id. at 1347-48. 
78 Id. at 1347. 
79 Id. (“[W]e conclude that Abbott has not established a 
likelihood of success on the merits. As a result, Abbott is no 
longer entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm.”) 
(emphasis added). 
80 See id. 
81 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
82 Id. at 1383, n.9 (“Apotex contends that applying such a 
presumption is in direct contravention of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.  Because we 
conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding 
that Sanofi established several kinds of irreparable harm, 
including irreversible price erosion, we need not address this 
contention.”) (citations omitted). 
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presumption.83  In 2008, Federal Circuit declined to 
rule on presumption of harm for the third time in 
Amado v. Microsoft Corporation stating it was un-
necessary for the court to make a definitive ruling on 
the issue.84 
 The lack of a clear ruling from the Federal Cir-
cuit led to confusion among the district courts.85  
Some courts continued to apply the presumption of 
harm noting that eBay only applied to permanent in-
junctions.86  Others ruled that eBay had eliminated 
the presumption.87  There is even an instance where 
a court ruled that eBay had eliminated the presump-
tion but declined to apply the presumption only be-
cause the plaintiff failed to establish success on the 
merits.88 
In 2011, the Federal Circuit finally announced 
                                                             
83 Id. 
84 Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.1 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (“We find it unnecessary to reach this argument, 
however, because regardless of whether there remains a 
rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm following eBay, the 
district court was within its discretion to find an absence of 
irreparable harm based on the evidence presented at trial.”) 
(emphasis added). 
85 See, e.g., Everett Labs., Inc. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 
573 F.Supp.2d 855, 866 (D.N.J. 2008) (“In the wake of [the 
eBay] decision, the Federal Circuit has neither overruled its 
cases applying the presumption of irreparable harm nor offered 
an explicit directive on whether (1) to apply the presumption on 
a motion for a preliminary injunction or (2) the presumption 
exists at all.”). 
86 See, e.g., Abbott Labs.v. Andrx Pharm., Inc. 452 F.3d 1331, 
1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
87 See, e.g., Ortho McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 
03-4678 (SRC), 2009 WL 2182665, at *9 (D.N.J. July 22, 2009). 
88 Klewin, supra note 21, at 2136 (citing Wireless TV Studios, 
Inc. v. Digital Dispatch Systems, Inc., No. 07 CV 5103, 2008 WL 
2474626, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008)). 
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that “eBay jettisoned the presumption of irreparable 
harm as it applies to determining the appropriate-
ness of [preliminary] injunctive relief.”89  However, in 
the absence of the presumption, courts can still reach 
similar results by examining the patent holder’s 
right to exclude.90  In “traditional” cases of patent in-
fringement where both the patentee and infringer 
are manufacturing or using the technology courts are 
more likely to find irreparable harm.91  This is in 
contrast to “non-traditional” cases like eBay where 
the patentee had not made a commercial use of the 
patent.92 
 
III.  THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT ACTIONS 
 The Hatch-Waxman Act93 was enacted to 
achieve two competing goals: protecting pharmaceu-
tical patent rights and encouraging competition from 
generic pharmaceutical makers.94  This Part will de-
scribe historical background the Act, the provisions 
of the Act, and the process outlined in the Act for the 
approval of generic pharmaceuticals. 
 
 
 
                                                             
89 Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 1150-51.  
92 Id. at 1150 (citing eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388, 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
93 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). 
94 Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The 
Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 590 (2003). 
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A. Pharmaceutical Approvals Prior to the 
Hatch-Waxman Act 
 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was 
empowered by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA) in 1938 to keep unsafe drugs from the 
market by reviewing all new drugs prior to market 
entry.95  Under this Act, before a new drug was per-
mitted to enter the market the manufacturer was re-
quired to submit a new drug application (NDA).96  
The NDA contained scientific studies attesting to the 
drug’s safety.97 
 The FDA maintained a policy that kept any 
unpublished information submitted with an NDA as 
confidential.98  It reasoned that if competitors had 
access to the information contained in the NDA, they 
could use the information as a shortcut in their own 
NDA submittals.99  The FDA further reasoned that 
competing companies making identical or similar 
drugs would be less likely to invest in testing and 
safety practices if they could demonstrate the safety 
of their own products through the research of an-
other drug maker.100  The policies promulgated by 
the FDA at the time presented a barrier to generic 
makers.101 
In 1962, the FDCA was amended to require 
drug makers to establish the effectiveness of their 
drugs in the NDA process in addition to the prior re-
                                                             
95 Id. at 587; see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99f). 
96 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 587. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 See id. 
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quirements.102  Over time, drug makers were often 
required to run at least two clinical trials in order to 
“demonstrat[e] statistically significant benefits for 
consumers.”103  Drug makers were often required to 
file for a patent before clinical trials.104  The new re-
quirements burdened the drug makers with lengthy 
studies and trials which eroded the exclusivity peri-
ods of their patents.105  
In 1970, the FDA created the Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA), an approval process 
for generic drugs.106  However, there were relatively 
few generic drugs on the market because the ANDA 
process primarily applied to generic versions of drugs 
approved prior to 1962.107  Despite streamlining the 
ANDA process even further in 1980, there was very 
little generic competition in the market.108 
There was great concern over the rise of pre-
scription drug prices in the early 1980s.109  Drug 
makers, without competition from generic makers, 
were able to charge high prices to recoup the im-
mense cost of the FDA application process in the 
short period of effective exclusivity.110  The need to 
                                                             
102 Id. at 588. 
103 Id. 
104 Pamela J. Clements, The Hatch-Waxman Act and the 
Conflict Between Antitrust Law & Patent Law, 48 IDEA 381, 
386 (2008). 
105 Id. (noting that in some instances, drug makers lost “up to 
ten years” of exclusivity). 
106 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 589. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 590. 
109 Id. 
110 See B. Scott Eidson, Note, How Safe is the Harbor? 
Considering the Economic Implications of Patent Infringement 
in Section 271(e)(1) Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1169, 1172 
(2004). 
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reduce drug prices through competition while in-
creasing incentives for innovation set the stage for 
the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
 
B.  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
The Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted with the 
intention “to balance two conflicting policy objectives: 
to induce name brand pharmaceutical firms to make 
the investments necessary to research and develop 
new drug products, while simultaneously enabling 
competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those 
drugs to market.”111 
First, Congress incentivized innovator compa-
nies by creating a process that could extend patent 
exclusivity by up to five years.112  Secondly, a generic 
drug could gain approval before the patent’s expira-
tion, enabling a generic maker to release the product 
to market at the moment of expiration.113  Further, 
the Act enabled a generic maker to challenge the pa-
tent’s validity, presenting an opportunity for generic 
drugs to reach the market even sooner.114  The Act 
established a new ANDA process that also enabled 
generic makers to market versions of drugs approved 
after 1962.115 
The Act also gave additional incentives for ge-
neric makers by granting a 180 day period of mar-
keting exclusivity for the first generic maker that 
                                                             
111 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 
991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting on other 
grounds)). 
112 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 590-91. 
113 Clements, supra note 104, at 388. 
114 Id. 
115 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 593. 
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successfully challenges a patent.116  However, the ex-
clusivity to a first filer can create a bottleneck for ge-
nerics; the FDA will not approve any subsequent 
ANDAs pending the approval of the first ANDA, even 
in the absence of litigation.117 
 
C. The ANDA Process Under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the patents of 
all drugs approved through the NDA are recorded in 
their publication, Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, more com-
monly known as the “Orange Book.”118  Innovator 
companies enjoy a period of “data exclusivity” for five 
years in which a generic maker may not submit an 
ANDA.119  After the data exclusivity period expires, 
generic drugs are approved provided that the generic 
is the “same and bioequivalent” to an approved pa-
tented drug.120  Applications must contain the follow-
ing: 
 
(1) a full list of articles used as components  
 of the drug, 
(2) a full statement of the composition of 
the drug, 
(3) a full description of the methods used in, 
and the facilities and controls used for 
the manufacture, processing and pack-
ing of the drug, 
(4) samples of the drug and components as 
required by the FDA, and 
                                                             
116 Id. at 603. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 595. 
119 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2012). 
120 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(iii), (j)(5)(F)(iii) (2012).  
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(5) sample labeling.121 
 
Generic makers must also file one of the following 
certifications along with their ANDA:  
 
(I) that there are no patents listed in the 
Orange Book for the drug (a “Para-
graph I” certification); 
(II) that the relevant patents have expired 
(a “Paragraph II” certification); 
(III) that the generic manufacturer will not 
seek approval of the ANDA until after 
the expiration of the relevant patent 
(a “Paragraph III” certification); or  
(IV) that such a patent is invalid or will 
not be infringed by the manufacture, 
use, or sale of the new generic drug for 
which the ANDA is submitted (a “Par-
agraph IV” certification).122  
 
 Generally, the first three certifications do not 
result in patent infringement litigation; the relevant 
patents have either expired or the generic maker will 
not release their product until after the patent’s ex-
piration.123  However, a Paragraph IV certification 
can be the opening salvo in litigation because the 
certification puts an innovator company on notice 
that their patent is being challenged.124  Further, 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) provides that conduct pursuant to 
an ANDA submittal with the purpose of challenging 
                                                             
121 Weisswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 595 (quoting 21 
U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(B)-(F) (2012)) (internal quotations omitted).  
122 Id. at 600 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012)). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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a patent is considered infringement.125 
 The patent holder has forty five days to file 
suit after being served notice that a Paragraph IV 
certification has been filed.126  If the patent holder 
does not file suit within the forty five day period the 
ANDA may be approved and the patent holder for-
feits their rights to a stay of FDA approval for the 
generic.127  If the suit is filed within the forty five day 
period, the FDA must stay the approval of the ANDA 
for thirty months.128  The stay may be cut short by 
the patent’s expiration, the patent’s invalidation by a 
court ruling, or a finding that the patent was not in-
fringed.129  The ANDA is approved upon a finding 
that the patent is not valid or infringed.130 
 The FDA grants a thirty month stay only 
once.131  An applicant will not be granted an addi-
tional stay for any subsequent Paragraph IV certifi-
cations.132  After the expiration of the stay, the inno-
vator company may move for a preliminary in-
junction to enjoin the generic maker from releasing 
their product.133  
                                                             
125 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012); Clements, supra note 104, at 
389.  But see 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of 
infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the 
United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal 
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or 
veterinary biological products.”). 
126 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 94, at 600. 
127 Id. at 601. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 602. 
132 Id. at 603. 
133 See id. at 601-03 
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In the absence of a preliminary injunction, ge-
neric makers may attempt to release their product in 
an “at-risk launch.”134  In such launches, the generic 
maker can be liable for a significant amount of dam-
ages if the generic maker is later ruled to have in-
fringed the patent.135  The threat of a large damage 
award, which can exceed the expected revenues of a 
generic drug, had kept at-risk launches at bay.136  
However, starting in 2007 generic makers have been 
more aggressive in releasing product before the con-
clusion of litigation.137  Commentators have stressed 
the importance of preliminary injunctions by noting 
that preliminary injunctions have only been granted 
in two instances following an at-risk launch.138 
 
IV.  SURVEY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES 
POST-EBAY IN THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
A Westlaw search reveals sixteen cases in the 
District of New Jersey since the eBay decision in 
2006 where an innovator company sought to enjoin a 
generic maker from an at-risk launch.139  Prelimi-
                                                             
134 Joseph M. O’Malley, Jr. et al., Failure to Launch, 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. MAGAZINE at 30, 30 (Apr. 2011), available 
at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1877.pdf.  
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 31. 
139 Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 496 Fed.App’x 46 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (denying preliminary injunction); Warner 
Chilcott Labs. Ir. Ltd. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 451 Fed.App’x 935 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (appealing from the District of New Jersey, 
holding that the trial court’s grant of preliminary injunction 
was an abuse of discretion); Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Cobalt 
Pharm. Inc., Nos. 07-4539(SRC)(MAS), 07-454(SRC)(MAS), 08-
4054(SRC)(MAS), 2010 WL 4687839 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2010) 
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nary injunctions were granted in seven instances.140  
Although the District of New Jersey has held in 2009 
that eBay had abrogated the presumption of irrepa-
rable harm, a finding of likelihood of success on the 
merits is still heavily linked to disposition of the sec-
                                                                                                                             
(granting preliminary injunction); Albany Molecular Research, 
Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., No. 09-4638(GEB-MCA), 2010 
WL 2516465 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (granting preliminary 
injunction); Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark 
Pharm. Inc., USA, No. 07-CV-5855(DMC), 2010 WL 2428561 
(D.N.J. June 9, 2010) (denying preliminary injunction); King 
Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 08-5974(GEB-DEA), 2010 WL 
1957640 (D.N.J. May 17, 2010); King Pharm., Inc. v. 
Corepharma, LLC., No. 10-1878(GEB-DEA), 2010 WL 1850200 
(D.N.J. May 7, 2010) (granting preliminary injunction); 
Graceway Pharm., LLC v. Perrigo Co., 697 F.Supp.2d 600 
(D.N.J. 2010) (denying preliminary injunction); Tyco Healthcare 
Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. Co., No. 07-1299(SRC), 2009 WL 
2422382 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2009) (denying preliminary injunction); 
Ortho McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 03-
4678(SRC), 2009 WL 2182665 (D.N.J. July 22, 2009) (granting 
preliminary injunction); AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 623 F. 
Supp.2d 579 (D.N.J. 2009), aff’d 633 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(granting preliminary injunction); Everett Labs., Inc. v. 
Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 573 F. Supp.2d 855 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 
2008) (granting preliminary injunction); Eisai Co., Ltd. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., Nos. 05-5727(HAA)(ES), 07-5489(HAA)(ES), 
2008 WL 1722098 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008) (granting preliminary 
injunction); Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 532 
F. Supp.2d 666 (D.N.J. 2007) (denying preliminary injunction); 
Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (Novartis I), 
No. 05-CV-1887(DMC), 2007 WL 2669338 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2007) 
(denying preliminary injunction); Novartis Corp. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc. (Novartis II), Nos. 04-4473(HAA)(ES), 06-
1130(HAA)(ES), 2007 WL 1695689 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007) 
(denying preliminary injunction). 
140 Cobalt Pharm., 2010 WL 4687839; Albany Molecular, 2010 
WL 2516465; King Pharm., 2010 WL 1850200; Ortho McNeil, 
2009 WL 2182665; AstraZeneca, 623 F. Supp 579; Everett Labs., 
573 F. Supp.2d 855; Eisai, 2008 WL 1722098. 
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ond injunction factor.141 
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., a re-
cent case before the District of New Jersey, illus-
trates how the first preliminary injunction factor can 
be dispositive.142  The drug at issue was Boniva, a 
treatment for osteoporosis.143  U.S. Patent 4,927,814 
(the “’814 patent”) was for one of the ingredients for 
Boniva, while the other two patents, U.S. Patents 
7,410,957 (the “’957 patent”) and 7,718,634 (the “’634 
patent”) were for the method of treatment.144  Hoff-
man-La Roche, referred to throughout the case as 
simply Roche, sought to enjoin generic makers from 
releasing their versions of Boniva after the ex-
piration of the ’814 patent in March 2012.145 
The defendants in Hoffman-La Roche mounted 
a vigorous challenge to the validity of the ’957 and 
’634 patents.146  The defendants cited to numerous 
studies, reports, and patents dating back to the late 
1990s trying to establish that the industry was re-
searching a weekly or monthly treatment for osteo-
porosis.147  The defendants argued that the ’957 and 
                                                             
141 See Ortho McNeil, 2009 WL 2182665, at *9-10 (D.N.J. July 
22, 2009). 
142 Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc., Nos. 07-
4417(SRC)(MAS), 08-3065(SRC)(MAS), 08-4053(SRC)(MAS), 
10-6241(SRC)(MAS), 07-4661(SRC)(MAS), 08-4052(SRC)(MAS), 
11-0579(SRC)(MAS), 07-4540(SRC)(MAS), 08-4054(SRC)(MAS), 
10-6206(SRC)(MAS), 2012 WL 869572 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2012). 
143 Id. at *1. 
144 U.S. Patent No. 4,927,814 (filed July 9, 1987); U.S. Patent 
No. 7,410,957 (filed May 6, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 7,718,634 
(filed June 16, 2008). 
145 Hoffman-La Roche v. Apotex, 2012 WL 869572, at *1. 
146 For the obviousness standard, see Altana Pharma AG v. 
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 532 F.Supp.2d 666, 674 (D.N.J. 2007) 
aff’g, 566 F.3d 399 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
147 Hoffman-La Roche v. Apotex, 2012 WL 869572, at *3-6. 
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’634 patents would have been obvious to a pharma-
ceutical researcher on account of the published stud-
ies.148  Moreover, Roche did not highlight “the inge-
nuity of the inventors,” which is unusual when de-
fending patent validity.149 
The court concluded that Roche did not estab-
lish a likelihood of success on the merits and denied 
the motion for preliminary injunction.150  However, 
the court declined to consider the other factors on ba-
sis of Roche failing to establish the first factor.151  
The court similarly considered only first factor in two 
other instances where the plaintiff’s application for 
preliminary injunction was denied.152 
While seeking a preliminary injunction, inno-
vator companies often argue that an entry of a ge-
neric competitor causes price erosion and loss of 
market share.153  This, in turn, causes job losses, re-
duction of research opportunities for newer drugs, 
and a loss of goodwill and brand equity.154  
The court in AstraZeneca v. Apotex, Inc., in 
concluding that AstraZeneca had shown sufficient 
evidence of irreparable harm, analyzed each of the 
plaintiff’s arguments in depth.155  First, the court 
concluded that the damages stemming from a loss of 
market share and price erosion are not irreparable 
                                                             
148 Id. at *6. 
149 Id. at *8. 
150 Id. at *8-9. 
151 Id. 
152 King Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 08-5974(GEB-DEA), 
2010 WL 1957640, at *6 (D.N.J. May 17, 2010); Tyco Healthcare 
Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. Co., No. 07-1299(SRC), 2009 WL 
2422382, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2009). 
153 AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 623 F. Supp.2d 579, 608 
(D.N.J. 2009). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 608-14. 
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because loss of sales and profits are generally calcu-
lable.156  Moreover, the resulting loss of research op-
portunity and funding is also calculable.157  
The court also found that Apotex’s at-risk 
launch could cause irreparable harm through per-
sonnel layoffs.158  The court agreed that layoffs, while 
commonplace in business, can cause a loss of morale 
and productivity that cannot be calculated.159  Fi-
nally, the court concluded an at-risk launch can 
cause market confusion.160  Moreover, AstraZeneca’s 
reputation could suffer if customers, after lowering 
prices to compete with Apotex, feel that the drug was 
originally priced “at an unfairly high level.”161  Loss 
of goodwill as an irreparable harm is a concept origi-
nally from trademark law that has been incorporated 
into patent law.162 
Despite a thorough analysis in AstraZeneca, 
there is little consistency within the District of New 
Jersey.  In some instances, the court has held that a 
loss of goodwill is too speculative to be an irreparable 
harm.163  In other instances, the court has held that 
                                                             
156 However, the court found that the loss of future sales could 
not be calculable due to a licensing agreement already in place 
between AstraZeneca and another generic maker who had 
promised not to release their generic until a later date.  Thus, 
in this instance, lost future sales and licensing revenue 
constituted an irreparable harm.  Id. at 608-11. 
157 Id. at 613. 
158 Id. at 612. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 613. 
161 Id. 
162 See Roy H. Wepner & Richard W. Ellis, The Federal 
Circuit’s Presumptively Erroneous Presumption of Irreparable 
Harm, 6 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 147, 163-65 (2004). 
163 Sanofi-Aventis, 2010 WL 2428561, at *17; Novartis I, 2007 
WL 2669338, at *15. 
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a potential loss of jobs is too speculative for irrepara-
ble harm at large companies, such as many of the in-
novator companies.164  
The varied case law on how courts have evalu-
ated irreparable harm in Hatch-Waxman actions val-
idates Professor Chisum’s observations on irrepa-
rable harm determinations.165  The following cases 
illustrate how the court usually finds irreparable 
harm where it also finds a likelihood success from 
the plaintiff. 
In Novartis v. Teva Pharmaceuticals (Novartis 
II). the court made a preliminary finding that 
Novartis was unlikely to establish that Teva’s ge-
neric version of Lotrel infringed on Novartis’ 
patents.166  The court also found that Novartis failed 
to establish Teva’s infringement under the doctrine 
of equivalents.167  
Novartis further argued that Teva’s at-risk 
launch of generic Lotrel would cause irreparable 
harm through “lost sales revenue, lost market share, 
irreversible price erosion, lost business and growth 
prospects, and lost research opportunities.”168  The 
court said that economic loss estimates set forth by 
Novartis seemed to go against their arguments for 
irreparable harm.169  Further, the court posited that 
any potential economic damages are calculable and 
thus could “be reparable by money damages.”170  
Thus, the irreparable harm determination in 
                                                             
164 See Novartis II, 2007 WL 1695689, at *28. 
165 See supra notes 35-36, 152, 156 and accompanying text. 
166 See Novartis II, 2007 WL 1695689, at *24. 
167 Id. at *25. 
168 Id. at *26 (internal quotations omitted). 
169 Id. at *27. 
170 Id. (citing Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 871 
(Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
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Novartis II is consistent with the definition in 
Chisum’s treatise.171 
However, the District of New Jersey found in a 
subsequent case that an innovator company could 
suffer irreparable harm while given similar economic 
arguments.  In Albany Molecular Research v. Dr. 
Reddy’s Laboratories, a preliminary injunction was 
sought to enjoin the defendant from an at-risk 
launch172 of generic fexofenadine.173  Unlike the 
Novartis court, the court in Albany Molecular found 
that the plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of 
success on the merits.174 
Like in Novartis II, the plaintiff argued that 
an at-risk launch would mean a loss of market share, 
permanent price erosion and loss of brand equity.175  
Although the court noted that most of the harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff would be monetary in nature 
and calculable, it held that a “loss of goodwill associ-
ated with the brand” is considered an irreparable 
harm.176  However, in a case decided just a few days 
before Albany Molecular, a different judge in District 
of New Jersey ruled that loss of goodwill was too 
speculative for irreparable harm in Hatch-Waxman 
litigation.177  In that case, the court declined to issue 
                                                             
171 See supra text accompanying note 35. 
172 Albany Molecular, 2010 WL 2516465, at *1. 
173 Fexofenadine is an allergy medication, notable brand 
names include Allegra. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, Fexofenadine, 
MEDLINEPLUS (last visited Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a697035.ht
ml.  
174 Albany Molecular, 2010 WL 2516465, at *9. 
175 Id. at *11. 
176 Id. 
177 Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. 
Inc., USA, No. 07-CV-5855(DMC), 2010 WL 2428561, at *17 
(D.N.J. June 9, 2010). 
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a preliminary injunction.178 
In all seven instances where a preliminary in-
junction was granted by the District of New Jersey, 
the court also found that the plaintiff had a likeli-
hood of success on the merits.179  Likewise, in those 
nine instances, the court also found that the plaintiff 
had also established irreparable harm.180  Con-
versely, when the court declines to grant a prelim-
inary injunction, it usually finds that the plaintiff 
failed to establish a likelihood of success on the mer-
its.181  Courts have refused to consider the remaining 
factors once the plaintiff fails to establish the first 
                                                             
178 Id. 
179 Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Cobalt Pharm. Inc., Nos. 07-
4539(SRC)(MAS), 07-454(SRC)(MAS), 08-4054(SRC)(MAS), 
2010 WL 4687839, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2010); King Pharm., 
Inc. v. Corepharma, LLC., No. 10-1878(GEB-DEA), 2010 WL 
1850200, at *5 (D.N.J. May 7, 2010); AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, 
Inc., 623 F. Supp.2d 579, 614 (D.N.J. 2009), aff’d 633 F.3d 1042 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Ortho McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 
No. 03-4678(SRC), 2009 WL 2182665, at *11 (D.N.J. July 22, 
2009); Everett Labs., Inc. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 573 F. 
Supp.2d 855, 871 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2008); Eisai Co., Ltd. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., Nos. 05-5727(HAA)(ES), 07-5489(HAA)(ES), 
2008 WL 1722098, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008); see also 
Warner Chilcott Labs. Ir. Ltd. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 451 
Fed.App’x 935, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (showing that although the 
Federal Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, the 
District of New Jersey analyzed all four factors in favor of the 
plaintiff). 
180 See id. 
181 Sanofi-Aventis, 2010 WL 2428561, at *17; Altana Pharma 
AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 532 F. Supp.2d 666, 684 (D.N.J. 
2007); Novartis II, 2007 WL 1695689, at *28; Novartis I, 2007 
WL 2669338, at *13; see also Graceway Pharm., LLC v. Perrigo 
Co., 697 F.Supp.2d 600, 610 (D.N.J. 2010) (due to the innovator 
company’s bad faith actions and the doctrine of laches the court 
would have granted the preliminary injunction, found a 
likelihood of success and irreparable harm). 
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factor in some instances.182  When the courts con-
sider all four factors, they have been consistent in 
determining a lack of irreparable harm when de-
clining injunctive relief. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The District of New Jersey has recognized that 
eBay had abrogated the presumption of irreparable 
harm in preliminary injunction determinations as 
early as 2008.183  However, it seems that the pre-
sumption is alive and well in Hatch-Waxman actions, 
in practice if not in name.184  It is clear that likeli-
hood of success on the merits influences the irrepa-
rable harm determination.185  It is hard to envision 
that the cases cited in Part IV would have been de-
cided differently if eBay did not abrogate the pre-
sumption of irreparable harm in patent cases. 
 
A.  The Irreparable Harm Presumption Is  
Not as Dead as the Bosch Court  
Would Lead You to Believe 
 Ironically, the case that is considered the 
death knell of the presumption of irreparable harm 
also gives courts sufficient latitude to apply the pre-
sumption tacitly.186  The patent at issue in Robert 
                                                             
182 Apotex, 2012 WL 869572, at *9; King Pharm., Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., No. 08-5974(GEB-DEA), 2010 WL 1957640, at *6 
(D.N.J. May 17, 2010); Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. 
Co., No. 07-1299(SRC), 2009 WL 2422382, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 
2009). 
183 Everett Labs., 573 F.Supp.2d at 866. 
184 See supra Part IV. 
185 See supra text accompanying notes 166. 
186 Jason Rantanen, Bosch v. Pylon: Jettisoning the 
Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Injunction Relief, 
PATENTLY-O (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/10/bosch-v-pylon-
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Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corporation was 
for windshield wiper blades.187  Bosch is part of a 
multinational conglomerate that manufactures and 
sells a wide variety of goods including automotive 
parts, industrial machinery, and consumer products, 
such as power tools.188  Pylon is company based in 
Florida that manufactures wiper blades under li-
cense from DuPont and Michelin.189  After obtaining 
a favorable judgment at the district court, Bosch un-
successfully sought a permanent injunction against 
Pylon.190  
 On appeal, the Federal Circuit examined the 
four injunction factors de novo.191  Acknowledging 
that neither eBay nor its subsequent cases clearly 
addressed the presumption of irreparable harm, the 
Federal Circuit emphatically stated that “eBay jetti-
soned the presumption of irreparable harm as it ap-
plies to determining the appropriateness of injunc-
                                                                                                                             
jettisoning-the-presumption-of-irreparable-harm-in-injunction-
relief.html. 
187 Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 
1145 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
188 Business Sectors and Divisions, BOSCH GROUP, 
http://www.bosch.com/en/com/bosch_group/business_sectors_div
isions/business_sectors_divisions_2.php (last visited Feb. 21, 
2014). 
189 About Us, PYLON, http://www.pylonhq.com/company.html 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
190 Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1145. 
191 Id. at 1148 (The permanent injunction factors are: “(1) that 
it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available 
at law, such a monetary damages are inadequate to compensate 
for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.”) (quoting eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)) (emphasis 
added). 
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tive relief.”192 
 The court noted that plaintiffs “can no longer 
rely on presumptions or other short-cuts to support a 
request for [injunctive relief].”193  However, the court 
also enunciated that “the fundamental nature of pa-
tents as property rights grant[ ] the owner the right 
to exclude.”194  The court noted that in cases of tradi-
tional patent infringement, courts should not act 
from a “clean slate” and look to precedent in making 
an injunction determination.195  Applying the four 
factor analysis, the court found that Bosch had made 
a showing of irreparable harm by, among other 
things, establishing that Pylon had taken market 
share through infringing product.196  In reversing the 
trial court’s decision, at least one commentator has 
noted that the new standard may not be much differ-
ent from the old.197  The presumption of irreparable 
harm may be dead, but Bosch allows courts to apply 
the old presumption in traditional patent infringe-
ment cases without calling it by name. 
 
B. Non-Practicing Entities, Patent Trolls, and 
Non-Traditional Patent Infringement 
 Given their context, both eBay and Bosch were 
decided correctly.  MercExchange did not make 
commercial use of their patents; it sought to license 
their patents after unsuccessfully attempting to open 
                                                             
192 Id. at 1149. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 1155. 
197 Rantanen, supra note 186. 
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on online marketplace.198  MercExchange is consid-
ered a non-practicing entity (NPE), which are some-
times pejoratively known as a patent troll.199  Bosch, 
on the other hand, is a global manufacturer that 
spent approximately $5 billion in 2011 for research 
and development.200  
 One of the more notable examples of a non-
practicing entity is Soverain Software.  Soverain is 
the holder of patents for online “shopping carts” used 
in e-commerce.201  They do not manufacture products 
of any kind nor do they sell goods over the internet or 
otherwise.202  Instead, Soverain is known for initiat-
ing patent infringement suits and obtaining generous 
settlements and licensing agreements.203  Due to 
their litigious conduct, Soverain is widely known as a 
patent troll.204  In 2004, Soverain filed a patent in-
                                                             
198 Brief for Respondent at 4, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 622506, at *4 
(March 10, 2006). 
199 Jones, supra note 66, at 1040. 
200 Bosch to Invest $10 Million to Support Local Higher 
Education and Research Initiatives, BOSCH PRESS (May 19, 
2011), http://www.bosch-press.com/tbwebdb/bosch-
usa/modules/oragetblob.dll/BERN%20Investment%202011.pdf?
db=TBWebDB_rbna&item=TBWebDB_texpdf&id=466,1&dispo
=a (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
201 Joe Mullin, How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” 
Patent and Saved Online Retail, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 27, 2013, 
4:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/how-
newegg-crushed-the-shopping-cart-patent-and-saved-online-
retail/. 
202 Id. 
203 Id.  Notably, the term “patent troll” was used a total of five 
times in Mullin’s article. 
204 See, e.g., Don Reisinger, Newegg Wins Key ‘Shopping Cart’ 
Lawsuit Against Patent Troll, CNET (Jan. 28, 2013, 9:52 AM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57566195-93/newegg-wins-
key-shopping-cart-lawsuit-against-patent-troll/; Mike Masnick, 
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fringement action against Amazon.com and The Gap 
alleging infringements of patents for online payment 
processing and shopping carts.205  Amazon.com later 
settled the case days within the start of trial for $40 
million.206 
The Supreme Court was correct in eBay to ab-
rogate the presumption of irreparable harm.  By 
placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff to estab-
lish irreparable harm, litigation and the threat of a 
permanent injunction cannot be used to force a set-
tlement or as leverage in licensing negotiations, es-
pecially in cases where the patent holder is an NPE. 
 
C.  Differences Between NPEs and the  
Pharmaceutical Companies and Why Congress 
Should Amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to Allow 
for the Irreparable Harm Presumption 
 Today, it is possible to be an NPE and own a 
significant amount of patents, especially those re-
lated to information technology and internet applica-
tions.  Instagram is a free photo sharing app for 
Internet enabled smartphones.207  By the time Insta-
gram was acquired by Facebook in 2012, it held 
around eight hundred patents.208  Industry experts 
                                                                                                                             
Newegg’s ‘Screw Patent Trolls!’ Strategy Leads to Victory, 
TECHDIRT (Jan. 28, 2013, 12:48 PM), . 
205 Dawn Kawamoto, Amazon Pays $40 Million to Settle 
Patent Dispute, ZDNET (Aug. 11, 2005, 9:11 PM), 
http://www.zdnet.com/news/amazon-pays-40-million-to-settle-
patent-dispute/144171. 
206 Id. 
207 FAQ, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/faq/ (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
208 Tyler Kingkade, What Would $1 Billion Buy You Besides 
Instagram & 800 Patents?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2012, 
1:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/11/1-billion-
would-buy-you_n_1417712.html. 
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have valuated the labor costs of developing an app 
similar to Instagram at under $200,000.209  Even 
considering costs for filing patents, it does not take a 
significant investment to create an NPE, sit on a 
stable of patents, and make money purely through 
licensing.  As mentioned before, developing a new 
drug can cost upwards of $800 million.210  Although 
pharmaceutical companies can negotiate licensing 
agreements, innovator companies will try to recoup 
their substantial investment by releasing product to 
the market themselves.  
Moreover, “patent trolling” in the pharmaceu-
tical industry is unlikely due to the nature of re-
search.  Unlike information technology patents, 
which may be vague, pharmaceutical patents are for 
a thoroughly researched chemical.211  Further, the 
research behind pharmaceutical patents is also pro-
tected by the Hatch-Waxman Act’s data exclusivity 
period.212  Thus, pharmaceutical patent infringement 
is almost always between two producing entities. 
 
D.  Moving Forward 
While the Federal Circuit has made clear in 
Bosch that the irreparable harm presumption is no 
more, courts have the latitude to conclude similarly 
                                                             
209 Andres Garzon, The Correct Price for $1-Billion-Instagram 
is $175,500, PRICETAG (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://pricetaghq.com/blog/correct-price-1-billion-
instagram#sthash.KkIMBklN.dpuf; see also Roy Chomko, The 
Real Cost of Developing an App, MANUFACTURING.NET (July 30, 
2012, 11:50 AM), 
http://www.manufacturing.net/articles/2012/07/the-real-cost-of-
developing-an-app. 
210 See supra text accompanying note 9. 
211 Stu Hutson, Pharma “Patent Trolls” Remain Mostly the 
Stuff of Myth, 15 NATURE MEDICINE 1240 (2009). 
212 Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 119. 
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as if the presumption still applies.213  Latitude is not 
a certainty and different jurisdictions or even judges 
may conclude differently for the irreparable harm 
factor while adhering to the holding in Bosch.  As 
discussed earlier in this Article, the rulings of Fed-
eral courts in New Jersey in Hatch-Waxman actions 
are consistent with the irreparable harm presump-
tion, even if they decline to apply it.214  However, the 
same cannot be said of other jurisdictions. 
A lack of certainty can lead to forum shop-
ping.215  Knowing that a patent infringement suit 
may take much longer than a 30 month stay, innova-
tor companies will try to file suit in a jurisdiction 
where the first two preliminary injunction factors 
have not been decoupled.216  This problem can be 
solved by amending the Hatch-Waxman Act to give 
courts the power to apply the irreparable harm pre-
sumption.  Firstly, courts can apply tests or pre-
sumptions outside of the four factors with legislative 
authorization.217  Secondly, applying the irreparable 
harm presumption is consistent with the legislative 
aims of the Act by strengthening pharmaceutical pa-
                                                             
213 See supra Conclusion, Section A. 
214 See supra Part IV. 
215 See Ronald T. Coleman, Jr. et al., Applicability of the 
Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay, 32 FRANCHISE 
L.J. 3, 10 (2012) (“Perhaps most important, know your 
jurisdiction. If a plaintiff has a choice as to where to bring a 
lawsuit, look for a jurisdiction that continues to apply (or at 
least has not foreclosed) the presumption of irreparable harm in 
that kind of case. A potential defendant sometimes can exercise 
forum selection as well by initiating a declaratory judgment 
action in a forum that has applied eBay and demands proof of 
irreparable harm.”). 
216 See id. 
217 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-
92 (2006). 
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tent protections. 
In conclusion, the presumption of irreparable 
harm is still alive in Hatch-Waxman actions despite 
reports to the contrary in eBay and Bosch.  The tacit 
application of the presumption is compatible with 
current law because most instances of pharmaceuti-
cal patent infringement are considered to be “tradi-
tional.”  Due to the immense costs of research and 
clinical trials, pharmaceutical patents have enjoyed 
heightened protection.  Amending the Hatch-
Waxman Act to allow for the presumption would be 
consistent with its original intent.  However, even 
without legislative action, eBay and Bosch do not 
fundamentally change the outcomes of preliminary 
injunction motions in Hatch-Waxman cases. 
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Abstract 
This Article argues why the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) Big-Time Divi-
sion I College Football and Men’s Basketball student-
athletes are legally “employees” and why these stu-
dent-athletes are inadequately compensated for their 
revenue-producing skills. 
Part II of this Article sets forth the common 
law “right of control” test and the National Labor Re-
lation Act’s (NLRA) special statutory test for stu-
dents in a university setting, and shows how the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the judici-
ary determine whether a particular person, specifi-
cally a university student, meets these standards 
and is legally an “employee”.  Moreover, the NCAA 
asserts it does not have to compensate these student-
athletes above their grant-in-aid because their rela-
tionship with their universities is an educational one. 
Part II also discusses the right of publicity tort to 
show that the relationship between these particular 
student-athletes and the NCAA is predominantly an 
economic one and not an educational one. 
Part III of this Article applies two tests, the 
common law “right of control” test and the NLRB’s 
special statutory test it developed and applied to 
university students in Brown to show that these par-
ticular “student-athletes” are legally “employees.” As 
such, they should be compensated more than the 
grant-in-aid they already receive from the NCAA for 
their revenue-producing skills.  This section also dis-
cusses Texas A&M Quarterback Johnny Manziel, 
and why Texas A&M University is reaping major fi-
nancial benefit for the misappropriation of Manziel’s 
“likeness.” Part III also discusses NCAA Proposal 26 
and how the NCAA and its member schools are con-
tinuing to invent innovative ways to misappropriate 
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student-athletes’ “likenesses” for financial gain with-
out compensating them. Additionally, this section il-
lustrates that former student-athletes in addition to 
current athletes recognize that the NCAA is exploit-
ing them for commercial gain without compensation.  
This section concludes with three potential solutions 
to how the NCAA could pay the student-athletes and 
at the same time advances the NCAA’s amateurism 
dogma in college athletics. The NCAA can no longer 
use its affirmative defense of “amateurism,” and 
should develop a payment method to compensate the 
services rendered by student-athletes who are the 
true moneymakers for its lucrative commercial en-
terprise. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every year student-athletes who compete in 
revenue generating sports, such as Big-Time College 
Football and Division I Men’s Basketball, produce 
billions of dollars which are funneled directly to the 
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National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).1  
The idea of paying these particular student-athletes 
is an ongoing debate.  The large revenue generated 
from the BCS Championship football series and 
“March Madness” created a clamoring for compensat-
ing Big-Time College Football and Division I Men’s 
Basketball players beyond that of an athletic schol-
arship, or what the NCAA calls a grant-in-aid.2  
While operating in a purely capitalistic and profes-
sional atmosphere, the NCAA continues to endorse 
its amateurism concept in college athletics.  These 
particular student-athletes realize that the NCAA 
commercialized the industry and generates billions of 
dollars in revenue from doing so.  Even though the 
NCAA asserts the value of amateurism in college 
athletics, the student-athletes are now attempting to 
get a bigger piece of the pie.3 
The NCAA initially created the term “student-
athlete” to stop workers’ compensation lawsuits 
against it in the 1950s and 1960s,4 and to obscure the 
                                                             
1 Nicholas Fram & Thomas Frampton, College Athletes 
Deserve Employee Status, SF GATE, (March 25, 2012, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/College-athletes-deserve-
employee-status-3430855.php. 
2 Athletic Financial Aid Rules Mandated by the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), WASH. STATE UNIV., 
http://finaid.wsu.edu/media/675179/Athletic-Financial-Aid-
Rules-finaid-website.pdf (explaining athletic grant-in-aid 
“consists of tuition, books, fees and room & board,” however, 
“note that transportation and miscellaneous are not included”).  
3 Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, Point/Counterpoint: 
Paying College Athletes,  SPORT J. (June 15, 2012, 9:48 AM), 
http://thesportjournal.org/article/pointcounterpoint-paying-
college-athletes. 
4 Jared Wade, How the NCAA Has Used the Term “Student-
Athlete” to Avoid Paying Workers Comp Liabilities, NAT’L L. 
REV. (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/how-
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reality of the university-student-athlete employment-
relationship.5  Part I of this Article sets forth the 
common law “right of control” test6 and the National 
Labor Relation Act’s (NLRA) special statutory test 
for students in a university setting,7 and shows how 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the 
judiciary determine whether a particular person, 
specifically a university student, meets these stand-
ards and is legally an “employee.”  Moreover, the 
NCAA asserts it does not have to compensate these 
student-athletes above their grant-in-aid because 
their relationship with their universities is an educa-
tional one. This part also discusses the right of pub-
                                                                                                                             
ncaa-has-used-term-student-athlete-to-avoid-paying-workers-
comp-liabilities. 
5 Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The 
Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete As Employee, 
81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 86 (2006).  
6 St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474, 478 (2005) 
(“‘[w]hile we recognize that the common-law agency test 
described by the Restatement ultimately assesses the amount 
or degree of control exercised by an employing entity over an 
individual, we find insufficient basis for the proposition that 
those factors which do not include the concept of ‘control’ are 
insignificant when compared to those that do.  Section 220(2) of 
the Restatement refers to 10 pertinent factors as ‘among 
others,’ thereby specifically permitting the consideration of 
other relevant factors as well, depending on the factual 
circumstances presented . . . .  Thus, the common-law agency 
test encompasses a careful examination of all factors and not 
just those that involve a right of control . . . .  To summarize, in 
determining the distinction between an employee and an 
independent contractor under Section 2(3) of the Act, we shall 
apply the common-law agency test and consider all the 
incidents of the individual’s relationship to the employing 
entity.’” (quoting Roadway Package System, 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 
850 (1998))). 
7 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 489 (2004).  
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licity tort8 to show that the relationship between 
these particular student-athletes and the NCAA is 
predominantly an economic one and not an educa-
tional one.  
Part II of this Article applies the common 
“right of control” test and the NLRB’s special statu-
tory test, developed in Brown,9 to student-athletes. 
Both tests show that these particular student-
athletes are legally employees and should be com-
pensated by more than the grant-in-aid they already 
receive from the NCAA for their revenue producing 
skills.  Also, this part will discuss Texas A&M Quar-
terback Johnny Manziel, and why Texas A&M Uni-
versity is reaping major financial benefit through the 
misappropriation of Manziel’s likeness. 
Part II will also discuss NCAA Proposal 26 
and how the NCAA and its member schools are con-
tinuing to invent innovative ways to misappropriate 
their student-athletes for financial gain, without 
compensation.  Part II further shows that former 
student-athletes, in addition to current athletes rec-
ognize the NCAA is exploiting them for commercial 
                                                             
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977) (“The 
common form of invasion of privacy under the rule here stated 
is the appropriation and use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness 
to advertise the defendant’s business or product, or for some 
similar commercial purpose.  Apart from statute, however, the 
rule stated is not limited to commercial appropriation. It 
applies also when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff’s 
name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though 
the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit 
sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one.  Statutes in some 
states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of 
the name or likeness.”). 
9 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487. 
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gain without compensation.10  Finally, this part of-
fers three solutions as to how the NCAA could com-
pensate student-athletes, while simultaneously ad-
vancing the NCAA’s “amateurism” dogma in college 
athletics.  
This Article concludes that the NCAA can no 
longer use its affirmative defense of “amateurism.”  
Instead, the NCAA should develop a payment meth-
od to compensate the services rendered by student-
athletes, who are the true moneymakers for its lucra-
tive commercial enterprise. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The NCAA is a voluntary association of ap-
proximately 1,200 colleges and universities.  The 
NCAA’s philosophy as it relates to the student-
athlete is to promote amateurism.11In the NCAA Di-
vision I Manual, the first stated purpose is “[t]o initi-
ate . . . and improve intercollegiate athletics pro-
grams for student-athletes and to promote . . . athlet-
ics participation as a recreational pursuit.”12  Despite 
the prominence of this assertion, the NCAA has 
failed to further this purpose for athletes in the most 
commercially lucrative sports, Big-Time College 
Football (i.e., Division I Football) and Division I 
Men’s Basketball.13 
                                                             
10 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. C 09-1967 
CW, C 09-3329 CW, C 09-4882 CW, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 8, 2010). 
11 Matthew Stross, The NCAA’s “No-Agent” Rule: Blurring 
Amateurism, 2 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 167 (2012); see also NCAA 
DIV. I MANUAL Bylaw art. 12.01.3 (2013), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf. 
12 See NCAA DIV. I MANUAL Const. art. 1.2(a) (2013). 
13 Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: 
Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist? 86 OR. L. REV. 
329 (2007). 
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The NCAA Division I football season culmi-
nates with the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) Na-
tional Championship game.  The NCAA Division I 
Men’s basketball season culminates with “March 
Madness” and the Final Four, with the national 
champion being crowned.14  Both events are big 
business.   
The University of Alabama played in the BCS 
National Championship Game in 2012, resulting in a 
total payout of $18.3 million dollars.15  Alabama re-
ceived $2 million from the NCAA for directly partici-
pating.16  The remaining $16.3 million was divided 
into 13 shares equally distributed into shares of ap-
proximately $1.26 million among the 12 member 
Southeastern Conference (“SEC”) schools and the 
SEC office.17  In addition to compensation for simply 
participating, Alabama received a hefty payout for 
winning the BCS National Championship in 2013. 18 
Similarly, the University of Kentucky received 
a large payout for winning the NCAA Men’s Basket-
ball Championship in 2012. In its most recent con-
tract agreement with the television network CBS, 
the NCAA $10.8 billion for the March Madness 
broadcasting rights for the next fourteen years.19  
The direct value of the NCAA Division I Men’s Bas-
                                                             
14 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1. 
15 Jon Solomon, Profit from BCS National Championship 
Game Won’t Be a Big Windfall, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Jan. 5, 
2010, 9:01 PM), http://blog.al.com/birmingham-news-
stories/2010/01/profit_from_bcs_national_champ.html. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Chris Smith, The Money Behind The BCS National 
Championship, SPORTSMONEY (Jan. 7, 2013, 4:09 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/01/07/the-money-
behind-the-bcs-national-championship/.  
19 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1. 
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ketball Tournament comes from the NCAA’s Reve-
nue Distribution plan, which explains that payouts 
are “to be distributed to the Division I Men’s Basket-
ball Championship over a six-year rolling period.”20  
“That six-year payment period means that games 
played in the 2012 March Madness tournament will 
not count towards annual conference payouts until 
2017.”21  
To better understand the NCAA’s revenue dis-
tribution model for March Madness, consider the 
revenue generated by the Kentucky Wildcats in 
2012.  Kentucky played in six tournament games in 
2012, five of which are included in the NCAA’s count 
of games played, as championship games are not in-
cluded.22  The NCAA revenue distribution model cal-
culates each game as a “game unit,” and each “game 
unit” for the 2012 tournament was $278,820.23  Ken-
tucky generated approximately $1.4 million for the 
South Eastern Conference as a whole due to their 
tournament success in 2012.24  
 
A.  The Common Law Test and a Statutory Test 
to Establish the “Employee” Status of 
College Students 
“Division I athletic grant-in-aid students in 
college football and men’s basketball can be consid-
ered ‘employees’ under both the National Labor Rela-
                                                             
20 Chris Smith, March Madness: A Trip to The Final Four is 
Worth $9.5 Million, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2012, 9:45AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/03/14/march-
madness-a-trip-to-the-final-four-is-worth-9-5-million/. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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tions Act and under most applicable state laws.”25 If 
a person is deemed an employee under the NLRA, 
those employees are granted the rights to gather 
amongst themselves and discuss their wages and 
working conditions even if they are not part of a un-
ion.26  However, the NLRA only applies to employees 
who work in most private sectors and specifically ex-
cludes protection to persons employed by Federal, 
state, or local government.27  The question of wheth-
er a particular person is an employee has been essen-
tial in the development of American labor law.28  The 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the ju-
diciary have developed different legal standards in 
determining a person’s employee status.  Thus, there 
are several approaches the NLRB or the judiciary 
can take in determining whether these particular 
student-athletes in Division I college football and 
basketball are legally employees.29 
 
1.  The “Employee” Under the  
National Labor Relations Act 
The federal rights granted to employees, and 
only to employees, under the NLRA are “the rights to 
self-organization; to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations; to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing; and to engage in other 
                                                             
25 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 86.  
26 Employee Rights, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employee-rights (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2014). 
27 See id.  
28 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 87; see also 
ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON 
LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 37-38 
(2d ed. 2004) (describing courts’ early efforts to distinguish 
between employees under the Act and other persons). 
29 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 88.  
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concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.”30  Since 
these collective bargaining rights are granted exclu-
sively to employees under the statute, determining 
whether a particular person is or is not an employee 
is of paramount importance.31 
 The central issue with the NLRA when first 
administered was that it defined both “employer”32 
and “employee”33 by reference only to each other, and 
it used those definitions to distinguish the status of a 
particular person in the same way.  Because the 
statutory language by itself fails to demarcate the 
pronounced characteristics of either “employer” or 
“employee” from other classes of entities or persons, 
the judiciary and the NLRB have been guided mainly 
by common law doctrines when determining the 
meaning of the term “employee.”34  Relying solely on 
common law principles, the NLRB interpreted the 
NLRA’s definition of “employee” and developed the 
“right of control” test.35  Under this legal standard, 
the important factor in distinguishing an employee 
                                                             
30 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
31 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 89.  
32 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ includes 
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or 
indirectly. . . .”).  
33 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (“The term ‘employee’ shall 
include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees 
of a particular employer,  . . . but shall not include any 
individual . . . having the status of an independent contractor, 
or any individual employed as a supervisor . . .”). 
34 E.g., McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 89; 
Klement Timber Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 681, 683 (1944).  
35 Field Packing Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 850, 852-53 (1943) (holding 
that truck drivers were employees and, therefore, not 
independent contractors because the employer had not fully 
divested itself of the right to control drivers’ work); GORMAN & 
FINKIN, supra note 28, at 38. 
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from an independent contractor was the level of con-
trol the alleged employer maintained over the work-
ing life of the employee.36  The Court first applied the 
‘right of control test’ in NLRB v. United States Insur-
ance Co. of America.37  The Court in its decision not-
ed that the term “employee” excludes “any individual 
having the status of an independent contractor.”38 
The Court went on and held general agency princi-
ples will be applied in a case-by-case basis in distin-
guishing an employee from an independent contrac-
tor.”39 
 Congress further endorsed the common law 
“right of control” test as the proper interpretation of 
the statute through the addition of the 1947 Taft-
Hartley Amendments to the NLRA.40  The Amend-
ments expressly excluded independent contractors 
from the definition of employee.  The common law, as 
well as the NLRB and the judiciary, have long used 
the term “independent contractor” to distinguish cer-
                                                             
36See Nat’l Freight, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 144, 145-46 (1964).  
The right of control test was derived from the common law 
doctrine of respondeat superior, which determines whether a 
master might be liable for the torts of his servant.  Under this 
measure, a person who performs a particular task by his own 
methods, not subject to the control of the alleged employer, is 
an independent contractor, while a person who is subject to the 
control of the employer, not only as to the ends to be 
accomplished, but also as to the methods and means of 
performing the work, is an employee.  See Carnation Co., 172 
N.L.R.B. 1882, 1888 (1968); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 28, 
at 38. 
37 NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254 
(1968).  
38 Id. at 256. 
39 See id.  
40 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (2012) (“The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not 
include any individual . . . having the status of an independent 
contractor.”).  
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tain workers from employees, applying the right of 
control standard to draw that distinction, referring to 
the right of control standard as the basic measure for 
determining whether individuals are employees un-
der the NLRA.”41  
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly upheld 
the NLRB’s interpretation of employee and its reli-
ance on the “right of control” standard.  The Court 
most recently upheld the NLRB’s interpretation of an 
employee in National Labor Relations Board v. Town 
& Country Electric, Inc.42  In this case Town & Coun-
ty Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill 
several positions for a construction job in Minneso-
ta.43  Town & Country received applications from un-
ion staff, but refused to interview any of the appli-
cants except one, who was eventually hired and fired 
soon thereafter.44  These individuals applied with the 
intention to organize Town & Country and were to 
remain on union payroll during their time of em-
ployment.45 The union, the International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the 
National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town 
                                                             
41 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 157; see, e.g., 
NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 
1948) (stating that “the employer-employee relationship exists 
when the person for whom the work is done has the right to 
control and direct the work, not only as to the result 
accomplished by the work, but also as to the details and means 
by which that result is accomplished”); Teamsters Nat’l Auto. 
Transp. Indus. Negotiating Comm., 335 N.L.R.B. 830, 832 
(2001) (“[T]he contracting employer must have the power to give 
the employees the work in question--the so-called ‘right of 
control’ test.”) (footnote omitted).  
42 NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995). 
43 Id. at 87.  
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 88. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut? 
87 
& Country had refused to interview or retain the 
workers because of their union affiliation, a violation 
of the National Labor Relations Act.46  The Board 
held that the 11 individuals met the definition of 
employees under the Act and rejected Town & Coun-
try’s claims that the individuals had been refused for 
other reasons.47 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed on the ground that the term “employee” 
does not include those individuals who remain on un-
ion payroll during their time of employment with an-
other company.48  The central question that the U.S. 
Supreme Court dealt with on certiorari was:  Does a 
worker qualify as an “employee” under the NLRA if, 
while working, he is simultaneously paid by a union 
to help the union organize a company?49 
 In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled for the Board and held that individuals 
can meet the definition of employee even if they are 
paid by a union to organize a non-union company 
while on company payroll.50  The Court found this 
result consistent with the language and purpose of 
the Act as well as the dictionary definition of em-
ployee.51  The Court also reasoned that the language 
of the Act seemed to specifically take into account the 
possibility of workers who are paid by union organiz-
                                                             
46 Id. at 87. 
47 Id. at 87-88; see also Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B., 106 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1997).  
48 Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 629 (8th 
Cir. 1994).  
49 NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 87 
(1995). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 90. 
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ers.52 
Since the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. 
Town & Country, the NLRB has further relied on 
that decision in defining employee, as “[u]nder the 
common law . . . a person who performs services for 
another under a contract of hire, subject to the oth-
er’s control or right of control, and in return for pay-
ment.”53 
 
2.  The NLRB’s Statutory Test from Brown for  
Students Seeking Status as Employees 
University students who receive academic 
scholarships and perform services as teaching or re-
search assistants appear to satisfy the common law 
test for “employee.”  The NLRB recognized the low 
threshold the common law test presents to distinct 
classes of persons attempting to be regarded as “em-
ployees” under the NLRA.54  
The NLRB in Brown developed a new re-
quirement. In order for university students to be 
treated as employees and granted collective bargain-
ing rights under the NLRA, they must satisfy both 
the common law “right of control” test and the 
NLRB’s additional special statutory test developed in 
Brown.55  In that case, Brown University filed a peti-
                                                             
52 Id. at 93. 
53 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 n.27 (2004) (citing 
Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 94); see also Boston 
Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999) (quoting Town & 
Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 91-93).  
54 See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 491.   
55 See id. at 487 (stating that “attempting to force the student-
university relationship into the traditional employer-employee 
framework” is problematic and that “principles developed for 
use in the industrial setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on the 
academic world”’) (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 
672, 680-81 (1980)). 
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tion with the NLRB, asking the Board to reconsider 
and overturn the Board’s decision in NLRB v. New 
York University.56  New York University dealt with 
graduate student assistants who were admitted into 
but not hired by the university.  The central question 
was whether the graduate student assistants’ super-
vision of teaching and research was an integral com-
ponent of their academic development.  The NLRB in 
Brown held that the “financial support” the graduate 
student assistants received in order to attend Brown 
University made the relationship between the grad-
uate student assistants and the university primarily 
an educational one rather than an economic one.57  
 The NLRB’s decision in Brown is currently the 
legal standard for determining whether a university 
student is a statutory employee.  In that decision the 
NLRB majority acknowledged that the right to con-
trol standard must be satisfied as a general require-
ment.58 The NLRB further held that another specific 
requirement for students was that unless the rela-
tionship between the school and the student was 
“primarily economic,” rather than “primarily educa-
tional,” then the students were not employees. 59  
Therefore, when students’ efforts are predominantly 
                                                             
56 See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B.  at 483.  
57 See id. at 486. 
58 See id. at 490 (“Even assuming arguendo that this is so [i.e., 
that graduate student employees are employees at the common 
law], it does not follow that they are employees within the 
meaning of the Act. The issue of employee status under the Act 
turns on whether Congress intended to cover the individual in 
question. The issue is not to be decided purely on the basis of 
older common-law concepts.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, the 
Board has certainly applied the common law “right of control” 
test since its 2004 Brown decision in determining whether 
workers were employees under the NLRA.  
59 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487-89. 
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educational and not economic, then those individuals 
are not employees within the meaning of the 
NLRA.60  From that test it logically follows that 
when a student who works for a university performs 
services that are not primarily educational or aca-
demic and the relationship to the university with re-
spect to those services is an economic one, the stu-
dent may be an employee under the NLRA, provided 
that he also meets the common law test for that 
term. 
 
B.  Tort: Right of Publicity 
To assert a claim for the tort of right of public-
ity, a person must demonstrate that one or more of 
his or her protected attributes that are reasonably 
deemed private were appropriated by another party 
for that party’s own use or benefit without his or her 
consent.61  The Restatement (Second) of Torts specif-
ically notes that a person who appropriates the name 
or likeness of another for his or her own use or bene-
fit is subject to liability to the other for invasion of 
privacy.62  The “own use” or “benefit” of another per-
son’s protected attributes has been interpreted in 
some states to mean a commercial benefit.63  Other 
states however, have applied it to instances where a 
person uses another’s name or likeness for his or her 
own purposes and benefit even though the use is not 
a commercial or pecuniary benefit.64 
                                                             
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) 
(“Appropriation of Name or Likeness: One who appropriates to 
his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject 
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”).   
63 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977).  
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C.  The NCAA National Letter of Intent 
The National Letter of Intent, signed by the 
potential student-athlete, is a binding contract be-
tween the individual and the university that the stu-
dent-athlete attends.65  If the individual is under the 
age of 21, a parent or registered guardian must co-
sign the agreement.66  A coach or representative of 
the coaching staff cannot be present when the indi-
vidual is signing.67  Once the Letter of Intent is 
signed no other school can recruit that person.  The 
agreement is for a period of one year.68  Usually the 
individual receives a scholarship towards tuition and 
a stipend for room and board.69  If for any reason the 
student does not meet the academic or chosen sport 
performance expectations the school has the right to 
terminate the agreement.70  After one year the stu-
dent-athlete’s scholarship or stipend is continued if 
he or she has met academic and sport performance 
expectations.71  The sequence carries forward for a 
four-year matriculation at the chosen school.72 
 
1.  Student-Athlete Statement – Division I  
Form 08-3a Section IV 
Before the student-athlete is allowed to partic-
ipate in practice, he or she must sign various sections 
of Form 08-3a, the Student-Athlete Statement.  Sec-
                                                             
65 Barile v. Univ. of Virginia, 441 N.E.2d 608, 615 (Ohio 
1981).  
66 Signing a Letter of Intent, VARSITYEDGE.COM, 
http://www.varsityedge.com/nei/varsity.nsf/main/national+lette
r+of+intent.  
67 Id. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id.   
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tion IV of the statement contains wording which al-
lows a student-athlete’s name or picture to promote 
the NCAA and the school he or she is attending.  The 
exact wording is as follows: 
 
You authorize the NCAA (or third party 
acting on behalf of the NCAA, e.g., host in-
stitution, conference, local organizing com-
mittee) to use your name or picture to gen-
erally promote NCAA championships or 
other NCAA events, activities or pro-
grams.73 
  
If student-athletes do not sign the Student-
Athlete Form, they are deemed ineligible for practice 
and competition until the form is signed and com-
pleted.  This is the same form that the NCAA refer-
ences in their claim that they have the right to li-
cense the likeness and image of former student-
athletes.74  The legal question then becomes: does the 
form govern former student-athletes, enabling the 
NCAA and its member schools to use former student-
athletes’ likeness for its own commercial and promo-
tional purposes?75 
 
D.  NCAA Proposal 26-2010 
A controversial proposal by the NCAA would 
broaden the way companies are allowed to use col-
lege athletes in advertising campaigns, giving athlet-
ic departments more opportunities to trade on play-
                                                             
73 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. C 
09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011). 
74 Id. at *4. 
75 Id. at *5. 
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ers’ popularity.76  
Athletics officials who support the proposal 
say that they are not seeking to exploit athletes, and 
that the changes would align outdated NCAA rules 
with today’s technologies.77  Some players also sup-
ported the amendment.78  
Contrarily, opponents of the proposal say that 
the changes are overreaching.  It allows sponsors to 
expand their reach without compensating players for 
the use of their likeness in commercial promotions.79  
While players would continue to earn nothing for the 
use of their likenesses, their colleges, conferences, or 
the NCAA would reap profits from the advertisers.80  
Up until the time of the proposal, corporate 
sponsorship companies were allowed to include pic-
tures or images of college athletes in their adver-
tisements as long as the athletes did not promote 
commercial ventures.  In addition, companies were 
permitted to show only their corporate logos and 
names, not their products.81  
Under the proposal, corporate sponsorship 
companies would now be allowed to advertise their 
products and services in association with pictures or 
images of college athletes, as long as the players did 
not specifically endorse the products.82  The person-
                                                             
76 Lauren Smith, Controversial NCAA Proposal Would Allow 
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Would-Let/2881.   
77 Id.  
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nel who have the authority to make the proposal, a 
powerful NCAA committee made up of athletics offi-
cials and faculty members, said that it provides col-
leges, conferences, and the NCAA greater flexibility 
in developing relationships with commercial entities 
that benefit the athletics program.”83  Ellen J. Stau-
rowsky, a professor and chair of the graduate pro-
gram in the Department of Sport Management and 
Media at Ithaca College said, “There is a little bit of 
disingenuousness in this.  Until the players are com-
pensated, these kinds of things are problematic.”84 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Applying the NLRA Common Law Test and 
the Federal Labor Standards Act 
 
1.  The Right of Control Test 
 Under the common law tests in determining if 
a particular person is an employee, the case for col-
lege student-athletes employee status is strong. 
“Their labor and talent generate huge revenues for 
universities, just like the services rendered by pro-
fessional athletes for their leagues.”).85  These par-
ticular student-athletes are employees from the 
standpoint of the common law “right of control” test: 
school officials directly control their labor and exer-
cise a level of oversight over players’ lives far greater 
than that of most employees in the United States.86   
                                                                                                                             
%2Bsponsors%2Bpossible%2Bamendments%2Bto%2Blikeness
%2Bproposaldf30.html; Smith, supra note 76.  
82 Id. 
83 Smith, supra note 76.  
84 Id. 
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Critics argue that paying college athletes is 
only providing them with additional compensation on 
top of the already valuable compensation they get 
from universities in the form of scholarships.87  One 
key principle from Brown was that the NRLB assert-
ed that graduate student assistants, whether in an 
instruction or research role, were primarily there for 
educational purposes  and the scholarships they re-
ceived to perform their duties were requisite to ob-
taining their higher education degrees.88  No one 
would argue that playing college football or men’s 
basketball is a prerequisite to obtaining an under-
graduate or graduate degree.89 
 Federal law, which dictates the requirement of 
a university student to meet the standard “right of 
control” test and the Brown statutory test to be con-
sidered an employee, only applies to students in pri-
vate institutions.90  University student-athletes com-
peting at private institutions will probably be able to 
satisfy both tests, but college athletes playing for 
public institutions will be subject to state labor law, 
which has generally been more favorable to student-
employees.91 Over the last ten years, undergraduate 
student-employees have successfully formed unions 
consisting of dining hall workers, clerical assistants, 
and dormitory advisors.92  Like such student-
employees, student-athletes also render services to 
their universities by filling stadiums and arenas and 
                                                             
87 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 157; see, e.g., 
NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 
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generating revenue.  State labor law has already 
held that students who are employed as dining hall 
workers, clerical assistants, and dormitory advisors 
meet the legal standard for an employee.93  If a uni-
versity student meets the legal standard of an em-
ployee by being employed as a food server in dining 
halls, answering telephone calls as a telemarketing 
fund raiser, or as a student advisor, then it logically 
follows that the student whose scholarship requires 
that he compete in college football or basketball 
meets the same standard and should be recognized 
as an employee.94  This question has been debated at 
length, but to this point there has been no definitive 
answer. 
 
2. The Economic Reality Test 
 In determining an employee under the Federal 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) the U.S Supreme Court 
applied the “economic reality” test in United States v. 
Silk.95  The five-factor “economic reality” test would 
be useful in determining whether or not student-
athletes are actually employees.  The factors are as 
follows:  
 
(1) the degree of control exercised by the 
alleged employer; 
(2)  the extent of the relative investments of 
the [alleged] employee and employer; 
(3)  the degree to which the “employee’s” 
opportunity for profit and loss is 
determined by the “employer”; 
(4)  the skill and initiative required in 
performing the job; and 
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(5) the permanency of the relationship.96 
 
To examine if student-athletes are employees 
under the “economic reality” test, I interviewed a 
current University of Connecticut (“UCONN”) Divi-
sion I Varsity Football player, who had just complet-
ed his third season as a linebacker for the UCONN 
football team.97  Like all other Division I College 
Football players, his Monday through Saturday in-
season and off-season schedules are structured by his 
football coaches and are strictly regimented.98  The 
football player explained that the athletic depart-
ment tailors his academic class schedule around his 
mandatory practice sessions.99  He explained that the 
football coaches require the players to eat every meal 
throughout the day together as a team, including a 
midmorning and an afternoon snack together. The 
linebacker coach uses this lunchtime as a film view-
ing session to review game UCONN campus dining 
hall.100  Following breakfast, the football player at-
tends his first class from 11:00 to 11:50 a.m.   He 
stated that the athletic program requires him “to 
make sure that he gets classes that don’t cut into 
practice time or conflict with any of the UCONN 
football team’s workouts.”101 
The football player attends his second class 
from 1:00 to 2:15 p.m. In between the first and sec-
                                                             
96 Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 
1987) (citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 715).  
97 Interview with a Univ. of Conn. Div. I Varsity Football 
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ond class, he reports to the dining hall for a team 
lunch exclusively for linebackers.102  The linebacker 
plays and strategies.103  The football player said, 
“Coach Wholley will usually make us watch a video 
of our last opponent and tells us what we will be do-
ing, and what he wants to see out of us in our after-
noon practice.”104  From 3:00 to 5:30 p.m., the football 
player participates in an on-the-field practice that 
consists of football drills and conditioning.105  Follow-
ing the afternoon practice, he reports for the team 
dinner and then attends an evening class.106  Addi-
tional requirements include that he must room with 
other members of the team, sit in the front row of the 
classroom for each of his classes, comply with a bed-
time curfew six nights of the week, and the night be-
fore each game he must sleep in the campus hotel 
with the other players.107 
Applying the UCONN football player’s situa-
tion to the first factor of the “economics reality” test, 
it shows that there is a high degree of control that 
the football player’s coaches whom are hired by the 
University of Connecticut have over him.  
The second factor deals with the extent of the 
relative investments between the student-athletes 
and their respective schools.  Division I college foot-
ball programs, barring any NCAA penalties or sanc-
tions against them, are allowed 85 scholarships per 
year to be given out to student-athletes.  The schol-
arships granted to those 85 individuals are good for 
one year, and the amount of scholarship granted to 
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each student-athlete is contingent upon their athletic 
and academic performance at the university.108  A 
grant-in-aid is a transfer of money from the federal 
government to a state or local government or indi-
vidual person for the purposes of funding a project or 
program.109  Grant money is not a loan, and does not 
have to be repaid, but it does have to be spent accord-
ing to the federal government’s guidelines for that 
particular grant.110  
Applying this to the football player’s situation, 
the federal government gives a fund to the Universi-
ty of Connecticut (an academic institution funded by 
the state government) for the specific purpose of fur-
thering the UCONN football program.111  The stu-
dent-athlete, in this case, the football player, gets the 
grant-in-aid for one year with the expectation that 
his athletic performance will help the football team.  
If enrolled at an NCAA member school and to remain 
eligible to compete in NCAA intercollegiate competi-
tion, the student-athlete must adhere to academic 
performance standards, set forth by the school itself, 
the NCAA athletic conference the school is member 
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of, and the NCAA’s rules.112 A general rule for stu-
dent-athletes to remain eligible is they must be ac-
cepted for enrollment in compliance with the school’s 
rules, eligible to practice under the conference and 
NCAA rules, and be registered for at least 12 credit 
hours for each academic term.113  
The NCAA allows a student-athlete to remain 
eligible for five years of athletic competition within 
five calendar years of the athlete’s full-time enroll-
ment.114  Student-athletes must earn at least six 
credit hours each term to be eligible for the following 
term, in addition to meeting minimum GPA re-
quirements for graduation.115 For example, at 
UCONN, the football player must maintain a GPA of 
at least 1.8, and if he falls below the criteria he 
would be placed on academic probation.116 
To summarize, the football player must meet 
the requirements of academic standing as well as the 
rigorous time commitment for his chosen sport. This 
includes on field practice and team meetings, manda-
tory team wide strength and conditioning sessions, 
and the actual games.  In return for assurance of the 
football player’s effort for optimum performance on 
the field and in the classroom, the school gave him 
grant-in-aid of $26,562 for the year. In addition, for 
each academic term the football player received an 
                                                             
112 UNIV. OF CONN. 2013-2014 STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 
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114 See id. at 14, 16. 
115 Remaining Eligible: Academics, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/remaining-eligible-academics (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2014).  
116 UNIV. OF CONN. 2013-2014 STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK, 
supra note 112, at 34. 
 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut? 
101 
additional $1,650 to cover the cost of student fees, 
housing, on/off campus meal plans, books, supplies 
and transportation. This illustrates that the “relative 
investments” between the student-athlete and the 
school, the alleged employee and employer, have 
been met. The football player as the employee gives 
up much of his time and is controlled, scheduled, and 
enforced by his coaches (employees of the University 
of Connecticut) and in return, he receives a one-year 
stipend.  
The relationship between the football player 
and UCONN could also be considered an “employee 
at-will” relationship, due to the fact that if he fails to 
meet the academic eligibility requirements, or does 
not comply with the rules in the “Division I Student-
Athlete Statement,” UCONN can, after his first full 
academic year as a Division I student-athlete, deny 
him grant-in-aid for the upcoming year.   
The third factor of the “economic reality” test, 
that the employee’s opportunity for profit and loss is 
determined by the employer,117 is easily met.  The 
football player is required to attend every practice 
and strength and conditioning workout set up by the 
coaching staff.  The football player says that due to 
the time commitment, although not expressively 
stated in the Division I Student-Athlete Statement, 
it is impossible for him to hold a part-time job.118  His 
daytime hours are filled with academics and his 
commitment to the team activities.119  It would be 
reasonable to argue that his participation in 
UCONN’s football program is a job in itself (through 
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daily preparation leading to performance at football 
games) and the school compensates him for this.  
As to the fourth factor,120 the skill required to 
handle the football player’s job is limited to a certain 
few gifted athletes.  For any Division I College Foot-
ball player in the Football Bowl Subdivision, it is a 
rare combination of size, speed, and strength that 
enable an individual to successfully compete at that 
level.  This football player, who received high school 
and college All-American honors for his football 
skills, must continue to train daily to maintain his 
optimum athletic ability.  
Finally, the fifth factor, “the permanency of 
the relationship,”121 could be reasonably argued to be 
an “employee at will” agreement.  UCONN, at any 
time, can deny the football player an additional year 
of grant-in-aid.  Before deciding to commit to playing 
football at UCONN, the football player had to sign 
the “NCAA National Letter of Intent” and the “Divi-
sion I Student-Athlete Statement” that details all of 
the NCAA guidelines, including his full commitment 
to the UCONN football program. 
If for any reason the football player fails to 
comply with the terms set forth in both forms, the 
school could deny him a second grant-in-aid year.  
Also, it is at the school and the coaches’ discretion 
whether the football player is “deserving” of an addi-
tional grant-in-aid year. The football player said that 
the school can deny him an additional grant-in-aid 
year if, “The coaches don’t think I am cutting it.”122  
In other words, whether or not the football player re-
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ceives an additional grant-in-aid is in the hands of 
the coaches and how they view his performance on 
the football field.   
   
B.  Applying the Brown Statutory Test 
The NLRB in Brown examined four criteria to 
decide whether graduate assistants were employees 
in line with the NLRA.  The four criteria were: (1) 
“the status of graduate assistants as students,” (2) 
“the role of graduate student assistantships in grad-
uate education,” (3) “the graduate student assistants’ 
relationship with the faculty,” and (4) “the financial 
support they receive to attend Brown.”123 
The first three criteria from the Brown Board 
as it relates to student-athletes as employees are eas-
ily met.  It is merely impossible to argue against the 
first criterion because student-athletes, like graduate 
assistants, routinely attend class to receive an aca-
demic degree.  The second factor goes to the role of 
the graduate student assistantships predominately 
for educational purposes and as a prerequisite to an 
educational degree.124  Playing Big-Time College 
Football or Division I Men’s Basketball is certainly 
not a prerequisite to obtaining a higher education 
degree.  The third factor has been analyzed and it 
has been shown that coaches of Division I athletic 
teams’ exercise a great degree of regulation over 
their student-athletes. 
 
1.  Interpreting the Fourth Factor in Brown 
The logic underlying the fourth factor of the 
Brown analysis is flawed. Even if the fourth factor 
was logical, Big-Time College Football and Men’s 
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Basketball student-athletes would still be NLRA em-
ployees.125  The Brown Board relied upon a fourth 
element concluding that the graduate assistants 
were primarily students and not employees.126 The 
financial rewards graduate assistants received were 
not compensation for teaching and research services 
performed, but were merely financial aid to permit 
attendance at Brown University.127  In support of its 
conclusion, the NLRB underscored two aspects of 
graduate assistants’ financial packages.  First, the 
amount provided to teaching assistants (TAs) and 
resident assistants (RAs) was the same as that pro-
vided to graduate fellows for whom no teaching or 
research activity was required.128  Second, the fact 
that the financial aid awarded to graduate assistants 
was unrelated to the quality or value of services they 
rendered, indicated that the payment was not com-
pensation for their services, but was financial assis-
tance to attend school.129 
 The Brown Board improperly analyzed the 
fourth factor of its own analysis.  The proper analysis 
in determining whether a payment is compensation 
for services rendered, as opposed to financial aid, is 
whether the payment to the particular person would 
cease if the services were stopped.130  It is inconceiv-
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able to believe that if TAs and RAs were to withhold 
their services either collectively or individually, they 
would continue to receive full scholarships and sti-
pends.  It follows logically that the financial aid giv-
en to such personnel must be compensation for their 
services to the university.  
 Even if this proper analysis of the Brown 
fourth factor was looked at in regards to student-
athletes, athletic grants-in-aid are never given with-
out the requirement of athletic services being ren-
dered.131  Even third or fourth string personnel on a 
college football team or a 12th man on a Division I 
Men’s Basketball team must still attend all practices, 
abide by team rules, undertake the required and 
“voluntary” strength and conditioning, and perform 
all activities identical to their grant-in-aid superstar 
counterparts.  Further, the NCAA makes it clear 
that no third parties receive grants-in-aid without 
having to participate in the athletic program as a 
condition in order to continue being granted the 
“scholarship” for their athletic services.132  
 Finally, comparing the athletic scholarship 
with the merit-based or need-based scholarship 
awarded to a non-athlete undergraduate or a gradu-
ate assistant also shows that the former is compen-
sation.133  Athletic scholarships are granted only if 
                                                                                                                             
competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) Uses his 
or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form 
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132 Id. Bylaw art. 15.01.2. 
133 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 155. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
I’m the One Making the Money, Now Where’s My Cut? 
106 
the athlete provides athletic services while merit-
based or need-based scholarships awarded to non-
athletes require no such reciprocity.134  Merit-based 
and need-based scholarships are given to enable stu-
dents to attend universities, but the universities 
have the option to discontinue scholarships if the 
student-athletes do not compete for them.135  
 
C.  The Predominantly Economic Relationship 
Between Grant-in-Aid Student-Athletes and 
Their Colleges 
Applying the NLRB’s test in Brown to grant-
in-aid Big-Time College Football and Division I 
Men’s Basketball student-athletes shows that they 
are not average students and their relationship with 
their universities is an economic one.136  In order to 
show that a university-athlete relationship is pre-
dominantly economic in nature, the standard in the 
past was to demonstrate that the relationship was 
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not primarily academic.137  “The NCAA academic 
standards are designed to serve the employers’ 
enormous commercial interests, enabling universities 
to recruit and retain gifted athletes rather than to 
promote true academic achievement.”138  These “stu-
dent-athletes” are not primarily students.139  The 
majority of these individuals are inadequately pre-
pared to handle the academics at their respective 
universities and thus unable to adequately further 
their education.140  The NCAA denotes these individ-
uals as student-athletes in order to disguise their le-
gal status of employees in the commercial college 
sports entertainment industry.141 
The Board in Brown decided that the relation-
ship between graduate assistants is primarily an ac-
ademic one as opposed to an economic one.142  If the 
relationship was found to be for a university’s com-
mercial benefit, then the decision may have gone the 
other way. The Board refused to “assert jurisdiction 
over relationships that are primarily educational.”143  
 
1.  Johnny Manziel’s Right of Publicity: The 
Misappropriation of His Likeness for the 
Commercial Benefit of Texas A&M University 
If an NCAA student-athlete uses his or her 
likeness for his or her own commercial benefit, it 
may result in that athlete’s ineligibility.  When this 
same student-athlete makes his debut onto the cam-
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pus field or court and performs at a high level, the 
NCAA and the athlete’s school recognize that they 
can reap commercial benefits from the athlete’s per-
formance, which is actually exploiting the student-
athlete.144  This poses a legal question for the NCAA 
and its relationship with the current student-athlete.  
Exploiting the student-athlete for a commercial bene-
fit actually undermines the NCAA’s amateurism 
dogma.  
Texas A&M Quarterback Johnny Manziel and 
his family recognized the intent of the NCAA and be-
gan to take steps to trademark his coveted name, 
“Johnny Football.”145  A trademark is “a word, 
phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol used by a man-
ufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or prod-
ucts from those of others. . . . In effect, a trademark 
is the commercial substitute for one’s signature.”146 
Texas A&M University did not hesitate to try and 
reap the commercial benefit from Manziel’s star sta-
tus. “Texas A&M is working in concert with the 
Manziel family to trademark the nickname,” said 
Shan Hinckley, who is an Assistant Vice President of 
Business Development at the school and runs the 
Texas A&M University Aggies’ licensing program.147  
The news was reported to the NCAA less than 
two weeks after the investment organization filed for 
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the “Johnny Football” trademark.148  The lawyer who 
filed the trademark did not comment after the inves-
tigation but a university official confirmed the lawyer 
was not working with Texas A&M University or the 
Manziel family.149  The NCAA made it known that in 
order for Johnny Manziel to keep his eligibility, nei-
ther Texas A&M nor his family could sell products 
that in any way hint of a connection to the Texas 
A&M quarterback Johnny Manziel.150  Also, the 
NCAA notified Texas A&M to ensure that the school 
prohibits vendors from selling products hinting to the 
moniker “Johnny Football.”151   
The Manziel family may have to wait two 
more years to attempt to own the trademark “Johnny 
Football” for licensing and merchandising deals, 
since Manziel just finished his freshman football 
season.152  NCAA regulations require that a Division 
I football player remain in school for at least three 
years. In order for Manziel to maintain his athletic 
eligibility at Texas A&M the NCAA asserted that 
neither the university or Manziel and his family can 
sell products that connect ‘Johnny Football’ to 
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149 Id. 
150 Id. 
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Manziel himself.153  Moreover, the NCAA put Texas 
A&M on notice that they must take reasonable 
affirmative steps to stop vendors from doing the 
same.154  Once the NCAA told the school to enforce 
this policy against vendors, Texas A&M took 
appropriate steps in October and November 2012.155 
However, Manziel’s number 2 jersey was available at 
the school’s bookstore on Friday, November 9, 2012.  
The bookstore completely sold out his jersey over 
that weekend and another shipment of his number 2 
jersey arrived on Monday November 12, 2012.156  
From that point on it was a revolving door of number 
2 Texas A&M football jerseys being shipped to the 
store and purchased by consumers.  Before that, the 
only two Texas A&M football jerseys on the shelves 
in the Texas A&M bookstore that were available for 
purchase bore the numbers 1 and 12.157  There was 
never a Texas A&M football jersey with the number 
2 on it in the bookstore available for purchase before 
Manziel’s jersey.158 
 Since Manziel’s name, image or the moniker 
“Johnny Football” was not placed anywhere on the 
Texas A&M football jersey that had the number 2 on 
it, the NCAA and Texas A&M University would ar-
gue that they are in no way exploiting Manziel’s 
likeness.  The school would say that it never attached 
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Johnny Manziel’s name, image, or likeness to the 
sold commercial merchandise and thus never ex-
ploited him for the school’s financial gain.   
However, once a person is well-known entity 
and a drawing card for revenue generating public 
consumption, a person’s likeness is not limited to 
name, moniker, and image.  A person’s likeness can 
also be an identifiable mark or trait of a person.  This 
is evident in the California Court of Appeal case, 
Motshenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.159  
In Motshenbacher, Lothar Motshenbacher was 
a Formula I race driver who had his car painted in 
esoteric color designs so that they would stand apart 
from the other cars.160  R. J. Reynolds created a 
commercial with cars on the track and the plaintiff’s 
car in the foreground. The plaintiff’s image was 
scrambled so he could not be identified and some of 
the car’s characteristics were changed.161  The car’s 
number was changed from 11 to 71, and a wing 
spoiler was added to the back of the car.162  The red 
color and the white pinstripes remained, however, 
giving the illusion that Motshenbacher was driving 
the car.163  The initial decision of the trial court 
found in favor of the defendant, with the court find-
ing that (1) the person driving the car was unrecog-
nizable and therefore unidentifiable, and (2) a rea-
sonable inference could not be drawn that the driver 
was Motschenbacher, or any other driver.164 But the 
California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s 
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decision and stated that the fact that the likeness of 
the driver (alleged to be Motschenbacher) was unrec-
ognizable in the commercial, the number of the rac-
ing car had been changed from 11 to 71 and the fact 
that car now had an added spoiler did not preclude a 
finding that the driver was identifiable as Motschen-
bacher in view of the distinctive decorations on the 
car.  The California Court of Appeal for those reasons 
held that the use of the car was a misappropriation 
of an identifiable attribute of Motschenbacher, thus 
violating his right of publicity.165 
 Applying the California Court of Appeal’s rea-
soning to the Texas A&M number 2 football jersey, 
when a Texas A&M student, alumni member, or gen-
eral college football fan walks into the Texas A&M 
bookstore, a more than reasonable inference will be 
drawn that the player who wears that Texas A&M 
number 2 football jersey on Saturdays is Johnny 
Manziel.  First, it is the Texas A&M Football Team 
jersey and second, the number 2 is on the jersey and 
the inference can be made that the jersey is that of 
Johnny Manziel.  In view of the distinctive commer-
cial object, the number 2 Texas A&M Football jersey 
is identifiable by the majority of the public as Johnny 
Manziel’s jersey.  For these reasons, the NCAA and 
Texas A&M’s use of the number 2 Texas A&M foot-
ball jersey on it is a misappropriation of an identifia-
ble attribute of Johnny Manziel for the sole ad-
vantages of the NCAA and Texas A&M University 
advantage, thus violating Manziel’s right of publici-
ty. 
 Additionally, Texas A&M knows that it can 
make money indirectly from Johnny Manziel by sell-
ing jerseys, T-shirts and hats with the signature 
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number 2 placed on them, but they’re not permitted 
to use Manziel’s name, likeness or “Johnny Football” 
moniker.166  That did not stop Texas A&M from do-
ing what they are allowed to do within the NCAA 
rules.167  Over the course of the 2012-2013 college 
football season, 2,500 Texas A&M Replica Football 
jerseys and 1,400 t-shirts with the number 2 were 
sold at the Texas A&M campus store.168 Another 
shipment of T-shirts was made to the Texas A&M 
campus store sometime in early December after the 
T-shirts sold out.169  
 Footballs and helmets signed by Manziel, 
(or at least advertised as signed by him, as Texas 
A&M University officials say many of the items 
are fake), have sold for more than $400.170  One 
seller on eBay who claims to be selling the original 
“Johnny Football” shirt boasts in his listing that 
he has sold 625 footballs and helmets.171  Also 
listed is a version of a pullover-hooded sweatshirt 
with a new phrase growing in commercial popular-
ity, “HEISMANZIEL.”172  Other items listed for 
commercial consumption were bumper stickers, 
trading cards, custom figurines, iPhone cases, and 
mugs.173  
 Scenarios like the one with Johnny Manziel 
have been an ongoing commercial benefit for the 
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NCAA member schools for several years.  It would be 
unreasonable to think that the University of Florida 
did not make a small fortune by selling University of 
Florida football jerseys with the number 15 when 
Tim Tebow was the quarterback for the Gators.  It is 
also reasonable to believe that the University of Tex-
as increased its revenue by selling the University of 
Texas football jerseys with the number 10 the year 
Vince Young was playing quarterback for the Long-
horns.  However, there will be much larger revenues 
generated for Texas A&M University with respect to 
sales of the football jerseys with the number #2 over 
the next two years.  Texas A&M’s Vice President 
John Cook said, “Frankly, we’re not doing anything 
that hasn’t been done before. The difference is he’s 
[Quarterback Johnny Manziel] a freshman.”174  It is 
an important difference. Johnny Manziel flourished 
as a star quarterback as a true freshman.  Under the 
NCAA bylaws, Manziel will be forced to play at the 
Division I College Football level for at least two more 
years before becoming eligible to enter the National 
Football League draft. 175  
 In all likelihood Johnny Manziel will play his 
second and third year of Division I college football 
eligibility as quarterback for the Texas A&M Aggies 
and the money at the campus bookstore will continue 
to flow in. The average price of a replica football jer-
sey, whether college or professional, is between $60 
and $70.  Replica T-shirts sell for approximately $20 
each.176  Furthermore, one can speculate that other 
merchandise will be sold at Texas A&M given the 
fact the school officials will surely think of innovative 
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ways to try and disguise the inference of Manziel’s 
name, image or likeness.  It is more than reasonable 
to infer and conclude that the revenue Texas A&M 
University will generate from the sales of commercial 
merchandise while Johnny Manziel is still playing 
quarterback for the Aggies during the 2013-2014 and 
2014-2015 college football seasons will be similar if 
not greater than in the 2012-2013 season. 
The amount of potential revenue that Manziel 
will generate for the school is certainly substantial.  
Yet it is simply incomprehensible that under the cur-
rent NCAA bylaws, Manziel will not receive any 
monetary compensation for any item sold bearing a 
resemblance to him.  Texas A&M will certainly cash 
in big if it continues to sell commercial merchandise 
carrying the number 2, and continuing to misappro-
priate Johnny’s Manziel’s likeness for its own com-
mercial benefit.  
NCAA President Mark Emmert feels that it is 
a non-issue that Manziel can market his image and 
likeness while enrolled at an NCAA member school. 
Although an athlete like Manziel can generate future 
profits for himself through his image and likeness, it 
does not mean he should be able to do so while en-
rolled at Texas A&M.  He further contends that one 
of the reasons it is hard to figure an appropriate 
monetary compensation for Manziel is because it is 
not known how much Manziel himself helped to sell 
any item, whether a Football Jersey, T-shirt, football, 
Texas A&M helmet, etc.  President Emmert said, 
 
The position of the NCAA has always been 
that when a student is playing for their 
university, they are getting the full ad-
vantage of being part of that university.  
They are able to build on that popularity, 
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and when they go pro, they are extraordi-
narily well-positioned to monetize their 
brand.  And why will Johnny Manziel be 
able to do that? Because he played at Texas 
A&M and was successful and perhaps won 
the Heisman.177 
 
 President Emmert further contends, “It’s not 
just that it’s a No. 2 [jersey], . . . [i]t’s a Texas A&M 
No. 2.  I can’t parse out the value of the number on 
one side and the university on the other.  They go to-
gether.”178 
However, this statement does not focus on the 
reality of why there would be such substantial sales 
of Texas A&M number 2 jerseys and T-shirts.  The 
reason is that the number 2 is a recognizable attrib-
ute as Johnny Manziel’s Texas A&M football jersey 
number.  It is a difficult inference to make that the 
success Johnny Manziel experienced as freshman col-
lege football quarterback would automatically lead 
him to the National Football League, enabling him to 
reap the benefits of his brand “Johnny Football.”179  
What if Manziel suffers a career ending injury while 
in college or suffers an injury that will weaken his 
playing ability as a quarterback for the remainder of 
his career? 
Emmert, in his assertion, is guaranteeing that 
Manziel will have a successful professional career in 
the National Football League, or other professional 
football league, after his time at Texas A&M.  This is 
a risky assumption to make in a violent game like 
football where injuries occur often and unexpectedly. 
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D.  NCAA Proposal 26: An Attempt to Further 
Disguise the NCAA “Money Machine” by  
Exploiting Student-Athletes’ Likenesses 
Technological advancements, such as the im-
provement of video game graphics, have forced the 
NCAA to change its rules that govern corporate 
sponsorship attaching themselves to student-
athletes.  For example, the NCAA’s current rules al-
low a corporate sponsor, such as NIKE, to attach its 
brand name to current student-athletes, where those 
same athletes appear at NCAA sanctioned events.  
Moreover, the current rules allow corporate sponsors 
to attach themselves to student-athletes and adver-
tise their brand, as long as it is contemporaneous 
with “promoting NCAA athletic competitions or other 
NCAA sanctioned events.”180  
The NCAA is continuously testing the waters 
in this respect.  In March 2011, the NCAA Cabinet 
sponsored possible amendments to its likeness pro-
posal.181  The Cabinet, in an article posted on the 
NCAA website, stated,  
 
Prop[osal] No. 2010-26, aims to accommo-
date advancements in technology and facili-
tate more authentic promotions associating 
schools with their sponsors while maintain-
ing the Association’s fundamental princi-
ples that prohibit commercial exploitation 
of student-athletes.182  
 
 The proposal that follows the principles devel-
oped by the 2008 Presidential Task Force on Com-
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mercial Activity in Division I Athletics continues 
many of the safeguards contained within the current 
legislation, which allows the use of student-athlete’s 
name or likeness for “promotions, advertisements 
and media activities if specific conditions are met.”183  
“Among current conditions carried over into the new 
legislation” of Proposal No. 2010-26 are: (1) student-
athlete permission and (2) athletic director approval 
for each activity.  Additionally the new proposal 
takes those two core requirements and adds a re-
finement:  
 
Promotional activity by a sponsor of an in-
stitution, conference or the NCAA must 
clearly identify the commercial entity’s 
sponsor affiliation (for example, an official 
sponsor of the institution or event) when 
student-athlete images are shown.184 
 
 The two current conditions in Proposal 2010-
26 are tainted and represent legal issues for the 
NCAA.  In regard to a student-athlete’s permission 
to use their likeness for the NCAA’s purported com-
mercial purposes, the NCAA would be able to do this 
even if they never approached the athlete for consent 
to use his image for the association’s own commercial 
purposes.185  Technically, the student-athlete had al-
ready consented to this by signing the NCAA’s Stu-
dent-Athlete Form 08-3a found in the NCAA Division 
1 National Letter of Intent.  
 
1.  Student-Athlete Permission 
 As previously mentioned, before the student-
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athlete is allowed to participate in practice he or she 
must sign various sections of Student-Athlete State-
ment Form 08-3a, which contains the language refer-
ring to the use of their images and likeness to pro-
mote NCAA championships, activities, events, or 
other programs.  The wording is vague and ambigu-
ous.  This could present a legal dilemma for the 
NCAA.  As mentioned earlier, the student-athletes 
must sign Form 08-3a in order to participate in team 
practices and games, NCAA athletic competitions, 
among other NCAA member institutions.   
These student-athletes are essentially left 
with no reasonable alternative but to sign Form 08-
3a.  It is unreasonable to argue that a student-
athlete would refuse to sign Form 08-3a, and thus 
voluntarily pass up their NCAA athletic eligibility 
because of their preference for the NCAA not to use 
their name, image, or likeness to further promote the 
association. 
 
2.  Athletic Director Approval 
Proposal 26 arose from a debate.  Some NCAA 
athletic directors supported the idea of attaching a 
brand, such as NIKE, to a current student-athlete.  
Some athletic directors approved this because they 
each recognize that attaching a corporate sponsor to 
a current student-athlete’s name image or likeness 
would create a new source of revenue to college 
sports programs.186  Given the way the purported 
amendments in Proposal 26 are drafted, athletic di-
rectors will now search for imaginative ways to gen-
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erate revenue for their athletic department by at-
taching brands to well-known student-athletes’ 
names, images, or likeness.187   University of Texas 
San Antonio Athletic Director Lynn Hickey argued if 
the NCAA wants to use the student-athletes’ images 
and likeness for promotion it should be done in a way 
to help them rather than exploit them.188  Athletic 
Director Hickey then added,  
 
It would be great to do something that 
would give the kids more visibility or to give 
more credit to the program,” Hickey said. 
“But how are you going to determine if 
you’re just not producing revenue for the 
corporate group vs. the university’s inter-
ests?189 
 
 It is hard to say, but it is more likely than not 
that the NCAA has created a new source of revenue 
generation for itself and is exploiting the student-
athletes for its own commercial benefit.  Moreover, 
some athletic directors of the NCAA’s member 
schools already recognize student-athletes as a draw-
ing card to the public, thus attaching a brand to well-
known student-athletes would create a huge revenue 
stream.   
Proposal 26 is aimed at avoiding the exploita-
tion of current student athletes while broadening the 
scope of what sponsors can do with promotions.  
Aside from the already mentioned current rules in 
the legislation, athletes would not endorse commer-
cial products. The current proposal combines these 
three core requirements of student-athlete permis-
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sion, athletic director approval, and non-commercial 
products and adds refinements, including: “A promo-
tional activity by a sponsor of an institution, confer-
ence or NCAA must clearly identify entity’s sponsor 
affiliation.”190  This raises issues and demonstrates 
why these student-athletes should be compensated 
for their revenue producing skills. Mike Rodgers, the 
faculty athletics representative at Baylor University, 
argued for this new refinement set forth in Docket 
No. Proposal 2010-26 to the NCAA Division I Ama-
teurism Cabinet.191  
 There have been several arguments for paying 
student-athletes in the past.  A common argument 
that several officials have made is generally summa-
rized as follows, “Why would we not pay these stu-
dent-athletes?  They are the people that draw 
111,000 paid spectators for Saturday football games 
at the Big House (The University of Michigan Foot-
ball Stadium). They are the people who sell out Cam-
eron Indoor Field House for every Duke University 
Home Basketball Game.”   
But now the NCAA and some of its member 
schools’ athletic directors want to attach corporate 
sponsorships to these student-athletes’ names, imag-
es, and likeness to make more money, without giving 
the athletes any portion of the revenue. It would be 
difficult for the NCAA to argue that a decision to use 
these student-athletes’ images or likenesses in any 
way that it or its member schools saw fit, would cen-
ter around the student-athlete’s welfare as opposed 
to the exploitation of these athlete for their own 
commercial benefit.  
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In the year 2014, it is a realistic fact that high 
level student-athletes are a huge attraction to the 
general public.192  There is no problem with the 
NCAA and its member institutions attaching current 
student-athletes to corporate sponsorships, but if this 
is the NCAA’s projected future of how it will operate 
its commercial enterprise, the NCAA must begin to 
compensate these student-athletes, because failing to 
do so would clearly be exploiting these athletes’ 
names, images, and likeness for its sole commercial 
benefit.193  
 
E. Recognition of the NCAA’s Manifest 
Disregard and Exploitation of Student-Athletes 
Big-Time College Football and Division I 
Men’s Basketball have both transformed into reve-
nue-generating machines.194  The college football 
teams who participate in different Bowl Games re-
ceive a hefty payout.  The majority of the money is 
distributed equally to that conference’s member in-
stitutions in addition to a windfall for the teams 
competing in the Bowl Games.195  Division I Men’s 
Basketball fares relatively well as well, with the 
NCAA licensing the rights to CBS and its member 
channels for 14 years to exclusively broadcast the 
March Madness tournament for $10.8 billion.196 
These statistics, along with the financial aid 
these student-athletes get specifically to compete in 
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NCAA competitions, shows that they are getting 
compensated for their athletic services rendered to 
their universities.  It has been demonstrated, but not 
held to date by the NLRB or the judiciary, that the 
Big-Time College Football and Division I student-
athlete-university relationship is predominantly an 
economic and not an educational one.197 Therefore, 
they should be considered employees under the 
NLRB legal standards. Additionally, both former and 
current Big-Time College Football and Division I 
Men’s Basketball student-athletes have acknowl-
edged that the NCAA has turned into a “money mak-
ing machine” for its own commercial benefit.198   
The lawsuit filed by former University of Cali-
fornia Los Angeles (UCLA) Men’s Basketball player 
Ed O’Bannon,199 demonstrates that former student-
athletes recognize that the NCAA misappropriates 
their likenesses for its own commercial benefit, and 
fails to compensate these once NCAA student-
athletes even though these athletes are no longer en-
rolled in college. Several former Big-Time College 
Football and Division I Men’s Basketball players at-
tempted to join O’Bannon’s lawsuit in a consolidated 
class action Complaint filed in July 2013.200  The 
players received a class action certification for the 
lawsuit against the NCAA, and the lawsuit is set for 
trial in early 2014. 
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1.  O’Bannon v. NCAA and Student-Athlete 
Statement Division I Form 08-3a Section IV  
O’Bannon, barring a settlement, will most 
likely be tried in 2014201 and may ultimately fore-
close that the relationship between these student-
athletes and their universities is purely an economic 
one, and therefore student-athletes should be com-
pensated for their athletic services rendered to their 
universities. 
Ed O’Bannon, a former college basketball 
player for UCLA, filed the aforementioned class ac-
tion lawsuit in July 2009 against the NCAA, CLC, 
and EA claiming that the defendants were conspiring 
to use former collegiate players’ images and likeness-
es for commercial benefit in perpetuity, because the 
former players had relinquished their personal at-
tribute rights by signing the Student-Athlete State-
ment Division I Form 08-3a Section IV.202  EA sought 
a dismissal, arguing that the company was simply 
following the rules laid down by the NCAA: former 
athletes’ rights were relinquished and they did not 
have to be compensated for the use of their images or 
likenesses.203  Judge Claudia Wilken of the US Dis-
trict Court of Northern California agreed with EA, 
Inc. and granted the company a dismissal in May 
2011.204  In doing so, Judge Wilken stated:  
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This purported conspiracy involves ‘De-
fendants’ concerted action to require all 
current student-athletes to sign forms each 
year that purport to require each of them to 
relinquish all rights in perpetuity for the 
use of their images, likeness and/or names’ 
and to deny any compensation ‘through re-
strictions in the [NCAA]  Bylaws.’ The Con-
solidated Amended Complaint, however, 
does not contain any allegations to suggest 
that EA agreed to participate in this con-
spiracy.205 
 
But Judge Wilken left the door open for the 
plaintiff to introduce evidence that would show that 
EA was involved with a conspiracy to use the former 
athletes for commercial benefit without compensa-
tion.206  O’Bannon’s attorney Jon King later argued 
that the rules that apply to current student-athletes 
should not govern former student-athletes in relation 
to compensation if their images or likenesses are 
used for commercial benefit, and that EA conspired 
with the NCAA and CLC not to pay them. 207  
If the plaintiffs win O’Bannon, the decision 
will not only forever affect the way the NCAA con-
ducts its commercial business but may also prove the 
relationship between these particular student-
athletes and their universities is predominantly an 
economic one, leading to the conclusion that the stu-
dent-athletes should be compensated by more than 
just a financial aid package. 
                                                             
205 Id. at *6 (citation omitted).  
206 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. 
C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011). 
207 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. 
C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011). 
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2.  What the Future May Hold for the NCAA as 
a Result of the Forthcoming 
O’Bannon Decision 
Regardless of whether the Manziel family 
eventually receives the “Johnny Football” football 
trademark, the Manziel family recognizes the 
NCAA’s restriction of student-athletes to license 
their likenesses, so that the NCAA is the only entity 
currently allowed to use each student-athlete’s like-
ness for its own commercial benefit. This demon-
strates the economic nature of this relationship be-
tween student-athletes and the NCAA.  
One further point with respect to the 
O’Bannon case, U.S. District Court Judge Alfred 
Covello has ordered ESPN to provide Ed O’Bannon 
and his attorneys with its television and licensing 
contracts for Division I Men’s Basketball and Foot-
ball since 2005.208  The order sets the table for 
O’Bannon to gain a much better understanding of 
how much the NCAA profits from current and former 
players’ names, images and likenesses.209  The order 
also highlights how the O’Bannon case threatens not 
only the NCAA and its member institutions, but also 
companies that have profited from Division I Men’s 
Basketball and football through contracts with the 
NCAA and members.210  Judge Covello’s ruling is a 
                                                             
208 Michael McCann, Judge Orders ESPN to Turn Over 
Contracts in Ed O’Bannon Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 
2012, 4:26 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/ 
michael_mccann/10/02/Ed-O-Bannon-ESPN/index.html. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
O’Bannon claims that, among other things, 
Form 08-3a and Article 12.5.1.1 enable NCAA to 
enter into licensing agreements with companies 
that distribute products containing student ath-
letes’ images . . . and [the athletes] do not re-
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reminder that the O’Bannon case presents real fi-
nancial and legal risk for the NCAA, CLC or any of 
the NCAA’s member institutions.211 
The information that ESPN was enjoined to 
disclose by Judge Covello, which ESPN considered 
privileged, is nowhere near the biggest worry.212  Re-
gardless of whether the plaintiffs win, the NCAA, 
CLC, EA, and any other entity (including ESPN) will 
be forced to surrender its own private knowledge of 
just how much it has profited from the labor of Big 
Time College Football and Division I Men’s Basket-
ball student-athletes.213  If the plaintiffs in fact win 
in 2014, it follows that the court will hold that the 
NCAA wrongly profited from the names, images, and 
likenesses of the student-athletes.214  If the NCAA 
did this knowingly, then the companies connected 
                                                                                                                             
ceive compensation for the use of their images.  
O’Bannon Compl. ¶ 80.  O’Bannon asserts that 
NCAA’s and CLC’s actions excluded him and 
other former student athletes from the colle-
giate licensing market. He claims that, because 
NCAA has rights to images of him from his col-
legiate career, it, along with its co-conspirators, 
fix the price for the use of his image at ‘zero.’ 
O’Bannon Compl. ¶ 86.  He maintains that this 
conduct ‘has artificially limited supply and de-
pressed prices paid by Defendants and their co-
conspirators to Plaintiff and the members of the 
Class for use of their images after cessation of 
participation in intercollegiate sports.’  
O’Bannon Compl. ¶ 182. 
O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *3. 
211 McCann, supra note 208. 
212 Id.  
213 Id. 
214 Id.; see also O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 
2010). 
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with the NCAA have arguably done the same.215  
Regardless of the outcome of O’Bannon, it is 
no longer a secret as to how much the NCAA benefits 
from these particular student-athletes.216  If the 
plaintiffs lose, it is only a matter of time as to when 
the judiciary and the NLRB will come to conclude 
that the relationship between the schools and their 
grant-in-aid Big-Time College Football and Division I 
Men’s Basketball student-athletes is predominantly 
an economic one, and therefore student-athletes 
should be compensated by the school for their ser-
vices rendered.  
 
A.  Possible Methods of Compensation for  
Student-Athletes 
 The cornerstone of the NCAA’s argument is 
that it wants to instill the notion of amateurism in 
college athletics.217  Since the beginning of college 
athletics, student-athletes have played for pride and 
for the love of the game, without being compensated 
for their performance on the fields and courts. How-
ever, the time has come for the NCAA to shy away 
from this ancient hallmark, and begin to pay players.  
Wallace Renfro, an NCAA Senior Policy analyst, 
commented on the NCAA’s economic model that re-
distributes money from revenue generating sports to 
other parts of the athletic department at a universi-
ty.218  Renfro drafted a memo to NCAA President, 
Mark Emmert, noting that the term student-athlete 
                                                             
215 McCann, supra note 208. 
216 Id.  
217 Pruitt, supra note 144.  
218 Tom Farrey,‘Student-Athlete’ Term in Question, ESPN 
(Sept. 19, 2012, 8:31 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8396753/ncaa-policy-chief-
proposes-dropping-student-athlete-term. 
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is one that “Walter Byers created to counter the criti-
cism that we are paying college athletes when we be-
gan providing grants-in-aid.”219  Walter Byers, the 
first executive director of the NCAA, coined the 
phrase grant-in-aid, and the term has been used ever 
since to describe an athletic scholarship.220   
 Renfro wrote the memo to Emmert in response 
to the O’Bannon suit’s claim that the NCAA violates 
antitrust laws by preventing universities from allow-
ing athletes to be compensated beyond the monetary 
amount of a grant-in-aid. An important quote from 
the memo, which Emmert has not yet responded to, 
is as follows: 
 
We have always had a cradle-to-grave ap-
proach to amateurism,’ Renfro wrote. ‘You 
are born an amateur, but like innocence 
once lost, it cannot be regained. But our 
commitment to amateurism has often been 
based on something other than how we de-
fine amateurism in our own constitution. In 
the most romantic sense we think of ama-
teurism as playing sports for the love of the 
game, for the camaraderie among competi-
tors, for the pride of victory for school or 
colors, and then we use this romanticized 
sense of amateurism to define the entire en-
terprise of collegiate athletics.221 
 
This quote alone speaks volumes. The NCAA 
                                                             
219 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
220 Id.   
221 Id. (internal quotes omitted); see Eamonn Brennan, First 
Wave of NCAA Documents Arrive, ESPN (Sept. 19, 2012, 1:05 
PM), 
http://m.espn.go.com/general/blogs/blogpost?blogname=collegeb
asketballnation&id=64203&wjb=.  
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understands that the amateurism veil is pierced, and 
the NCAA must move forward and leave behind the 
antiquated notion that the student-athlete only re-
ceives the grant-in-aid money, when evidence clearly 
shows that the student-athletes deserve more or at 
least “a cut of the pie” from the revenue they gener-
ate for the NCAA from their services rendered.222 
However, there are ways to compensate the 
student-athletes and at the same time promote the 
amateurism of college athletics, even if the student-
athlete and NCAA relationship is predominantly an 
economic one.223 There are three different possibili-
ties.  
First, the NCAA should set up an escrow ac-
count for each student-athlete, where money earned 
from NCAA licensing and merchandising deals with 
respect to each player will be deposited.224  Having 
this type escrow account for each student-athlete 
would be more effective than the potential of having 
the NLRB regulate the distribution of the licensing 
and merchandising revenue.  The marketplace will 
determine what each student-athlete earns – the 
same scheme used in professional sports leagues.225  
Second, the NCAA could pay players based on 
their merit and performance in games.  In this sce-
nario, the financial situation would not be deter-
mined by the celebrity status of the student-
athlete.226  From a performance standpoint, compen-
                                                             
222 Steve Haywood, Top College Athletes Deserve a Piece of the 
Pie. ONMILWAUKEE.COM (May 14, 2008, 6:53 PM), 
http://onmilwaukee.com/myOMC/authors/stevehaywood/haywoo
dblog051408.html. 
223 Farrey, supra note 218. 
224 Pruitt, supra note 144.  
225 Id.  
226 Id.  
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sating student-athletes for their athletic performanc-
es would lead to a stronger work ethic.  This in turn 
would motivate both the superstar just out of high 
school, and the third or fourth stringer to work hard-
er to obtain loftier goals.227  This would ultimately 
provide a better showcase of the student-athletes’ 
talents and provide a greater financial contribution 
to their team and their university.228  
With respect to the “merit” stipulation, if the 
NCAA were to compensate athletes based on a cer-
tain grade point averages, greater academic excel-
lence would be encouraged.229  Most NCAA member 
institutions reward athletes for their athletic stand-
ing and fail miserably when overseeing and evaluat-
ing h student-athlete performance in the class-
room.230  If the NCAA truly feels that the relation-
ship between it and the student-athlete is predomi-
nantly an educational one, and would not want the 
NLRB to get involved, then it would be best at this 
stage to pay the student-athlete and also provide the 
student-athlete with incentive to work hard to per-
form well in academics. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Grant-in-aid student-athletes that compete in 
the two revenue-generating sports, Big-Time College 
Football and NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball are 
not student-athletes as the NCAA asserts, but are 
employees under the NLRA.231  Student-athletes 
meet both the common law test and the statutory 
test applicable to university students, and they 
                                                             
227 Id.  
228 Id.  
229 Pruitt, supra note 144. 
230 Id.  
231 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 92.  
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should be compensated for their athletic services 
rendered to the university.232  
 The NCAA refers to these athletes as “student-
athletes” which leads to significant legal implica-
tions.233  The term signifies that student-athletes are 
amateurs who should not expect any form of reward 
after participating in NCAA collegiate sports. How-
ever, the reality is these students are employees un-
der the NLRA because they meet the common law 
“right of control” test and the NLRA’s statutory em-
ployee standard.234  From an economic standpoint, 
Big-Time College Football and Division I Men’s Bas-
ketball both generate millions of dollars each year.235  
The NCAA provides the media with program-
ming material for advertising and directly retains all 
profits, yet it insists that the persons generating the 
revenue are amateurs.236  Moreover, the revenues 
generated benefit only the NCAA and its member in-
stitutions.  The NCAA’s decision to repeatedly deny 
student-athletes payment from a legal and economic 
standpoint is no longer justifiable. Grant-in-aid Big-
Time College Football and Division I Men’s Basket-
ball student-athletes should not be referred to as 
amateurs because the NCAA has commercialized the 
industry and has led to the exploitation of those stu-
dent-athletes for its own commercial benefit.237 
“Once the innocence is lost, it can never be re-
gained.”238  It is no longer a secret that the NCAA 
cannot claim its affirmative defense of amateur-
                                                             
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 86.   
234 Id.  
235 Fram & Frampton, supra note 1.  
236 Id. 
237 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5. 
238 Farrey, supra note 218. 
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ism.239  The NCAA should accept that these particu-
lar student-athletes are the moneymakers for its lu-
crative commercial enterprise, and should develop a 
payment method for fair compensation, above the 
grant-in-aid, for their services rendered and the rev-
enue produced for their school, the NCAA, and its 
member institutions. 
                                                             
239 Id.   
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Abstract 
This Article argues why human flesh, because 
of its inherent properties and its necessity for human 
survival, should not qualify as a tangible medium of 
expression under the Copyright Act of 1976. Through 
policy concerns and property law this Article demon-
strates why the fixation requirement, necessary to 
obtain copyright protection of a “work,” must be flex-
ible and eliminate human flesh as an acceptable, 
tangible medium of expression, to avoid the disas-
trous risk of the court falling into the role of “21st 
Century judicial slave masters.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Though the earth and all inferior creatures, be 
common to all men, yet every man has a property in 
his own person: this no body has any right to but 
himself.” ~ John Locke1 
 
 
The human skin is the body’s largest organ, 
spanning a total area of twenty-two square feet and 
weighing an average of eight pounds.2  The skin con-
stantly regenerates itself, shedding up to one million 
skin cells daily.3  Human skin is miraculous; it regu-
lates body temperature, permits sensory stimuli, and 
provides protection against harmful infections, dehy-
dration, and injury.4  In addition to the human flesh 
providing human beings with life, it is a way for 
many people to demonstrate individual expression, 
                                                             
1 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 209 (London, 
Printed for R. Butler 1821) (1690).  
2 Skin, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
http://science.nationalgeographic.com/science/health-and-
human-body/human-body/skin-article.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2014); Skin Problems & Treatment Health Center, WEBMB, 
http://www.webmd.com/skin-problems-and-treatments/picture-
of-the-skin (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Skin 
Problems]. 
3 Ed Grabianowski, How Many Skin Cells Do You Shed Every 
Day?, DISCOVERY FIT & HEALTH , 
http://health.howstuffworks.com/skin-
care/information/anatomy/shed-skin-cells.htm (last visited Feb. 
2, 2014). 
4 See id.; see also Skin Problems, supra note 2. 
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whether that be through body art, body modifica-
tions, unique body piercings, tattoos, skin stretching, 
plastic surgery, or skin alternation for cultural tradi-
tions. 
 In 2011, Warner Brothers released the much-
anticipated sequel, The Hangover Part II.5  The film 
raked in big bucks at the box office and caused an 
uproar in the copyright community when one of the 
characters, Stu Price, wakes up one morning after a 
wild night in Bangkok, permanently sporting around 
his left eye a replica of Mike Tyson’s infamous, tribal 
facial tattoo.6  The scene won laughs globally; howev-
er, the tattoo artist who imprinted the tribal art on 
the heavyweight-boxing champion’s flesh, S. Victor 
Whitmill, was not amused and filed a copyright in-
fringement lawsuit against Warner Brothers on April 
28, 2011.7  
Warner Brothers did not know that when 
Whitmill tattooed the tribal piece on Tyson’s face in 
February of 2003, Tyson signed a release form that 
acknowledged, “all artwork, sketches and drawings 
related to [his] tattoo and any photographs of [his] 
tattoo are property of Paradox-Studio Derma-
graphics.”8  Warner Brothers never asked Whitmill 
for permission to use, reproduce, or create derivative 
works of Tyson’s tattoo in advertising and promotion 
                                                             
5 THE HANGOVER PART II (Warner Brothers 2011); see Jon 
Reichman & Aaron Johnson, Hangover Ink, INTELL. PROP. 
MAG., July/Aug. 2011, at 28, 28, available at 
http://www.kenyon.com/newspublications/publications/2011/~/m
edia/Files/Publication%20PDFs/2011_IPM_JulyAug.ashx. 
6 Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 28. 
7 Id. 
8 Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 3, 
Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11CV00752, 2011 
WL 2038147, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2011). 
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of the film.9 
 In addition to alleging copyright infringe-
ment, Whitmill filed a preliminary injunction in an 
attempt to stop Warner Brothers from releasing the 
film, but the presiding judge denied the injunction, 
acknowledging that “[Whitmill had a] strong likeli-
hood of prevailing on the merits for copyright in-
fringement.”10  Warner Brothers and Whitmill even-
tually settled outside of court, preventing the East-
ern District of Missouri from establishing firm legal 
precedent on the controversial issue of copyrighting 
tattoos.11  As scholars and attorneys in the intellec-
tual property field across the country weighed in on 
this controversy, the question of whether human 
flesh is copyrightable was at the core of the debate.12 
The United States Constitution states, “Con-
gress shall have the power . . . [t]o promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts by securing for lim-
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”13  
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright protection 
is given to “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.”14  Originality 
under the Copyright Act requires the author inde-
pendently create the work using a low modicum of 
                                                             
9 Id. at *6-7.  
10 Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 28. 
11 See id. 
12 See id.; see also Declaration of David Nimmer at 3, Whitmill 
v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. 4:11CV00752, 2011 WL 
10744102, at 2 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011).  
13 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  
14 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).   
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creativity.15  A work of authorship affixed to human 
skin would likely be copyrightable as a “pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work,” but its copyrightability 
hinges on the fixation requirement.  This Article will 
argue why human flesh should not qualify as a “tan-
gible medium of expression” under the Copyright Act 
of 1976. 
The above copyright provisions endow the au-
thor with complete property rights to control her 
work for her lifespan, plus, seventy years after her 
death; only once this period has lapsed does the au-
thor lose control over her work.16  This Article, 
through policy considerations and basic property and 
privacy law, specific to the personal rights in an in-
dividual’s body, will demonstrate why the fixation 
requirement must be flexible and categorize human 
flesh as an intangible medium of expression17 to 
avoid the disastrous risk of the court falling into the 
                                                             
15 Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
511, 525 (2013) (citing Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)).  Works of authorship including: 
“(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any 
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any 
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) 
architectural works.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
16 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012); see Melissa A. Bogden, Comment, 
Fixing Fixation: The RAM Copy Doctrine, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181, 
186 (2011). 
17 Intangible medium of expression refers to the negative of 
“tangible medium of expression.”  A work of authorship 
qualifies for copyright protection when “fixed within a tangible 
medium of expression.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  However, a 
work that resides in an intangible medium of expression does 
not qualify for copyright protection.  Throughout this Article, 
the meaning of intangible medium of expression remains 
consistent with this footnote’s explanation. 
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role of “21st Century judicial slave masters.”18 
Part I provides a brief look at the legislative 
intent behind the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, 
with particular focus on the reasons the fixation re-
quirement is a necessity for copyright protection.  
Further, this Part will examine, through precedent 
and policy, what the legal standard for fixation is in 
the 21st Century, paying special attention to what 
constitutes a “tangible medium of expression.” 
Part II will argue why the human skin does 
not constitute a “tangible medium of expression,” ar-
guing that the regenerative nature of human skin 
disallows qualification under the standard laid out 
by the court for “sufficient permanence.”  Additional-
ly, this Part will discuss how through transitory du-
ration’s functional standard, body art, plastic sur-
gery, or a layperson’s tattoo are not reproduced for 
economic value, differentiating between reproduc-
tions by Warner Brothers in The Hangover Part II 
and the makeup designer for the Broadway play, 
Cats.  Finally, this Part will argue that above both 
the requirements of permanency and transitory du-
ration, because human skin is necessary for an indi-
vidual’s survival, it is a useful article and uncopy-
rightable. 
Part III addresses the personal rights in one’s 
own body, discussing an individual’s privacy and 
property interests set forth in the United States Con-
                                                             
18 In this Article, I coin the phrase “21st Century judicial slave 
masters.”  In terms of this Article, this phrase means that the 
United States judiciary will act as modern day slave master 
exercising behavior similar to 19th Century slave masters that 
existed prior to the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.  
However, courts will take on the role of “21st Century judicial 
slave masters” by controlling individuals through the remedial 
copyright laws. 
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stitution.  Further, this Part looks at these interests’ 
relationship to a copyright holder’s property rights, 
ultimately concluding that an individual’s personal 
rights in her body supersede copyright law. 
Part IV will present the dangers that the legal 
system will face if courts consider human flesh as a 
viable medium of expression for copyright protection.  
This Part will examine the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition on slavery, relating to the property rights 
endowed to an author for her copyrighted work.  Uti-
lizing various policies, this Part will show why nor-
mal copyright remedies, enforced by the courts for 
copyright infringement, can create disastrous conse-
quences leading to modern day slavery.  In the 21st 
Century, it becomes necessary, depending on an in-
dividual’s status, for a person to recognize the argu-
ments below before allowing an ink needle, surgical 
scalpel, henna brush, or piercing gun to touch the 
skin.19 
 
I.  MOLDING THE MEDIUM: THE HISTORY OF 
COPYRIGHT’S FIXATION REQUIREMENT 
Copyright protection under United States cop-
yright law requires that an author must create an 
original work of authorship, and that work must be 
fixed in a “tangible medium of expression;” neither 
can survive without the other.20  The Copyright Act 
                                                             
19 See Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 29. 
20 Laura A. Heymann, How to Write a Life: Some Thoughts on 
Fixation and the Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV 825, 830 (“Under U.S. copyright law, fixation is what 
creates both an author and a commodifiable subject, neither of 
which exists as a legal entity in copyright law before the act of 
fixation occurs.”); see also Trotter Hardy, Introduction to 
Boundaries of Intellectual Property Symposium, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV.825, 842 (2009). 
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considers a work fixed in a “tangible medium of ex-
pression” if: 
 
[I]ts embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, 
by or under the authority of the author, is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it 
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.  A work consisting of 
sounds, images, or both, that are being 
transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this 
title if a fixation of the work is being made 
simultaneously with its transmission.21 
 
This statutory language presents two reasons 
for the existence of the fixation requirement: (1) use 
of the work by others, creating a permanency to use 
the work in the future; and (2) the concept of author-
ity, which only considers a work fixed if the author of 
the original work or her agent physically performs 
the task of fixation.22 
 
A.  Fixation’s Legislative History 
The fixation concept is rooted in the printing 
press; evident through the Supreme Court’s holding 
in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 
that player piano rolls did not constitute copies un-
der the Copyright Act of 1909. 23  The Copyright Act 
required copies to be recorded in print through “intel-
ligible notion,” because the rolls were only readable 
                                                             
21 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
22 See Hardy, supra note 20, at 842; see also Perzanowski, 
supra note 15, at 526.  
23 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 
(1908). 
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by machine.24  However, prior to the Copyright Act of 
1976, the Copyright Act of 1909 did not make the 
fixation requirement mandatory to obtain copyright 
protection, but instead afforded copyright protection 
to “all the writing[s] of an author.”25  This broad lan-
guage demonstrated that although the statutory lan-
guage did not explicitly state the necessity of fixa-
tion, the concept still existed through the methods by 
which authors obtained copyright protection for their 
works through either: notice with the presence of the 
copyright symbol, displayed as ©, on the work, or 
providing the United States Copyright Office with a 
copy of the unpublished work.26 
In 1964, three members of Congress presented 
a revision to the 1909 Copyright Act, which later be-
came section 102(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act.  The 
proposal discussed the concept of fixation and re-
quired original works of authorship be fixed in a 
“tangible medium of expression” in order to secure 
copyright protection.  Further, the revision, in sec-
tion 15, explained what constitutes a copy, differen-
tiating between the ownership of the copyright and 
the material object that the work is first fixed in or 
embodied.27  Although the 1964 revision (now the 
1965 bill) laid foundation for the new requirement, it 
                                                             
24 Carrie Ryan Gallia, Note, To Fix or Not to Fix: Copyright’s 
Fixation Requirement and the Rights of Theatrical 
Collaborators, 92 MINN. L. REV. 231, 238 (2007) (quoting White-
Smith Music, 209 U.S. at 17) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
25 See Hardy, supra note 20, at 844. 
26 See id.; see also Bogden, supra note 16, at 188 (discussing 
the 1909 Copyright Act’s lack of fixation requirement because 
copyright protection only extended to specified categories of 
works listed in the Act: maps, charts, and books). 
27 Hardy, supra note 20, at 846 (noting that section 15 later 
became section 202 of the Copyright Act of 1976).  
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still lacked a concrete definition for “fixation.”  It was 
not until 1966, after broadcasters and commentators 
spoke out about whether computer software qualified 
as fixed, did the Judiciary Committee add what is 
today’s current definition of fixation to the 1965 
bill.28  Today’s broad fixation definition “was intend-
ed to ‘avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable 
distinctions . . . under which statutory copyrightabil-
ity in certain cases has been made to depend upon 
the form or medium in which the work is fixed.’”29 
 
B. The Fixation Requirement in the 21st Century 
Scholars agree that fixation’s purpose is to 
limit the privileges of copyright protection to works 
in tangible form; intangible works qualify for zero 
protection.30  The fixation requirement holds the ca-
pability of removing an author’s work from being a 
mere, unprotectable idea and labels it as one of the 
many “bundle of sticks” rights a person owns in 
property.31 
Fixation, in most cases, is easy to meet, which 
explains why there is rarely any controversy sur-
rounding the requirement.32  In a majority of cases, 
courts acknowledge the fixation requirement, state 
that it is met, and move on; cases that challenge fixa-
tion usually do so based on the case’s particular 
                                                             
28 Id. at 847.  
29 Id. at 848.  
30 See Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 28; see also 
Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 9. 
31 See Joshua C. Liederman, Note & Comment: Changing the 
Channel: The Copyright Fixation Debate, 36 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 289, 312-13 (2010) (“In essence, fixation 
acts as the ‘trigger’ for copyright protection, removing the work 
from a mere idea and creates a property that is eligible for 
copyright protection.”). 
32 Hardy, supra note 20, at 849.  
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facts.33  However, depending on the subject matter, 
the fixation requirement can be murky; therefore, 
fixation can be separated into three elements: (1) the 
embodiment requirement, in which the work must be 
embodied in a material object; (2) the permanency 
requirement, mandating that the work is sufficiently 
stable or permanent to permit perception;34 and (3) 
the durational requirement, where the work “must 
remain thus embodied ‘for a period of more than 
transitory duration.’”35  Case law provides that prob-
lems with fixation arise in both the permanency and 
durational requirements, leading courts, mostly in 
the computer technology arena, to further define 
these two requirements.36 
 
1.  Permanency 
The 1976 Copyright Act never required that a 
copy have “absolute permanence” to be fixed.37  Per-
manency only requires – sufficient – not absolute 
permanence, to satisfy fixation’s meaning under sec-
tion 102.38  Courts apply permanency in a functional 
standard, classifying a reproduction as fixed by de-
pending on “whether action can be performed to or 
with the reproduction and not arbitrarily on its de-
gree of permanency.”39   
The Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems Corp. v. 
                                                             
33 See id. at 850. 
34 See Bogden, supra note 16, at 188; see also MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02[B][2] 
(2012) (stating that the embodiment and permanency 
requirement are two separate concepts). 
35 Hardy, supra note 20, at 851 (citing Cartoon Network LP v. 
CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
36 See Liederman, supra note 31, at 298.  
37 Id. at 300.  
38 Id. at 298-99. 
39 Id. at 299. 
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Peak Computer Inc. (“MAI”),40 is to credit for estab-
lishing this framework; however, it is a standard 
used when dealing specifically with Random Access 
Memory (“RAM”) in a computer. In MAI, the Court’s 
task was to determine whether the unauthorized re-
production of a computer’s temporary memory consti-
tuted copyright infringement.  The Court held that 
copies of RAM are fixed because such memory is held 
long enough for a computer company service to make 
a diagnosis of the problem with the computer.41  The 
Ninth Circuit went further, stating that loading 
software into a computer creates a RAM copy, allow-
ing the RAM copy to be “perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated.”42 
 
2.  Transitory Duration 
Like, permanency, a majority of transitory du-
ration’s framework was established through comput-
er technology case law.  The Copyright Act, although 
it mentions that fixation requires a “more than tran-
sitory duration,” has no concrete period of time that 
specifies how long the reproduction must be stored or 
held in the material object.43  Courts use a functional 
approach to analyze transitory duration, focusing on 
“what should be done with the reproduction” as op-
posed to the reproduction’s temporariness.  This 
temporal requirement must be applied and inter-
                                                             
40 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th 
Cir. 1993).  Since the MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc. 
decision, courts across the country have treated the Ninth 
Circuit’s precedent as controlling authority.  See Liederman, 
supra note 31, at 290 n.11.  
41 Liederman, supra note 31, at 298. 
42 Id. at 299. 
43 Id. at 304 (further stating that this was the consensus of 
the Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc.). 
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preted in the context of the situation.44 
In 1998, when the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act (“DMCA”) was passed, the United States 
Copyright Office clarified the meaning of transitory 
duration, reiterating language of the requirement in 
the 1976 Copyright Act that a copy does not need to 
last for any specified amount of time.45  In the 
DMCA, the United States Copyright Office extended 
the functional standard for determining transitory 
duration to encompass the reproductions economic 
value.  “[T]he economic value derived from a repro-
duction lies in the ability to copy, perceive or com-
municate it.”46  Even though the courts established a 
workable, prevailing view for transitory duration,47 
there is still apprehension on implementing a tem-
poral threshold, laying out how temporary is tempo-
rary – days, hours, minutes, seconds, or nanosec-
onds?48  Transitory duration in the 21st Century 
makes it fundamental to challenge the liberal bounds 
of this requirement based on a case’s specific factual 
background.  
                                                             
44 Id. at 302.  In the late 1990s, courts were at a consensus 
that a copy could be for “the briefest of existence” in a 
computer’s RAM and still support a finding of infringement.  Id. 
at 303 (citing Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Taho Specialty, Inc., 
55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D. Nev. 1999)). 
45 Id. at 303-04.  
46 See id. at 304 (stating that by a person making a copy of a 
product, even if temporary, it clearly demonstrates the 
realization that the product has economic value).  
47 The Fourth Circuit established the minority test for 
transitory duration that considers the function/use of the copy 
requiring both, (1) “[a] qualitative aspect ‘describ[ing] the status 
of the transition,’” and (2) “[a] quantitative aspect ‘describ[ing] 
the period during which the function occurs.’”  Liederman, 
supra note 31, at 306.  
48 See id. at 305. 
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II.  DOES HUMAN FLESH QUALIFY AS FIXED IN A 
TANGIBLE MEDIUM OF EXPRESSION? 
 David Nimmer, a leading scholar on Copy-
right, states that “live bodies do not qualify as a ‘me-
dium of expression’ sufficient to ground copyright 
protection.”49  Professionals in the tattoo industry 
agree with Nimmer’s logic, believing that “[t]he im-
age [in the skin] is just what happens to be left after 
you spend a moment in time with a particular per-
son. It’s an intangible object.”50  This Part will argue 
why, based on three legal reasons, the human skin is 
an intangible medium of expression and not copy-
rightable.51  The first two arguments will focus on 
two requirements necessary for an author’s work to 
be fixed within a “tangible medium of expression:” 
permanency and transitory duration.  The third ar-
gument recognizes that although the human flesh 
may not fit perfectly into the intangible medium of 
expression category, the skin’s useful and functional 
nature, further supports why the skin is uncopy-
rightable.  
 
A.  Permanency 
Permanency requires sufficient, not absolute, 
permanence to provide copyright protection to a work 
                                                             
49 Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 5; William 
T. McGrath, Copyright Concerns Come with ‘Hangover’, 
CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL. (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/Law-Day/2012/04/28/LD-
mcgrathforum-2012.aspx.  
50 See Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 588 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
51 Congress did not intend for the human flesh to serve as a 
canvas that would embody legally protected authorship.  
Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 10. 
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of authorship.52  The human body lacks copyright 
protection in a variety of areas – hair, nails, and cu-
ticles – because of its constant evolution and 
growth.53  In this Section, I will argue why the hu-
man skin does not meet the standard of sufficient 
permanence because of the skin’s regenerative na-
ture, making it an inadequate medium of expression.  
Many scholars in intellectual property believe 
that the human skin automatically meets the per-
manency requirement, deeming the skin a “tangible 
medium of expression,”54 but if one examines the 
anatomy of the flesh, immediate questions of doubt 
arise concerning the skins true permanent nature.   
The human skin constantly changes with age, 
sun exposure, inhalation of toxins, and shedding of 
dead skin cells on a daily basis.55  The entire human 
body consists of 10 trillion cells, with 1.6 trillion of 
those cells belonging to the human skin.56  On an 
hourly basis, humans shed 30,000 to 40,000 skin 
cells, and in a twenty-four hour period, the flesh 
sheds almost one million skin cells.57  Such rapid, 
                                                             
52 See Liederman, supra note 31, at 298-99.  The dictionary 
defines sufficient as “adequate for the purpose” or “enough to 
meet a need or purpose.”  Sufficient, DICTONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sufficient?s=t (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
53 Michael M. Ratoza, More of The Hangover, U.S. IP L. (May 
30, 2011, 9:46 AM), http://www.us-ip-law.com/2011/05/more-of-
hangover.html. 
54 See Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 28; Perzanowski, 
supra note 15, at 525; Dave Fagundes, Can You Copyright a 
Nose Job?, PRAWFS BLAWG (May 28, 2011), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/can-you-
copyright-a-nose-job.html. 
55 See Skin, supra note 2.  
56 Grabianowski, supra note 3. 
57 Id.  Human skin’s shedding process affects tattoos daily 
because it causes bright and colorful works to fade over time.  
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consistent, and extensive loss of skin cells cannot log-
ically categorize the skin as sufficiently permanent, 
as it constantly evolves, leaving its past remnants 
scattered in the dust, literally. 
Another area of the body58 that unlike the 
flesh is notably uncopyrightable because it lacks 
permanency due to its constant growth is hair.  The 
human head holds between 90,000 and 140,000 hair 
follicles.59  These follicles grow 0.44 millimeters per 
day, amounting to about one half of an inch each 
month, and only six inches per year.60  Depending on 
the pigment of a hair follicle, an individual will shed 
between 30 to 50 single strands of hair per day,61 a 
far lower amount than the skin, shedding almost one 
million cells per day.  Although the hair’s growth 
rate is slow, hair stylists cannot claim copyright pro-
tection for specific couture hair designs or fashiona-
ble new haircuts because the of hair follicle’s con-
stant growth and lack of permanence.62  With the 
hair’s slow growth and minimal shedding process, it 
is hard to imagine why the hair is not sufficiently 
permanent enough to qualify as a “tangible medium 
of expression,” but the human skin’s extensive shed-
ding and adaptation to the environment, which is far 
greater than the hair’s growth, still allows skin to 
qualify as sufficiently permanent for body art or tat-
                                                             
58 Human nails do not meet sufficient permanency because of 
the nails rapid growth, functional nature, and upkeep of the 
fingers cuticles.  See id.; Ratoza, supra note 53. 
59 How Quickly Does Hair Grow?, TLC (Apr. 1, 2000), 
http://tlc.howstuffworks.com/style/question251.htm (last visited 
Feb. 2, , 2014). 
60 Id.  
61 Cinya Burton, Does Your Hair Shed Too Much?, 
BEAUTYLISH (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://www.beautylish.com/a/vcvrn/hair-shedding. 
62 Ratoza, supra note 53.  
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toos. 
  
B.  Transitory Duration 
Transitory duration has no bright line stand-
ard specifying the exact amount of time that a “picto-
rial, graphic, or sculptural work” must reside in a 
material object to satisfy the fixation requirement.63  
Instead, courts look to the economic value held in a 
reproduction.64  A layperson’s human skin, painted 
with tattoo ink or restructured to boost one’s self-
esteem, clearly does not hold any economic value 
once the individual walks out of the author’s office.  
In this Section, I will argue that human skin does 
not hold economic value under the functionality 
standard because many individuals do not alter their 
skin for any purpose other than to please themselves. 
Warner Brothers reproduced Mike Tyson’s fa-
cial tattoo in advertisement posters for The Hangover 
Part II in an effort to promote65 the movie’s comedic 
value and get moviegoers to pay their eight dollars66 
to see the flick on the silver screen.  Warner Broth-
ers’ incentive to reproduce Tyson’s facial tattoo on 
the movie’s character, Stu Price’s face was undoubt-
edly to generate revenue to boost the film’s economic 
success at the box office, which it did, allowing the 
film to gross $138 million in the United States 
                                                             
63 Liederman, supra note 31, at 304. 
64 See id. 
65 See Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, 
supra note 8, at 5, 7. 
66 Average Movie-Ticket Price Edges Up to a Record $7.93 for 
2011, L.A. Times Blog (Feb. 9, 2012), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2012/0
2/average-movie-ticket-price-2011.html.  An average movie 
ticket cost $8.00 in 2011 when The Hangover Part II was 
released.  Today, in 2014, movie tickets across the United 
States probably range from $8.00 to $20.00. 
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alone.67  Warner Brothers’ reproduction of Tyson’s 
tattoo to achieve economic heights does not compare 
to the reasons a layperson gets a tattoo.  Individuals 
do not walk into a tattoo parlor to get “inked” in an 
effort to economically exploit the tattoo artist’s work, 
but rather to get a piece of artwork on their skin that 
either represents a lost loved one, signifies a military 
brotherhood, embraces one’s faith or culture, symbol-
izes a life-changing event, or just for the love of art; 
the list goes on.68  The personal reasons an individual 
decides to get “inked” and the very nature of a tattoo 
do not logically demonstrate that reproduction of the 
product, in this case the tattoo, was for economic 
value.69 
In Carell v. Shubery Organizations,70 the 
United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York awarded copyright protection for 
the makeup designs of the Broadway sensation, Cats, 
to the play’s makeup artist, Candace Anne Carell.  
The court granted copyright protection because 
Carell’s makeup designs were fixed to the faces of the 
Cats actors.71  However, the constant reproduction of 
                                                             
67 Nikki Finke, Biggest Memorial Weekend B.O. Ever!, 
DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (May 30, 2011), 
http://www.deadline.com/2011/05/hangover-part-2-opens-with-
9m-10m-thursday-midnight-screenings-on-its-way-to-125m/. 
68 Michael R. Mantell, The Psychology of Tattoos: You Think 
It, They’ll Ink It: Why People Get Tattoos, SAN DIEGO MAG. (Aug. 
2009), http://www.sandiegomagazine.com/San-Diego-
Magazine/August-2009/The-Psychology-of-Tattoos/; Why Do 
People Get Tattoos?, TATTOOED ENGINEER (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.thetattooedengineer.com/2011/05/26/why-do-people-
get-tattoos/. 
69 See Liederman, supra note 31, at 304. 
70 Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
71 Id. at 247.  Infra Part IV.B.2.  
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Carell’s makeup designs in Cats held pure economic 
value; had the actors not donned the makeup designs 
that transformed each of them into human cats, the 
show would not have grossed a record $380 million in 
sales.72  Although the economic value resides in the 
transformative makeup designs for this theatrical 
Broadway play, performed on one of the most famous 
stages in the country, an individual does not apply 
makeup on a daily basis or opt to get plastic surgery 
for its economic value.  Individuals want, and get, 
plastic surgery to increase their self-esteem, improve 
unwanted imperfections, or make them happier in 
their lives.73  If transitory duration’s functional 
standard dictates that the reproduction of a “pictori-
al, graphic, or sculptural work” must hold economic 
value to pass the fixation requirement, then a lay-
person’s reasoning, stated above, for surgically alter-
ing or decorating his or her skin does not qualify for 
copyright protection under transitory duration, fur-
ther deeming the human flesh as an intangible me-
dium of expression.  
 
C.  Functionality of the Human Flesh 
In the 21st Century, individuals around the 
world utilize and transform their skin for cultural 
traditions or plain aesthetics, through body art, 
unique body piercings, tattoos, skin stretching, body 
modifications, and plastic surgery.  However, human 
skin does not only serve as a surface for creative dec-
                                                             
72 Jessee McKinley, ‘Cats,’ Broadway’s Longevity Champ, to 
Close, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/20/us/cats-broadway-s-
longevity-champ-to-close.html. 
73 Daniel J. DeNoon, Who Gets Plastic Surgery and Why, 
WEBMB (Aug. 20, 2005), http://www.webmd.com/healthy-
beauty/news/20050830/who-gets-plastic-surgery-why. 
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oration and sculptural purpose, but also serves as a 
useful article having more purpose than just as a 
material object meant to hold an author’s work.74 
The Copyright Act defines a useful article as 
“an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function 
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the 
article or to convey information,”75 meaning that 
when a material object has at least one other purpose 
than as a surface for an author’s original work, it 
constitutes a useful article.76  
In the recent The Hangover Part II case, David 
Nimmer gave a deposition for Warner Brothers.77  He 
discussed a “spectrum of non-expressive utility” that 
helps determine the level of usefulness a material 
object can hold, in relation to the human head, which 
functionally is comparable to human flesh.78  The 
spectrum’s first level provides an example of a sur-
face holding the least amount of functionality – a 
painting – which holds no purpose other than to de-
pict the painting.79  The second level is a material 
substrate that does have functionality, along with 
aesthetic purpose – the belt buckle.80  At the spec-
trum’s final level resides Mike Tyson’s head, provid-
ing minor aesthetic purposes due to Tyson’s celebrity 
status, that are clearly outweighed by the immensely 
important functions that the head holds because it 
harbors the brain.81 
Human skin falls on Nimmer’s final level of 
                                                             
74 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 10.  
75 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
76 Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 8. 
77 See id. 
78 Id. at 10. 
79 Id. at 9. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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the “spectrum of non-expressive utility,” having min-
imal aesthetic purposes, paling in comparison to the 
skin’s functions.82  The human skin consists of layers 
of cells, glands, and nerves, functioning as our con-
nection to the world and an outer layer of protection 
against the atmosphere’s elements and microbes.83  
The skin has six primary functions that logically 
demonstrate why flesh falls on the final level of 
Nimmer’s spectrum: (1) heat regulation, fluctuating 
the temperature of the body depending on the envi-
ronment it’s in; (2) absorption, that limits the 
amount of foreign substances that enter the body; (3) 
secretion by the sebaceous glands, which produces oil 
that helps maintain the skin’s health; (4) protection 
provided by fat cells that keep an individual’s inter-
nal organs safe from trauma and acts as a barrier, 
preventing against invasion by harmful bacteria; (5) 
excretion of waste materials through perspiration; 
and (6) sensation that allows, through nerve endings, 
for individuals to experience atmospheric tempera-
ture, touch, pain, and pleasure.84 
The human skin serves as much more than 
just a useful article; without the skin and its various 
functions the human body would literally evapo-
rate.85  The amount of life preserving functions that 
the human skin produces clearly indicates that Con-
gress lacked any intention of labeling human flesh as 
an article; therefore, demonstrating why aside from 
                                                             
82 Id. at 10. 
83 See Skin Problems, supra note 2; see also Skin, supra note 
2. 
84The Functions of Human Skin, PCA SKIN, 
http://www2.pcaskin.com/functions_of_human_skin.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2014).  
85 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 9; see 
also Skin, supra note 2. 
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the “tangible medium of expression,” the skin is not 
copyrightable.86 
 
III.  LEGAL CONFIDENCE IN ONE’S SKIN:  
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE HUMAN BODY 
 After the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolished slavery on December 6, 
1865,87 the days that human beings were the proper-
ty of others ended, or so we think.  Today, although 
the definitional term of slavery88 does not currently 
exist in this country, there is confusion surrounding 
                                                             
86 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 10.  
Nimmer explains further that it is necessary to look outside the 
“tangible medium of expression” when looking to see if the 
copyrighted work is afforded copyright protection.  Copyright 
protection for “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural [works] that can 
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”  Id. at 
11. Nimmer’s theory of separability is that the copyright 
protection is only afforded to works that are “physically 
separable” from the medium.  Nimmer demonstrates this 
concept with the tattoo on Mike Tyson’s face, reasoning that the 
tribal tattoo is not “physically separable” from the heavyweight 
champion’s face because the tattoo became part of his body.  
The only copy of the tribal tattoo resides around Tyson’s left 
eye, imprinted in his face; Whitmill never drew the tattoo on 
paper, but rather drew the tattoo directly on Tyson’s face.  Id. 
at 8, 11. 
87 Primary Documents in American History: 13th Amendment 
of the Constitution, LIBR. OF CONG., 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/13thamendment.htm
l (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).  
88 Slavery is defined as “a civil relationship whereby one 
person has absolute power over another and controls his life, 
liberty, and fortune.”  Slavery, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/slavery?s=ts (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2014). 
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the law of the body.89  The uncertainty of the laws 
categorizes the human body as either property, qua-
si-property, or merely a subject of constitutional pri-
vacy rights.90  However, both property and privacy 
rights – in the context of the human body – protect 
two of the same interests: “the right to possess one’s 
own body and the right to exclude others from it.”91  
Although these interests are similar, the main differ-
ence resides in the transferability of rights to others, 
which draws a thin line between an individual sell-
ing her body to a third party and self-ownership.  
This presents a problem, not only during life, but af-
ter death as well, specifically when dividing rights 
between close family and the interests of strangers 
that hold copyright interest in another’s skin.92 
This Part will discuss these two similar priva-
cy and property interests in the human body, and 
their relationship to a copyright holder’s property 
rights, demonstrating why many scholars suggest 
that an individual’s personal rights in her own body 
supersede copyright law.93 
 
A.  Classifying the Body as Property 
Traditionally, property rights consist of a 
“bundle of rights” (also conceptualized as a “bundle of 
sticks”) owned by the person relative to the particu-
                                                             
89 See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 
80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 363 (2000).  
90 Id. at 363.  
91 Id. at 366-67.  
92 Id. at 369.  
93 Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 28 (stating that this 
logic applies to tattoos and plastic surgery).  
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lar object.94  These rights include: 
 
the right to possess one’s property, the 
right to use it, the right to exclude others, 
the right to transfer ownership by gift or 
by sale, the right to dispose of one’s prop-
erty after death, and the right not to have 
one’s property expropriated by the gov-
ernment without payment or compensa-
tion.95  
 
The United States Supreme Court consistently 
holds that the most essential “stick” in the “bundle of 
rights” is an individual’s right to exclude others.96  
Further, “property rights are body rights that protect 
the choice to transfer.”97  Its importance is relevant 
when discussing copyright protection in relation to 
an individual’s property rights in her own body.98  
Traditionally, property law does not recognize the 
human body as concrete property; therefore looking 
at the Framers’ intent behind the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments of the Constitution, coupled with the 
philosophical opinion by John Locke, will help estab-
lish a framework for establishing an individual’s 
rights in her body.99 
The Framers of the United States Constitution 
                                                             
94 Rao, supra note 89, at 389. Each “right” or “stick” in the 
bundle represents a particular property right held by an 
individual.  
95 Id. at 370. 
96 Id. at 424.  
97 Id. at 367 n.16. 
98 See id. at 367.  
99 Paul Filon, Who Owns You? Property Right in the Human 
Body, SPRIEGEL & ASSOC. (Feb. 15, 2010), 
http://gotopatentlawfirm.com/2010/02/15/who-owns-you-
property-rights-in-the-human-body/.  
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never intended property’s “bundle of rights” to in-
clude property rights or interests in the human 
body.100  This intention is prevalent in the language 
of the Fourth101 and Fifth Amendments,102 which in-
dicate people are improper mediums in which to hold 
any property interests.103  Compared to the Framers’ 
intent, a copyright holder’s proprietary control over 
his or her work, constitutionally, could not extend to 
works in human flesh because individuals are pro-
tected by privacy not property interests in their 
body.104 
One of the great philosophers, John Locke,105 
expands on the Framers’ intent that an individual 
cannot hold property interest in another’s body, with 
one of the first influential theories on the subject 
matter.  Locke’s theory explicitly states that the hu-
man body is a form of property controlled by its own-
er, endowing that individual with all ownership of 
property rights that reside in human skin.106  His be-
                                                             
100 Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, Personalizing Personality: 
Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX L. REV. 209, 
220 (1990).  
101 Infra Part III.B.  
102 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of 
life, liberty, or property.”). 
103 Bray, supra note 100, at 220-21 (people and property are 
two distinct categories). 
104 Id. at 221. 
105 John Locke is known for being one of the greatest 
European philosophers in the 17th Century.  Locke graduated 
from University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, England and 
was a prestigious medical researcher.  His most famous and 
widely recognized work is The Second Treatise of Government, 
published in Two Treatises of Government.  William Uzgalis, 
John Locke, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward 
N. Zalta, ed. 2012), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/locke/. 
106 Rao, supra note 89, at 367. 
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lief is that an individual “literally owns one’s [own] 
limbs.”107  His widely recognized theory, coupled with 
the Framers’ intent, solidifies that the only individu-
al capable, under the law, of owning property rights 
in the human body is the person whom possesses its 
physical being.  Furthermore, the United States gov-
ernment codified this argument by passing the Thir-
teenth Amendment, which prohibits individuals from 
owning another individual as property.108 
With all the above evidence, an author’s prop-
erty rights in a work are seemingly protected by cop-
yright law, specifically when an author creates a 
“pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work” using the hu-
man skin as her canvas.  Logically, this right cannot 
trump the fundamental rights of the Constitution 
that allows individuals to exclude others from hold-
ing a proprietary interest in the body. 
 
B.  Classifying the Body as a Privacy Interest 
Like property rights, privacy rights encompass 
a “cluster of personal interests.”109  However, the 
United States Constitution protects an individual’s 
privacy rights, rather than the basic rules of property 
under the Fourth Amendment,110 which states that 
American citizens have the right “to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”111  Privacy 
consists of two fundamental rights: (1) personal pri-
vacy, also known as bodily integrity, and (2) relation-
                                                             
107 Id. at 367 n.19 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Property 
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 965 (1982)) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
108 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1.  Infra Part IV. 
109 Rao, supra note 89, at 389.  
110 Id. at 387. 
111 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Bray, supra note 100, at 220.  
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ship privacy.112  This Section will focus on the first 
principal, the personal right to privacy that provides 
an individual the right to restrict third parties from 
intruding or physically altering the individual’s hu-
man body.113 
“[P]rivacy envisions the body as an integral 
Part of the person”114 entitling the human body to 
protection because it is a physical embodiment of the 
person.115  Professor Daniel Ortiz,116 explains that 
constitutional privacy rights establish “a sphere of 
individual dominion,” disallowing interference of 
others without consent and creating a “dominion over 
oneself.  It defines a sphere of self-control, a sphere 
of decision-making authority about oneself, from 
which one can presumptively exclude others.”117 
Such complete control over one’s body collides 
head on with permitting human skin to stand as a 
“tangible medium of expression.”118  The collision of 
rights presents itself if a court orders an injunction119 
forcing an individual sporting a copyright holder’s 
body art, tattoo, or piercing, to – or not to – remove 
                                                             
112 Rao, supra note 89, at 388.  
113 Id. at 389.  
114 Id. at 444.  
115 Id. at 445.  
116 Professor Daniel Ortiz received his Juris Doctor from Yale 
Law School in 1983.  He currently teaches constitutional law 
and legal theory at Virginia Law School.  Daniel R. Ortiz, U. 
VA. SCHOOL OF L., 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/Faculty.nsf/FHPbI/119647
7 (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).  
117 Rao, supra note 89, at 428.  
118 See Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on 
the Body: Intellectual Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and 
Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 121-22 (2003). 
119 Infra Part IV.A. 
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the author’s work.120  Copyright owners hold moral 
rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”), 
which protects the integrity of their work from de-
struction, alterations, and distortions.121  However, 
any injunction favoring the copyright holder in re-
spect to another’s bodily integrity would create a 
“substantial bodily intrusion” under the Fourth 
Amendment.122 
Supreme Court precedent demonstrates why 
such a standard is applicable in Winston v. Lee.123  
The court ruled that ordering a bullet lodged in the 
defendant’s chest be surgically removed from his 
body, for evidentiary purposes, despite the accused’s 
objections, constituted an “extensive intrusion” on 
the defendant’s fundamental interests of personal 
privacy and bodily integrity interests.124  The Su-
preme Court’s holding brings to light the lack of dif-
ferences between an injunction ordering surgical re-
moval of a tattoo through laser surgery and one or-
dering the surgical removal of a bullet from a per-
son’s body.  To allow a copyright holder to obtain a 
remedy ordering surgical removals of this nature not 
only gives the copyright holder a right to control an-
other person by invading on their privacy rights, it 
also provides the author with more rights than those 
laid out in the 1976 Copyright Act.125  Therefore, a 
copyright holder’s property rights in a work imprint-
ed on another’s skin should never supersede an indi-
vidual’s fundamental privacy rights to resist third 
                                                             
120 Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 121. 
121 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
122 Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 123. 
123 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Rao, supra note 89, at 
396.  
124 Lee, 470 U.S. at 753; Rao, supra note 89, at 396.  
125 See Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 121. 
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party invasions or physical alterations of their body.  
 
IV.  MODERN SLAVERY THROUGH THE 1976 
COPYRIGHT ACT  
The Thirteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution states, “[n]either slavery nor in-
voluntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction.”126 
Copyright is a constant balancing act; its larg-
est challenge centers around the author’s right to 
control her property versus the amount of access that 
is in the public’s interest.127  The balance of these in-
terests presents a huge problem under the Thir-
teenth Amendment, particularly when enforcing the 
control an author holds over their work in another’s 
skin under section 106,128 and the court’s ability to 
issue injunctive relief for infringements of an au-
thor’s work under section 106A,129 also known as 
VARA.130  The consequences of enforcing these rights 
would defy the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
of servitude, rehashing slavery and putting courts in 
the position of “21st Century judicial slave mas-
ters.”131  The Section below will examine the disas-
trous effect, while showing why Congress should re-
lax the fixation requirement.  
 
A.  Virtual Slave Masters 
Today, unlike 200 years ago, the human race 
                                                             
126 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
127 Bogden, supra note 16, at 187.  
128 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).  Infra Part IV.A.  
129 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).  Infra Part IV.B.  
130 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
131 Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 4, 11. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
Slaves to Copyright 
165 
believes slavery to be repugnant and even difficult to 
fathom how human beings were once considered 
property of another individual.132  Although the pub-
lic has current distaste for the slavery that occurred 
200 years ago, the possibility of modern day slave 
masters, today, is very real in the intellectual prop-
erty arena.  Modern intellectual property apologists 
say that, “the work themselves are not property, but 
the right to use them are.”133  This quote, in short, 
exemplifies the dangers of allowing copyright’s fixa-
tion requirement to label human skin as a valid 
“tangible medium of expression.”  Such dangers lie 
within the exclusive rights granted to an author after 
the fixation requirement is satisfied, which allows 
the copyright holder to control the uses of her 
work.134  As noted, hereinabove, section 106 grants 
the copyright owner exclusive rights: (1) to reproduce 
the copyrighted work; (2) to prepare derivative works 
(known as adaptation rights); (3) to publish the copy-
righted work by distribution; (4) to perform the copy-
righted work; (5) to publicly display the copyrighted 
work; and (6) to perform the copyrighted work public-
ly through digital audio transmission. 135  These 
rights give the creator complete control of over what 
is done with their work. 
Copyright protection affords a copyright holder 
property rights in that particular work.  If the author 
owns a work it gives that owner the right to control 
that property to the extent of the exclusive rights 
                                                             
132 Nina Paley, Redefining Property: Lessons from American 
History, QUESTIONCOPYRIGHT.ORG (2009), 
http://questioncopyright.org/redefining_property (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2012). 
133 Id. 
134 See Hardy, supra note 20, at 859.  
135 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).  
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granted in section 106. 136  However, I believe that if 
the author’s work resides in another individual’s 
human skin, it could permit the copyright holder to 
control the daily activities of any human being that 
bears an author’s intellectual property.  The lack of 
boundaries set forth in the Copyright Act could re-
sult in authors ordering individuals to refrain from 
appearing on television or stopping people from get-
ting their pictures taken,137 bringing into play the po-
tential for plastic surgeons, professional piercers, or 
tattoo artists to become modern day slave masters, 
dictating the literal moves that an individual can 
make on a daily basis. 
The Hangover Part II case presented a close 
example of this dilemma because Tyson, prior to get-
ting his facial tattoo, signed a general tattoo release 
agreement with his tattoo artist, Whitmill. The re-
lease agreement stated, “I [Mike Tyson,] understand 
that all artwork, sketches, and drawings related to 
my tattoo and any photographs of my tattoo are 
property of Paradox-Studio of Dermagraphics.”138  
This release limits Tyson’s ability to display his face 
in public;139 and based on this language, Whitmill 
holds property rights in any photographs taken of 
Tyson’s face.  Although minimal, this language still 
                                                             
136 See Hardy, supra note 20, at 858. 
137 See Can You Copyright the Human Body?: Transcript, ON 
THE MEDIA (June 3, 2011), 
http://www.onthemedia.org/2011/jun/03/can-you-copyright-
human-body/transcript/. 
138 Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, supra 
note 8, at Exhibit 3 (Tattoo Release Form).  Whitmill ultimately 
sued only Warner Brothers for violating his exclusive rights 
through using, reproducing, creating a derivative work, and 
putting the tribal tattoo on public display in its advertising. Id. 
at 6-7. 
139 See Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 529. 
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gives Whitmill the authority to prevent magazines 
from publishing pictures taken of Tyson and even 
may require magazines to compensate him for the 
use of a photograph of the heavyweight champion. 
This dilemma is comparable to a 19th Century 
slave code – “no slave shall be allowed to work for 
pay”140 – that has the realistic capability of creeping 
its way into copyright law.  In Whitmill’s authorita-
tive position as the copyright owner of Tyson’s facial 
tattoo, it allows him to control Tyson’s career moves 
and receive compensation for Tyson’s labor.  This 
control of property rights in any author’s work, not 
just Whitmill, has the capability to negatively influ-
ence a person’s livelihood,141 dictating the class 
standard and means that an individual bearing an 
author’s copyrighted work can live.  Such control 
mirrors the 19th Century slave master’s control over 
a person, allowing the copyright author to reap all 
the benefits of an individual’s labor while financially 
crippling the individual bearing the author’s work.142 
Rasheed Wallace, an NBA player, appeared in 
a Nike commercial where he explained the meaning 
behind the tattoos that reside on both of his arms.143 
The commercial zoomed in on the player’s Egyptian 
inspired tattoo of his family, recreating it through 
                                                             
140 See CHARLES M. CHRISTIAN, BLACK SAGA: THE AFRICAN 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: A CHRONOLOGY 27-28 (1998). 
141 “Publicity enables a person to profit from their public 
persona by selling or otherwise exploiting commercially 
intangible body assets.”  Rao, supra note 89, at n.30. 
142 David Nimmer “worried that the derivative work right 
could give Whitmill some say over other tattoos Tyson might 
choose to apply to his face.” Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 529; 
see Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12.  
143 Robjv1, Rasheed Wallace NBA Finals Nike Commercial, 
YOUTUBE (June 26, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqmRu34PXrU. 
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computerized simulation.144  Wallace’s tattoo artist 
Matthew Reed saw the commercial and sued Wal-
lace145 for contributory infringement based on the 
basketball star claiming ownership rights in his tat-
tooed skin.146  Reed asserted his reproduction and 
public display rights against Wallace for making a 
career decision to appear in the Nike commercial, 
which for a professional athlete is normal publici-
ty.147 
Reed’s attempt to control Wallace’s tattooed 
forearm, demonstrates the dangers of a copyright 
holder becoming a modern day slave master when 
owning property interest in another’s skin.  Reed’s 
charge of contributory infringement against Wallace 
shows how Reed attempted to reinforce his proprie-
tary ownership and dictate the ways that Wallace 
can use his own arms in advertisements.  Reed’s 
slave master tendencies, like Whitmill’s with Tyson’s 
facial tattoo, have the capability to affect Wallace’s 
likelihood of sustaining future publicity and income, 
comparable to the slave code in the 19th Century that 
banned slaves from receiving compensation for their 
labor. 
The problem does not stop with the original 
author of a copyright from holding the capability to 
prevent an individual bearing their work of author-
                                                             
144 See Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. CV 05 198 2005 WL 1182840 
(D. Or. Feb. 10, 2005); see also Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos 
and Copyright Infringement: Celebrities, Marketers, and 
Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 313, 
316 (2006). 
145 Reed also sued Nike, Inc. and the advertising agency that 
came up with the commercial’s concept.  Harkins, supra note 
144, at 316. 
146 See id. at 317.  
147 See id. at 316.  
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ship in public, but copyrights, like all property, can 
constantly be sold to non-authors.  Consequently, 
strangers, unknown to the individual bearing any 
work of authorship on the human skin, could appear 
and limit the individual from using her body in a way 
that constitutionally endowed to her.148 
Looking at copyright’s largest challenge of 
balancing interests, permitting Congress to believe 
that human skin as a viable medium of expression is 
acceptable does not balance a copyright owner’s in-
terest against the interests of the public, but deems 
the author’s property rights more important than the 
freedom of the American people.  Ignorance of this 
potential problem could lead to copyright holders be-
coming modern day slave masters, controlling every 
move of individuals bearing their work on their skin.  
 
B.  Slave to the Court: Enforcing  
Copyright Remedies 
The problematic reality of courts favoring a 
copyright holder’s work in another’s skin, whether 
that be body art, tattoos, body modification, plastic 
surgery, or body piercings, resides in the court’s re-
medial enforcement, specifically injunctive relief, of 
an author’s moral rights.149  Section 106A, known as 
VARA, provides copyright owners, of visual works, 
morals rights protecting the integrity and attribution 
of their work of authorship from, “(A) any intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that 
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor 
or reputation,”150 and “(B) any destruction of a work 
of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly 
                                                             
148 Fagundes, supra note 54.  
149 Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 119.  
150 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
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negligent destruction of that work is a violation of 
that right.”151  
The list of legal concerns is extensive and in-
vades an individual’s basic constitutional rights.  
First, an author’s copyright protection in another’s 
skin could result in a court preventing the individu-
al, to whom the body belongs, from obtaining another 
plastic surgeon or tattoo artist to modify the poor 
workmanship of the original author as that would 
violate the copyright holder’s adaptation rights.152   
Courts could prevent individuals from going 
out in public or force one to cover up an area on the 
body containing the copyright holder’s work; this 
presents a real dilemma if the individual is a celebri-
ty because such an order could prevent that person 
from appearing on television, magazine covers, or 
films.153  Further, courts have the power to order the 
individual bearing the copyright holder’s work to re-
tain or remove a tattoo, causing the individual to for-
ever wear an unwanted piece of work or undergo la-
ser removal surgery, possibly leaving permanent 
remnants of the tattoo on the bearer’s body through 
scarring.154  The arguments below show why a court 
should not order the above remedies and deem hu-
man flesh as an intangible medium of expression, 
avoiding the American court system from being la-
                                                             
151 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
152 See Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 120.  
153 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 12; see 
also Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 120.  
154 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 12.  
Courts wanting to avoid being labeled slave masters and 
violating an individual’s constitutional rights may opt to avoid 
injunctive relief by ordering relief in the form of monetary 
damages.  See also Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 118, at 122.  
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beled as a “21st Century judicial slave master.” 155 
 
1.  Market Recognition 
It is evident that human flesh serves an aes-
thetic purpose,156 as a means for individual expres-
sion, and a basis for survival. The 1976 Copyright 
Act does not make mention of whether skin is a “tan-
gible medium of expression” or generally copyrighta-
ble,157 but the market of those individuals that adorn 
human flesh with colors and individualism hold a 
uniform consensus on the subject.158  I will demon-
strate why Congress should declare skin as an intan-
gible medium of expression based on the tattoo and 
piercing159 industry’s aversion to copyright ownership 
                                                             
155 This remedy problem does not just arise with the courts, 
but also with third parties.  Under VARA a copyright holder’s 
property rights in another’s skin does not just involve 
individuals bearing the author’s work, but, in context of tattoos, 
can implicate third party doctors hired to remove unwanted 
artworks.  See Timothy C. Bradley, The Copyright Implications 
of Tattoos: Why Getting Inked Can Get You into Court, 29 ENT. 
& SPORTS L. 1, 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.coatsandbennett.com/images/pdf/the-copyright-
implications-of-tattoos.pdf.  For example, Mike Tyson hires a 
doctor to perform laser tattoo removal on his face because he 
wants to rid himself of his infamous facial tattoo.  Once Tyson’s 
doctor starts to laser off Tyson’s tattoo, he becomes susceptible 
to liability under VARA for destruction of another copyright 
holder’s work.  Id. at 2-3; Fagundes, supra note 54. 
156 See Bradley, supra note 155, at 2. 
157 See Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 15.  
158 See Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 532.  
159 Marisa Kakoulas, The Tattoo Copyright Controversy, BME 
ZINE.COM (Dec. 8, 2003), http://news.bme.com/2003/12/08/the-
tattoo-copyright-controversy-guest-column/ (Professional 
piercer, Martin William McPherson comments on courts issuing 
injunctions for copyright infringement of tattoos stating that it, 
“[s]ounds dangerously like State control over our bodies, . . . 
Isn’t that what many of us are fighting against? Aren’t we 
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in a client’s skin.  
Tattoo artists uniformly acknowledge that af-
ter finishing a client’s tattoo, complete control over 
that tattoo shifts to the client’s “bundle of sticks.”160  
Artists in the tattoo industry recognize the individu-
ality and constitutional freedoms that clients possess 
in their bodies, which is why the inking industry 
throws its section 106 exclusive rights out the win-
dow, and embraces ownership rights that specifically 
favor their clients.  Tattoo artists do not care to have 
a “piece of the pie” after their clients walk out the 
door of their tattoo shop.  Typical tattoo artists do 
not file copyright infringement lawsuits when a cli-
ent reproduces their tattoo for commercial purposes, 
uploads a picture of their new ink to a social media 
website to show the world, walks around in public 
with their inked skin on display,161 or sends a photo-
graph of their permanent, meaningful, artwork to a 
magazine for publication.162  
                                                                                                                             
(some of us) trying to claim our bodies as our own?” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
160 See Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 532. 
161 “[A] tattoo artist cannot reasonably expect to control all 
public displays of his or her work.” Bradley, supra note 155, at 
2.  The tattoo artist, Matthew Reed, tattooed Rasheed Wallace, 
an NBA player.  Reed later sued for copyright infringement, 
however, prior to this suit, he “expected that the tattoo would 
be publically displayed on Wallace’s arm and conceded that 
such exposure would be considered common in the tattoo 
industry.” Harkins, supra note 144, at 316.  
162 See Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 537 (rehashing a tattoo 
artist’s positive and not legally entangling story when one of his 
clients wanted to put the image of his tattoo on the front cover 
of his upcoming compact disc).  Contra tattoo artists are not of a 
consensus that a client can take the tattoo design and use the 
tattoo as work for a clothing line disconnected to from the body.  
One tattoo artist said: “if [a client] wanted to then take [the 
tattoo design] and give it to a graphic artist and have him turn 
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When asked the question of whether a tattoo 
artist had any control over a client’s tattoo, the re-
sponse of a female tattoo artist captured the essence 
of my arguments set forth in Part III:  
 
It’s not mine anymore.  You own that, you 
own your body.  I don’t own that anymore.  I 
own the image, because I have [the draw-
ing] taped up on my wall and I took a pic-
ture of it.  That’s as far as my ownership 
goes.  [Claiming control over the client’s use 
of tattoo is] ridiculous. That goes against 
everything that tattooing is.  A tattoo is an 
affirmation that is your body  . . . that you 
own your own self, because you’ll put what-
ever you want on your own body.  For 
somebody else [(the tattoo artist)] to say, 
“Oh no, I own part of that.  That’s my arm.” 
No, it’s not your . . . arm, it’s my [(the tattoo 
bearer’s)] . . . arm.  Screw you.”163 
 
 Tattoo artists encourage clients to incorporate 
future work into present tattoos or destroy and re-
place original tattoos executed badly by an artist, 
disregarding their moral rights in section 106A.164  
The tattoo industry does not seek permission from 
the original tattoo artist of a new client, to make cor-
rections or incorporations to an unacceptable piece of 
ink, as is necessary in formal copyright law to create 
                                                                                                                             
it into an image [for a commercial use], then I’d feel like I 
should get some kind of compensation for it.  But if it was just a 
photo of the tattoo, even if it’s the centerpiece [of an 
advertisement], I’m OK with that.”  Id. at 538. 
163 Perzanowski, supra note 15, at 536 (alterations in 
original). Tattoo artists looked for new clients to gain prior 
client’s permission when the new client wants an identical 
custom tattoo already “inked” on a prior client.  Id. at 539.  
164 See id. at 25.  
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a derivative work.165  This industry norm further 
demonstrates that professionals in the field of body 
art believe that any property rights in a client’s tat-
tooed limbs reside exclusively in the client’s “bundle 
of rights.”  Although the tattoo industry’s response to 
ownership of the client’s artwork covered limb legal-
ly, in the copyright world, is viewed as the copyright 
author informally waiving166 her section 106 and 
106A rights, it still demonstrates that the industry 
acknowledges formal copyright law, but will not ad-
here to it.  Congress should recognize this country-
wide lack of adherence and deem an individual’s skin 
as an intangible medium of expression belonging to 
the individual whom it literally protects.   
 
2.  Lack of Recognition 
Did Congress really want copyright law to cov-
er human skin?167  The Copyright Act as of 1976 did 
not list tattoos as a “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
work” capable of gaining copyright registration.168  
The Act’s lack of guidance in providing copyright pro-
tection to tattoos can lead to the inference that Con-
gress never intended for human skin to pass as a val-
id “tangible medium of expression” because of the po-
tential slavery implications.169  In 1955, when Con-
gress first decided to revise the 1909 Copyright Act, 
                                                             
165 See id. at 26.  
166 For an author to effectively waive his or her rights the 
waiver must be: (1) “reflected in a written instrument signed by 
the artist,” (2) “expressly agreeing to the waiver, and” (3) 
“specifically identifying the work and uses of the work to which 
the waiver applies.” MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.06[D] (2012) 
167 Can You Copyright the Human Body?, supra note 137. 
168 Declaration of David Nimmer, supra note 12, at 15. 
169 See id. at 16. 
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Congress compiled seventeen volumes of legislative 
materials, and not one volume contained a single ref-
erence to human skin.170 
The judicial system has never had the privi-
lege to decide a case dealing with human skin’s copy-
rightability.171  The courts came close in the 2000 
case, Carell v. Shubery Organization, Inc.,172 holding 
in a motion to dismiss that the plaintiff’s makeup de-
signs for the actors in the Broadway play Cats “con-
tain[ed] the requisite degree of originality, and are 
fixed in a tangible form on the faces of the Cats ac-
tors.”173  However, on this matter the parties settled 
outside of court.174  Two more cases, Whitmill v. 
Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc. and Reed v. Ni-
ke, Inc.,175 held the capability of putting meat on this 
legal issue, but both parties in these cases settled 
outside of court, just as in Carell.  The judge hinted 
in Whitmill that tattoos and human skin can receive 
copyright protection, but this statement holds no 
weight until it appears in an opinion by a judge es-
tablishing legal precedent.176 
 The lack of intent and evidence by Congress to 
label human skin as a “tangible medium of expres-
sion” in the 1976 Copyright Act, in addition to the 
passing of the Thirteenth Amendment, demonstrates 
Congress’ avoidance of the issue based on the disas-
                                                             
170 See id. 
171 This statement is true for both before and after the passing 
of the 1976 Copyright Act..  Id. at 17. 
172 Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc.,104 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
173 Id. at 247. 
174 Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 29. 
175 Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. CV 05 198 2005 WL 1182840 (D. Or. 
Feb. 10, 2005). 
176 See Reichman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 29. 
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trous consequences that such a label could create.  
Congress needs to recognize its lack of recognition, 
along with the tattoo industry’s recognition that skin 
belongs to the individual that possesses and resides 
in it.  Congress must label human skin an unac-
ceptable medium for copyrights in order to avoid the 
courts from indemnifying people bearing tattoos, 
piercings, or undergoing plastic surgery into copy-
right-based slavery for the life of the tattoo artist, 
piercer, or plastic surgeon, plus seventy years after 
the death of the creator.177 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Congress’ lack of recognition and the judici-
ary’s inability to establish legal precedent surround-
ing the copyrightability of human flesh conjures up 
the opinions of many scholars in the intellectual 
property field to speak out about the disastrous con-
sequences of branding human skin as a “tangible 
medium of expression.”  Based on the arguments 
throughout this Article, Congress must produce leg-
islation amending the 1976 Copyright Act to explicit-
ly categorize skin as an intangible medium of expres-
sion in an effort to avoid the fatality of courts estab-
lishing “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works” in 
skin as copyrightable, allowing judges to act as “21st 
Century judicial slave masters.” 
                                                             
177 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (codifying that the life of the author 
plus seventy years provision only applies only to works created 
on or after January 1, 1978). 
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Abstract 
Lance Armstrong was one of the sport’s great-
est heroes and his doping admission shook the Amer-
ican public to its core.  Although professional cyclists 
are sanctioned for violating anti-doping rules on an 
almost regular basis, the investigation and lifetime 
ban of Lance Armstrong highlighted the serious 
problems facing the sport.  Increased efforts to police 
drug use in cycling appear to be ineffective; however, 
as Armstrong’s situation may reveal, private law-
suits have the potential to serve as a new and addi-
tional deterrent to cheating in the future. 
The aftermath of Armstrong’s admission has 
led to bickering of the major regulatory agencies, 
leading the general public to question whether the 
sport will ever be clean.  This Article explores the 
impact Armstrong’s doping admission might have on 
the sport of professional cycling in the future, as well 
as the history of doping in cycling. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After a doping scandal rocked the 1998 Tour 
de France, a leading expert on gene doping and drug 
testing commented that “[t]he Tour debacle has final-
ly made it acceptable to say in public and without 
provocation what many have known for a long time, 
namely, that long-distance cycling has been the most 
consistently drug-soaked sport of the twentieth cen-
tury.”1  Although the regulatory landscape has 
changed dramatically since Hoberman uttered this 
statement fifteen years ago, doping continues to en-
velop the sport of professional cycling today.  In fact, 
since 1995, only four winners of the Tour de France, 
cycling’s most famous race, have not become em-
broiled in controversies involving performance-
enhancing drugs.2 
                                                             
1 John Hoberman, A Pharmacy on Wheels – The Tour De 
France Doping Scandal, MESO-RX (Nov. 15, 1998), 
http://thinksteroids.com/articles/festina-tour-de-france-doping-
scandal/.  
2 See Ian Austen, 2010 Tour de France Winner Found Guilty 
of Doping,   N.Y, TIMES (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/sports/cycling/alberto-
contador-found-guilty-of-doping.html?_r=0.  Since 1995, Carlos 
Sastre, Cadel Evans, Bradley Wiggins, and Chris Froome are 
the only Tour de France winners who have not tested positive, 
admitted to the use of, or were sanctioned for the use of 
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In 2012 alone, the United States Anti-Doping 
Agency sanctioned seventeen American cyclists for 
the use of performance-enhancing substances.3  One 
of the sanctioned cyclists was Lance Armstrong, the 
only individual to have won seven Tour de France 
titles in the history of the sport.4  Shortly after being 
banned from professional cycling for life, Armstrong 
admitted using performance-enhancing substances 
throughout his entire professional career.5  Not only 
did his admission highlight the crisis facing the 
sport, it caused tension among the major regulatory 
bodies in the world, including the International Cy-
cling Union and the World Anti-Doping Agency, as 
they grappled with the aftermath.6   
Although the international community has at-
tempted to rid cycling of drug use through the en-
actment of new drug testing techniques and strict-
liability enforcement of anti-doping rules,7 the pres-
                                                                                                                             
performance-enhancing drugs.  See Alan McLean et. al., Top 
Finishers of the Tour de France Tainted by Doping, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/08/24/sports/top-
finishers-of-the-tour-de-france-tainted-by-doping.html; Daniel 
Benson, No Positive Doping Tests at 2013 Tour de France, 
CYCLINGNEWS (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/no-positive-doping-tests-at-
2013-tour-de-france. 
3 Sanctions, U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 
http://www.usada.org/sanctions/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
4 Id.; see also Tour de France Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 6, 2013, 
4:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/world/europe/tour-de-
france-fast-facts/. 
5 Lance Armstrong, Biography, BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL, 
http://www.biography.com/print/profile/lance-armstrong-
9188901 (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
6 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
7 See generally World Anti-Doping Code, WORLD ANTI-DOPING 
AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-
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sure to break records and win races continues to en-
tice athletes to engage in sophisticated doping pro-
grams.  Despite efforts to police the sport, athletes 
continue to use performance-enhancing substances in 
alarming numbers, threatening cycling’s credibility 
as a competitive sport.8  Further, many athletes that 
have been suspended for anti-doping violations in the 
past continue to compete today, undermining the im-
age that the international community is truly work-
ing to rid the sport of cheating.9 
Shortly after he admitted using performance-
enhancing substances throughout his career, Arm-
strong was sued by insurance companies and former 
sponsors.10  Additionally, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice joined a whistleblower lawsuit 
against Armstrong for defrauding the federal gov-
ernment.11  This Article explores the history of dop-
ing in cycling, as well as the impact of Armstrong’s 
admission on the sport.  Although increased efforts to 
police drug use in cycling appear to be ineffective, as 
Armstrong’s situation may reveal, private lawsuits 
have the potential to serve as a new and additional 
deterrent against cheating in the future. 
 
                                                                                                                             
Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/The-Code/ (last 
updated May 2011). 
8 See Sanctions, supra note 3. 
9 See discussion infra Part III. 
10 Michael O’Keeffe, Lance Armstrong Faces Another Lawsuit 
as Acceptance Insurance Coming After the Disgraced Cyclist for 
$3M Claiming Fraud & Breach of Contract, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Mar. 2, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-
team/disgraced-lance-faces-lawsuit-fraud-article-1.1277096. 
11 Juliet Macur, Armstrong Facing Two More Lawsuits, N.Y, 
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/sports/cycling/lance-
armstrong-is-facing-another-lawsuit.html. 
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I.  THE HISTORY OF MODERN DOPING 
The use of performance enhancing substances 
is not a new phenomenon.  The history of modern 
doping can be traced back to the early nineteenth 
century when cyclists and other endurance athletes 
began using substances such as caffeine, cocaine, 
strychnine, and alcohol to complete competitive en-
deavors.12  Athletes in ancient Greece were known to 
have used special diets and herb concoctions to gain 
a competitive edge while participating in the Olym-
pic Games.13  The first death attributed to doping oc-
curred in the sport of cycling in 1896, when English 
cyclist Arthur Linton died due to ephedrine intake 
during a race from Boudreaux to Paris.14  By the ear-
ly 1920’s, doping was prevalent in international 
sport; however it wasn’t until 1928 that the Interna-
tional Association of Athletics Foundations first 
banned the use of stimulating substances.15  The re-
strictions were largely ineffective, though, because 
doping tests were not performed.16  In 1960, the 
death of Danish cyclist Knud Enemark Jensen dur-
ing competition at the Olympic Games increased the 
pressure on sports authorities to institute drug test-
                                                             
12 See A Brief History of Anti-Doping, WORLD ANTI-DOPING 
AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/About-WADA/History/A-
Brief-History-of-Anti-Doping/ (last updated June 2010); see also 
Hoberman, supra note 1. 
13 Id.; History of Doping, TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN, 
http://www.doping-prevention.de/doping-in-general/history-of-
doping.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
14 History of Doping, supra note 13; Paul Cartmell, Lance 
Armstrong Ban Part of Long History of Doping in Cycling, 
YAHOO SPORTS (Aug. 24, 2012, 5:47 PM), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/lance-armstrong-ban-part-long-
history-doping-cycling-214700698.html. 
15 A Brief History of Anti-Doping, supra note 12. 
16 Id. 
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ing.17   
In 1966, the International Cycling Union 
(UCI) and the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA) introduced doping tests in their 
respective World Championships, and the next year 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) estab-
lished its Medical Commission and its first list of 
prohibited substances.18  Despite these develop-
ments, another cyclist, Tom Simpson, died in 1967 
during the Tour de France, due to the use of amphet-
amines and alcohol.19  International Sport Federa-
tions continued to implement more stringent anti-
doping measures throughout the following years; 
however, as doping procedures became more sophis-
ticated, sports agencies struggled to find reliable 
testing methods.20 
In 1998, the doping crisis in professional cy-
cling reached new heights.  Three days before the 
start of the Tour de France, one of the top teams in 
the world, Festina, was expelled after a team car was 
found to contain large quantities of doping products, 
including the banned blood-booster erythropoietin 
(EPO) and human growth hormone.21  In response, 
the IOC convened the First World Conference on An-
                                                             
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.  See also Tom Simpson Biography, CYCLING INFO, 
http://cyclinginfo.co.uk/cyclists/british/tom-simpson-biography/ 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
20 See A Brief History of Anti-Doping, supra note 12. 
21 See Robyn J. Rosen, Breaking the Cycle: Balancing the 
Eradication of Doping From International Sport While 
Upholding the Rights of the Accused Athlete, 25 ENT, & SPORTS 
LAW. 3, 4 (2007); see also Festina Affair Casts Shadow on Tour 
de France, DNA (July 3, 2008), 
http://www.dnaindia.com/sport/report_festina-affair-casts-
shadow-on-tour-de-france_1175462.  
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ti-Doping in February 1999, and established  the 
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)  on November 
10, 1999.22 
 
A.  The World Anti-Doping Agency 
WADA is an independent international body, 
whose mission is to “promote health, fairness and 
equality for athletes worldwide by working to ensure 
harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping 
programs at the international level . . .”23  To provide 
a framework for harmonized anti-doping policies, 
rules, and regulations, WADA adopted the World An-
ti-Doping Code (the “Code”) in January 2004.24  The 
Code works in conjunction with five International 
Standards that govern technical and operational ar-
eas, and is comprised of the Prohibited List, Testing, 
Laboratories, Therapeutic Use Exemptions, and Pro-
tection of Privacy and Personal Information.25  The 
Code takes a strict liability approach to doping viola-
tions: riders need not intend to enhance their own 
performance, or even ingest a banned substance, to 
receive sanctions.26 
More than fifty nations, including the United 
                                                             
22 See A Brief History of Anti-Doping, supra note 12. 
23 Sir Craig Reedie, President’s Welcome Message, WORLD 
ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/About-
WADA/Presidents-Welcome-Message/ (last updated Jan. 2014). 
24 World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 7. 
25 International Standards, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-
Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/International-
Standards/ (last updated Oct. 2009). 
26 See WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE §§ 2.1.1 cmt., 2.2.2 cmt., 
4.2.2 cmt. (World Anti-Doping Agency 2009), available at 
http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-
Doping_Program/WADP-The-Code/WADA_Anti-
Doping_CODE_2009_EN.pdf. 
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States, and 500 sports organizations, have signed the 
Code and adopted the rules and regulations estab-
lished by WADA.27  In 2004, cycling was the final 
Olympic sport to adopt the Code.28  Code signatories 
must ensure that their own rules and policies are in 
compliance with the anti-doping principles articulat-
ed by the Code.29   
 
B.  Implementation of the Biological Passport 
Traditional anti-doping efforts focused on di-
rect detection of prohibited substances through the 
use of urine and blood tests.30  As doping methods 
became more sophisticated, use of traditional analyt-
ical tests did not always detect the use of substances 
on an intermittent or low-dose basis, new substances, 
or modifications of prohibited substances.31  WADA 
began researching different methods of detection af-
ter a dozen athletes were suspended from the 2006 
Olympic Games for heightened hemoglobin levels.32  
                                                             
27 Rosen, supra note 21, at 5. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30Questions & Answers on Athlete Biological Passport, WORLD 
ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/Resources/Q-and-A/Athlete-Biological-Passport/ 
(last updated Sept. 2011) (expand “What modules compose the 
Athlete Biological Passport (ABP)?”). 
31 See id. (expand “Does the ABP replace traditional doping 
control?”). 
32 Juliet Macur, Cycling Union Takes Leap in Fight Against 
Doping, N.Y.TIMES (Oct. 24, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/sports/othersports/24cyclin
g.html?_r=2&.  Ahead of the 2007 Tour de France, Ivan Basso 
received a two-year suspension after confessing to attempted 
doping and team Astana fired German rider Matthias Kessler 
after his “B” sample confirmed a positive doping test from April 
of that same year.  Doping Incidents Ahead of and During 2007 
Tour de France, USA TODAY (July 28, 2007), 
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After a series of doping scandals nearly overtook the 
2007 Tour de France, WADA, in conjunction with the 
UCI, held a two-day summit to discuss a new biologi-
cal passport program.33  The new program gathers 
information from riders through a series of blood 
tests to provide baseline levels for certain biological 
markers.34  Variations in those levels would then be 
assessed for potential blood manipulation.35  The 
UCI became the first International Sport Federation 
to introduce the biological passport program in 
2008.36 
 
C.  Disciplinary Process 
As cycling’s International Federation, the or-
ganization that administers and promotes the sport, 
the International Cycling Union (UCI), has testing 
jurisdiction over all athletes who participate in its 
                                                                                                                             
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/cycling/2007-07-28-
3813791501_x.htm.  During the 2007 Tour, Patrik Sinkewitz 
dropped out after testing positive for high levels of testosterone; 
Alexandre Vinokourov, along with team Astana, was forced out 
of the race after Vinokourov tested positive for a banned blood 
transfusion after his 13th stage time trial victory; Italian rider 
Cristian Moreni tested positive for testosterone and withdrew 
from the race, along with his entire Cofidis team; and the Dutch 
Rabobank team removed overall leader Michael Rasmussen for 
lying about his whereabouts before the Tour.  Id. 
33 Macur, Cycling Union Takes Leap in Fight Against Doping, 
supra note 32. 
34 Id.; see Information on the Biological Passport, UNION 
CYCLISTE INTERNATIONALE (Dec. 12, 2007), 
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/ENews/ENewsDetails.asp?MenuId=
&id=NTQzOA. 
35 See Macur, Cycling Union Takes Leap in Fight Against 
Doping, supra note 32; see also Information on the Biological 
Passport, supra note 34. 
36 Information on the Biological Passport, supra note 34. 
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events.37  Additionally, as the national anti-doping 
organization for the Olympic Movement in the Unit-
ed States, the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) has 
testing jurisdiction over all riders who are present in 
the U.S. or are members of sports organizations in 
the country.38  If the UCI determines through its 
drug-testing program that a rider has committed an 
anti-doping violation, the UCI notifies the rider’s Na-
tional Federation and requests that it initiate disci-
plinary proceedings.39  Notification is also sent to the 
rider, the rider’s team, and WADA.40 
If USADA decides to charge an athlete with an 
anti-doping rule violation, the athlete can accept 
USADA’s recommended sanction or take the case to 
a hearing before arbitrators who are members of the 
American Arbitration Association and the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (“AAA/CAS arbitrators”).41  The 
hearing panel is required to hear the case under the 
UCI’s Anti-Doping rules42 and must allow the UCI to 
provide its opinion and demand that a sanction be 
imposed.43  Further, each party must have the right 
to be represented by a “qualified lawyer.”44 
The decision by the AAA/CAS arbitrators can 
                                                             
37 See World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 7.  
38 Id. 
39 UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: ANTI-DOPING pt. 14, art. 234 
(Int’l Cycling Union 2012), available at 
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=NDc3MDk&Lan
gId=1. 
40 Id. art. 206. 
41 U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY ATHLETE HANDBOOK 30 (effective 
Jan. 1, 2013 – Dec. 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.usada.org/uploads/athletehandbook.pdf. 
42 UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: ANTI-DOPING pt. 14, art. 345. 
43 Id. art. 332. 
44 Id. art. 267. 
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be appealed by either party, WADA, or the UCI, to 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport,45 however the de-
cision by CAS is final and binding on all parties, and 
is not subject to further review.46  USADA aims to 
provide a disciplinary process that is “fair to ath-
letes” and “provides for a full evidentiary hearing be-
fore experienced, internationally recognized arbitra-
tors.”47 
 
II.  CONTINUED DOPING SCANDALS 
Despite the adoption of the World Anti-Doping 
Code and the implementation of the Biological Pass-
port program, doping scandals have continued to pro-
liferate professional cycling.  For instance, in 2011, 
thirty-three riders were sanctioned by the UCI for 
anti-doping rule violations.48  Notably, many of the 
athletes implicated in previous doping scandals con-
tinue to compete today.  Some of the most significant 
doping scandals that have occurred since the imple-
mentation of WADA are detailed below. 
 
A.  Operación Puerto 
After Jesus Manzano, a former professional 
cyclist, admitted to blood doping and use of perfor-
mance enhancing substances in 2003 while a mem-
ber of the Kelme cycling team, a large scale investi-
                                                             
45 Id. art. 329. 
46 Id. art. 346. 
47 Adjudication, U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 
http://www.usada.org/adjudication/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).   
48 Consequences Imposed on License-Holders as Result of an 
Anti-Doping Violation Under the UCI Anti-Doping Rules, INT’L 
CYCLING UNION, 
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TU3Mjg&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=Nzk5OTY&Lan
gId=1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
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gation in 2006 lead to the implication of two team 
doctors for trafficking medicinal drugs and services 
as part of a sophisticated doping program adminis-
tered to elite athletes for several years.49  During the 
investigation, police recovered bags of blood and 
plasma,50 refrigerators full of drugs,51 administration 
schedules for some of the athletes being doped by the 
doctors,52 calendars of when athletes planned to 
compete during the year,53 and clinical trials in 
which blood parameters of riders were measured.54  
Additionally, investigators found documents impli-
cating riders being doped by the doctors that corre-
sponded with the prior doping suspension of those 
athletes, including Roberto Heras55 and Isidoro Noz-
al,56 whom were both suspended in 2005, and Tyler 
Hamilton57 and Santiago Perez,58 whom were sus-
pended in 2004. 
As a result of the investigation, several other 
elite riders were also implicated as participants in 
the doping program, including Jan Ullrich,59 Oscar 
Sevilla,60 Jorg Jaksche,61 Michele Scarponi,62 Allan 
                                                             
49 See Appendix M to USADA’s Reasoned Decision: Overview 
of Evidence in the Operación Puerto Doping Investigation, U.S. 
ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 1, 1-2 (2006), 
http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/Operacion+Puerto+Overv
iew.pdf. 
50 Id. at 2. 
51 Id. at 3. 
52 Id. at 4. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 5-6. 
56 Id. at 6-7. 
57 Id. at 7-9. 
58 Id. at 9. 
59 Id. at 10. 
60 Id. at 10-11. 
61 Id. at 11-12. 
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Davis,63 Alberto Contador,64 Ivan Basso,65 Santiago 
Botero,66 Francisco Mancebo Perez,67 and Alejandro 
Valverde.68  To date, only six of the fifty-six riders 
implicated in the investigation have been suspended 
for their participation in Operación Puerto, one of 
whom had his suspension overturned on appeal, and 
several riders, including Alberto Contador, were 
cleared of links to the doping scandal.69  
 
B.  Floyd Landis 
Floyd Landis began riding professionally in 
2002 with the U.S. Postal Service Team.70  In 2006, 
he won the Tour de France, securing his ultimate 
victory during Stage 17 of the race, when he “beat 
the field by nearly six minutes.”71  Landis later test-
ed positive for synthetic testosterone, was stripped of 
his title, and banned from cycling for two years.72  
Landis exhausted his options under the World Anti-
                                                                                                                             
62 Id. at 12-13. 
63 Id. at 13. 
64 Id at 13-14. 
65 Id. at 14. 
66 Id. at 14-16. 
67 Id. at 16-17. 
68 Id. at 17. 
69 See Matt Slater, Spain’s Operacion Puerto to Inflict More 
Embarrassment on Cycling, BBC (Jan. 30, 2013 ), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/cycling/21259759. See also Tim 
Line of Operacion Puerto, CYCLING NEWS (April 30, 2013, 11:41 
PM), http://www.cyclingnews.com/features/time-line-of-
operacion-puerto.   
70 Floyd Landis, Biography, BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL, 
http://www.biography.com/print/profile/floyd-landis-201313 ( 
last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
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Doping Code and appealed the case to CAS.73  In an 
unprecedented decision, CAS ordered Landis to pay 
$100,000 to USADA “as a contribution toward its 
costs in the CAS arbitration” because there was “no 
evidence of misconduct on the part [of] USADA in 
prosecuting the case.”74  The panel concluded, “On 
the contrary, . . . if there was any litigation miscon-
duct, it may be ascribed to the applicant.”75 
Landis continued to deny using performance-
enhancing substances until 2010, when he admitted 
to doping throughout his entire career, including 
during his 2006 Tour de France victory.76  After his 
admission, Landis was hit with various lawsuits, in-
cluding one related to donations he received to sup-
port his fight against the doping allegations.77  Lan-
dis was eventually ordered to repay all donations re-
ceived – nearly $480,000.78 
In 2010, Landis filed a whistleblower suit 
against his former teammate, Lance Armstrong, 
claiming that Armstrong defrauded the federal gov-
ernment by accepting sponsorship money to fund a 
U.S. Postal Service team fueled by performance-
enhancing drugs.79  Though the suit is under judicial 
                                                             
73 Floyd Landis Loses CAS Appeal, VELONEWS (July 4, 2008 
5:29 PM), 
http://velonews.competitor.com/2008/06/news/road/floyd-landis-
loses-cas-appeal_79029.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
76 Floyd Landis, Biography, supra note 70. 
77 Frederick Dreier, Floyd Landis Calls Pro Cycling 
‘Organized Crime,’ USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2013 4:46 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/cycling/2013/02/13/floyd-
landis-pro-cycling-is-organized-crime/1916805/.  
78 Id. 
79 Liz Clarke, Floyd Landis Whistleblower Suit Targets More 
than Lance Armstrong, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2013), 
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seal, Landis shared many of his allegations in news 
interviews with journalists and conversations with 
Travis Tygart, the head of USADA, and Jeff Novitz-
ky, an official of the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (“FDA”) tasked with investigating steroid use in 
sports.80  Much of the information Landis provided to 
USADA and the FDA became a part of the USADA 
document used to strip Armstrong of his seven Tour 
de France titles in 2012.81 
 
C.  Danilo Di Luca 
Danilo Di Luca, an Italian cyclist, was accused 
of doping for many years and was suspended for 
three months during the off-season in 2007-2008 for 
his involvement in an Italian doping case.82  In 2009, 
Di Luca tested positive for Continuous Erythropoie-
sis Receptor Activator (CERA), a form of EPO, twice 
during the Giro d’Italia and was suspended for two 
years by the Italian Olympic Committee’s anti-
doping court.83  His ban was reduced to nine months 
after he admitted using performance-enhancing sub-
stances and revealed his doping techniques to Italian 
police.84  Di Luca made a comeback in 2011 and rode 
                                                                                                                             
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-
17/sports/36409945_1_tour-de-france-titles-whistleblower-suit-
floyd-landis.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Di Luca Set to Ride for Free with One Year Katusha Deal, 
CYCLING NEWS (Jan. 10, 2011, 9:44 AM), 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/di-luca-set-to-ride-for-free-
with-one-year-katusha-deal.  
83 Id.  
84 Stephen Farrand, Di Luca Confesses to Doping Mistakes, 
CYCLING NEWS (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:19 PM), 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/di-luca-confesses-to-doping-
mistakes. 
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with Russian team Katusha in 2011 and team Acqua 
& Sapone in 2012.85  Shortly after signing an agree-
ment to ride for Vini Fatini-Selle Italia, Di Luca, 
once again, tested positive for EPO, five days before 
the 2013 Giro d’Italia.86  Di Luca was subsequently 
banned from cycling for life.87 
 
D.  Alberto Contador 
Alberto Contador, a three-time Tour de France 
Champion, tested positive for clenbuterol, a muscle 
building and weight-loss drug, during the 2010 
Tour.88  Contador claimed the positive test was the 
result of eating tainted meat, however he was sus-
pended by the UCI, pending an investigation.89  Sub-
sequently, the Spanish Cycling Federation cleared 
Contador of any wrongdoing, but both WADA and 
the UCI appealed the decision to CAS.90  CAS deter-
mined that Contador’s claim of having eaten tainted 
meat was not substantiated.91  As a result, Contador 
was ultimately suspended for two years and stripped 
of his 2010 Tour victory, in addition to his twelve 
                                                             
85 Id.; Di Luca Confirms Acqua & Sapone for 2012, CYCLING 
NEWS (Nov. 8, 2011, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/di-luca-confirms-acqua-and-
sapone-for-2012.  
86 Barry Ryan and Stephen Farrand, Danilo Di Luca Positive 
for EPO, CYCLING NEWS (May 24, 2013, 10:57 AM), 
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/danilo-di-luca-positive-for-
epo. 
87 Danilo Di Luca, Ex-Giro d’Italia Winner, Gets Life Ban for 
Third Doping Offence, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2013, 11:12 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2013/dec/05/giro-danilo-di-
luca-life-ban. 
88 Austen, supra note 2.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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other titles.92  As noted above, Contador was also im-
plicated in the Operación Puerto doping scandal in 
2006, but was later cleared of any involvement.93  Af-
ter serving his suspension, Contador rejoined his 
former team, Saxo Bank, in 2012.94 
 
E.  Frank Schleck 
Frank Schleck, who finished third in the 2011 
Tour de France, was forced to drop out of the 2012 
race five stages from the end for testing positive for 
the diuretic Xipamide.95  Schleck maintained that he 
unintentionally consumed a contaminated product, 
however the Luxembourg Anti-Doping Agency sus-
pended him from the sport for one year.96  While the 
council could have suspended Schleck for two years 
under the UCI’s strict liability anti-doping provi-
sions, the council only imposed a twelve-month sus-
pension, noting that Schleck unintentionally con-
sumed the substance.97  Schleck, WADA, or the UCI 
had the option to appeal the Luxembourg Anti-
Doping Agency’s decision, however, no appeal was 
filed and Schleck’s suspension ended on July 13, 
2013.98  Schleck returned to cycling in January 2014, 
                                                             
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Contador Returns with Saxo Bank, CYCLING NEWS (June 8, 
2012, 1:44 PM), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/contador-
returns-with-saxo-bank.  
95 Frank Schleck Given 1-Year Doping Ban, USA TODAY (Jan. 
30, 2013, 5:34 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/cycling/2013/01/30/frank-
schleck-given-1-year-doping-sentence/1877333/.  
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.; Frank Schleck Set for July 14 Return to Racing, 
CYCLING NEWS (April 4, 2013, 3:59 PM), 
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competing in the Tour Down Under in Australia.99 
 
F.  Lance Armstrong 
Lance Armstrong, one of the sport’s most in-
famous riders, won seven consecutive Tour de France 
titles after battling advanced testicular cancer.100  
Armstrong was faced with numerous doping allega-
tions throughout his career, but in 2012, USADA 
brought formal charges against him.101  Just as he 
had earlier allegations, Armstrong vehemently de-
nied that he ever used performance-enhancing sub-
stances at any time during his professional cycling 
career.102  On August 23, 2012, Armstrong an-
nounced that he would not continue to fight the 
USADA charges and the next day, USADA stripped 
all seven of Armstrong’s Tour titles, in addition to 
other honors he had received from 1999 to 2005, and 
banned him from cycling for life.103  In October 2012, 
USADA released the evidence it had gathered 
against Armstrong, including testimony from several 
of Armstrong’s former teammates who claimed he 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/frank-schleck-set-for-july-14-
return-to-racing. 
99 Frank Schleck Arrives for Tour Down Under and Denies He 
is a Drug Cheat, ABC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2014, 12:07 PM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-13/schleck-27turns-
page27-on-drug-ban/5197140. 
100 Lance Armstrong, Biography, supra note 5.  By the time he 
was diagnosed, Armstrong’s cancer was in an advanced stage 
and had spread to his abdomen, lungs, lymph nodes, and brain.  
He was given a 65-85 percent chance of survival, which dropped 
to 40 percent after the tumors in his brain were discovered.  
The surgeries and chemotherapy were successful and he was 
declared cancer free in February 1997.  Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
Pharmacy on Wheels 
196 
had not only used drugs, but was the ringleader for 
the team’s doping efforts.104  Though Armstrong dis-
puted USADA’s findings when they were released, he 
eventually admitted in January 2013, during an ap-
pearance on The Oprah Winfrey Show, that he used 
performance-enhancing substances throughout his 
career.105  
After his admission, the U.S. Department of 
Justice decided to join the whistleblower lawsuit that 
Floyd Landis filed against Armstrong in 2010, con-
tending he defrauded the government.106  If Arm-
strong loses, he may be forced to pay the government 
up to $90 million in damages.107  Since his admission, 
he has also been hit with several other private law-
suits for the return of prize money, bonuses, and a 
settlement for a false libel claim from the Times of 
London.108 
 
III.  THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL CYCLING 
While there have been multiple doping scan-
dals in professional cycling since the establishment 
                                                             
104 Id.  Six of the seven riders who provided testimony against 
Armstrong received six month suspensions for their 
participation in the doping program.  Sanctions, U.S. ANTI-
DOPING AGENCY, http://www.usada.org/sanctions/ (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2013) (listing David Zabriskie, George Hincapie, 
Michael Barry, Tom Danielson, Levi Leipheimer, and Christian 
Vande Velde as recipients of a six month suspension, beginning 
on October 10, 2012). 
105 Lance Armstrong, Biography, supra note 5. 
106 Macur, Armstrong Facing Two More Lawsuits, supra note 
11.  
107 Id. 
108 Michael O’Keeffe, Lance Armstrong Faces Another Lawsuit 
as Acceptance Insurance Coming After the Disgraced Cyclist for 
$3M Claiming Fraud & Breach of Contract, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Mar. 2, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-
team/disgraced-lance-faces-lawsuit-fraud-article-1.1277096.  
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of WADA in 2004, the Lance Armstrong admission is 
arguably the most high profile revelation of the drug 
problem embroiling the sport.  The following is an 
examination of the response from the cycling indus-
try and an analysis of the potential impact Arm-
strong’s admission will have on the future of cycling. 
 
A.  Reaction from the International  
Cycling Union 
Shortly after his doping admission, the UCI, 
cycling’s International Federation, announced that it 
welcomed Armstrong’s confession as a step in repair-
ing the damage done to cycling and restoring confi-
dence in the sport.109  Additionally, the President of 
UCI, Pat McQuaid, said they would embrace Arm-
strong’s participation in a truth and reconciliation 
process, something Armstrong suggested during his 
admission on The Oprah Winfrey Show.110 
Despite this somewhat positive reaction, 
McQuaid did little to reassure the public that cycling 
could emerge from its drug-marred past.  The 
USADA investigation contained allegations from 
Armstrong’s former teammates that the UCI had 
covered up Armstrong’s positive drug test from the 
Tour of Switzerland in 2001 in exchange for a dona-
tion of $100,000.111  While McQuaid denied ever cov-
                                                             
109 Julien Pretot, UCI Welcomes Armstrong’s Truth 
Commission Offer, REUTERS (Jan. 18, 2013, 3:46 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/us-cycling-
armstrong-uci-idUSBRE90H0BY20130118.  
110 Id. 
111 Robin Scott-Elliot, Cycling: UCI Rejects any Blame for 
‘Greatest Crisis’ over Lance Armstrong, Texan Stripped of Tour 
Titles but McQuaid Claims Sport May Never Escape Influence of 
Doping,  INDEP. (Oct. 23, 2012), 
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ering up positive drug tests in exchange for money, 
he “refused to rule out accepting future donations 
from riders to help combat doping, despite the clear 
conflict of interest.”112  Further, while McQuaid 
maintains that he is and has always been committed 
to combating doping in the sport, when asked if he 
thought cycling would ever be free from doping, he 
responded, “That’s a very difficult question to an-
swer.  I’d probably, to be honest with you, would say 
no.”113 
In December 2012, the UCI set up an inde-
pendent commission to address allegations in the 
USADA report “concerning the complicity of the UCI 
and its officials in doping” and “the manner in which 
the UCI has conducted its anti-doping program.”114  
The UCI set up the commission, however, without 
consulting WADA or USADA, and ultimately, WADA 
decided not to take part at all.115  In January 2013, 
the UCI disbanded the commission since “WADA and 
USADA refused to cooperate with the inquiry.”116  
Further, McQuaid said the UCI would move forward 
                                                                                                                             
rejects-any-blame-for-greatest-crisis-over-lance-armstrong-
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113 Id. 
114 UCI Disbands Independent Review Commission to Pursue 
Truth and Reconciliation, VELONEWS (Jan. 29, 2013, 7:41 AM), 
http://velonews.competitor.com/2013/01/news/uci-disbands-
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115 Rogers, supra note 114. 
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PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
Pharmacy on Wheels 
199 
with a proposed program to give amnesty to riders 
who admit to doping offenses, even though such a 
program would breach the Code.117  While the UCI 
renewed calls for establishing a truth and reconcilia-
tion commission in February 2013, WADA reiterated 
the process would have to be “under the management 
and control of the original independent commis-
sion”.118  John Fahey, the President of WADA said 
that: 
 
Only cycling can heal the problems cycling 
has, they’re independent, they run their 
own sport, the same as any other sport in 
the world.  If the members are prepared to 
continue to allow this lurching from one cri-
sis to another then I guess we are going to 
continue to read about turmoil in that sport 
for some time yet.  I would hope that within 
the root and file members of cycling there is 
recognition that it can’t continue this way 
without there being some dire consequences 
down the track.119 
 
Despite the serious problems plaguing the 
UCI’s response to the current doping crisis, the UCI 
announced a stakeholder consultation exercise to 
take place February 21, 2013 through March 15, 
2013 to gather stakeholder input on the future of cy-
cling.120  As part of this effort, the UCI is conducting 
                                                             
117 Id.   
118 John Mehaffey, UCI Renews Call for Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, REUTERS,  (Feb. 12, 2013, 8:42 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-doping-wada-
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119 Id.  
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a stakeholder survey and the results will be used to 
“help the UCI decide on changes and measures need-
ed to improve the organisation, functioning and im-
age of cycling.”121 
Although it appears the UCI is taking a step 
in the right direction by conducting the stakeholder 
consultation exercise, its public reaction to the Arm-
strong admission and subsequent squabbling with 
WADA and USADA certainly does not send a posi-
tive message to the general public or the cycling 
community.  Until it makes some serious efforts to 
repair the image of the sport, including working with 
WADA and USADA to enact policy changes, it is 
doubtful that athletes will make a concerted effort to 
stop the widespread use of performance-enhancing 
substances in professional cycling. 
 
B.  Reaction from the United States 
Anti-Doping Agency 
Shortly after Armstrong’s admission, USADA 
called on Armstrong to testify, under oath, about the 
full extent of his doping activities.122  Under WADA 
rules, if Armstrong were to cooperate with anti-
doping officials, he would be eligible to have his life-
                                                                                                                             
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/ENews/ENewsDetails.asp?id=OTA1
Ng&MenuId=MTI2Mjc.  
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USADA, USA TODAY (Feb. 20, 2013, 9:36 PM), 
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time suspension reduced to eight years.123  Fearful of 
criminal and civil liability, Armstrong refused 
USADA’s offer.124  Armstrong’s attorney, Tim Her-
man, released a statement indicating that Armstrong 
is still willing to cooperate and provide full details 
about his doping activities, but he would prefer to do 
so through an independent international tribunal ra-
ther than USADA.125  Because cycling is an “almost 
exclusively European sport,” Armstrong’s attorney 
stated “Lance will not participate in USADA’s efforts 
to selectively conduct American prosecutions that on-
ly demonize selected individuals while failing to ad-
dress the 95% of the sport over which USADA has no 
jurisdiction.”126  USADA CEO, Travis Tygart, ex-
pressed disappointment with Armstrong’s decision 
but stated that USADA is “moving forward with our 
investigation without him and we will continue to 
work closely with WADA and other appropriate and 
responsible international authorities to fulfill our 
promise to clean athletes to protect their right to 
compete on a drug free playing field.”127 
Although USADA only has jurisdiction over 
American cyclists, its efforts to combat doping 
amongst its own athletes must be commended.  
While much of the sport is European in nature, the 
U.S. can serve as a model for a cleaner, and healthi-
er, sport.  Armstrong is arguably one of the greatest 
cycling heroes of all time and his sanctions have the 
potential to serve as an example for the future of the 
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sport.  There is no doubt that Armstrong is a talent-
ed cyclist, however, young riders must learn that 
cheating cannot and should not be tolerated. 
 
C.  Reaction from Teams and Their Sponsors 
Professional cycling teams and team sponsors 
have been virtually silent in regard to the Armstrong 
admission; however, an examination of changes in 
team contracting practices or treatment of riders 
with doping allegations may offer an insight into 
their reactions.  Unfortunately, all of the teams and 
sponsors contacted for this Article did not respond to 
repeated requests for current rider requirements, 
sample contracts, or treatment of riders with doping 
allegations.128  Instead, this analysis will focus on 
sample contracts and general information made 
available by the UCI about rider requirements. 
Through their Cycling Regulations, the UCI 
governs all world cycling races, including the 
Olympic Games.129  In addition, the UCI directly 
manages all UCI Pro Teams and Professional 
                                                             
128 In the course of my research for this Article, I contacted 
the following teams: BMC Racing; Slipstream Sports (Team 
Garmin-Sharpe); Velocio Sports (Team Specialized-Lululemon); 
Team Astana; and Team Leopard Trek.  Additionally, I 
contacted the following team sponsors: Cervélo; Trek; Giant; 
and Garmin.  The only response I received was from Cervélo, 
whom commented they were unable to share sample contracts 
due to confidentiality reasons, and that I should contact one of 
the teams they sponsor directly for rider requirements. 
129 See generally UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: PRELIMINARY 
PROVISIONS art. 1 (Int’l Cycling Union 2010), available at 
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Continental Teams.130  To participate in world races, 
teams must sign joint agreements that govern the 
working condition of riders with the UCI, and all 
riders must adhere to UCI’s anti-doping 
regulations.131  It should be noted that while 
contracts between individual riders and teams must 
contain certain provisions, riders are permitted to 
negotiate their own individual contracts with each 
team.132  Additionally, while the anti-doping regula-
tions provide for rider eligibility after anti-doping 
violations, they do not contain provisions regarding a 
rider’s individual contract with his or her team after 
such an incident.133  As noted above, it appears that 
                                                             
130 See UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: ROAD RACING pt. 2 (Int’l 
Cycling Union 2013), available at 
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=34028&LangId=
1.  UCI Pro Teams are teams of at least twenty-three riders 
licensed to participate in UCI World Tour events.  Id. at 92.  
Professional Continental Teams are teams of at least sixteen 
riders licensed to participate in road races open to Professional 
Continental Teams.  Id. at 135. 
131 See UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: JOINT AGREEMENT (Int’l 
Cycling Union 2013), available at  
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=ODEzNzM&La
ngId=1.  See also UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: ANTI-DOPING pt. 
14 art. 2 (Int’l Cycling Union 2012), available at 
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=NDc3MDk&Lan
gId=1. 
132 See generally UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: PRELIMINARY 
PROVISIONS (Int’l Cycling Union 2010), available at 
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=34039&LangId=. 
133 See UCI CYCLING REGULATIONS: ANTI-DOPING pt. 14 (Int’l 
Cycling Union 2012), available at 
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=M
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many teams sever their contracts with individual 
riders suspended for doping allegations; however, 
most riders either re-join their old team or sign a 
contract with a new team to continue competing in 
world races.  
Presumably, if anti-doping clauses were in-
cluded in team and sponsor contracts, athletes who 
use performance-enhancing substances could be held 
liable for breach of contract or other financial sanc-
tions.  In fact, shortly after his admission, an insur-
ance company that paid Armstrong’s bonuses for 
winning races, as well as former sponsors sued Arm-
strong for unjust enrichment and breach of con-
tract,134 indicating that some contracts may in fact 
contain anti-doping clauses.  Together with the whis-
tleblower lawsuit against Armstrong for defrauding 
the federal government, he faces financial sanctions 
in excess of $106 million, an amount that may seri-
ously threaten his fortune.135 
Further, if sponsors or teams were not as will-
ing to re-sign athletes with previous doping suspen-
sions, it could act as a deterrent in the future.  A ze-
ro-tolerance policy, while harsh, can send a powerful 
message to other cyclists who are currently partici-
pating, or thinking about engaging, in doping pro-
grams. 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
TY2NjU&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=NDc3MDk&Lan
gId=1. 
134 Macur, Armstrong Facing Two More Lawsuits, supra note 
11; see also Andrew Rafferty, Justice Department: Lance Arm-
strong was ‘Unjustly Enriched,’ NBC News (April 23, 2013, 5:49 
PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/23/17883573-
justice-department-lance-armstrong-was-unjustly-enriched?lite. 
135 Id. 
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D.  Reaction From Current and Former  
Cyclists and Spectators 
To gauge the public perception of cycling after 
the Armstrong admission, eight current and former 
cyclists and spectators of the sport took part in a 
survey for this Article.136  About half of the respond-
ents felt disappointed by Armstrong’s admission, 
with one commenting that drug use in cycling is “out 
of control”137 and another stating that it “tarnished 
the legitimacy of cycling as a sport; a sort of ‘who is it 
going to be tomorrow?’ sensation.”138  Despite these 
feelings, half of the individuals surveyed think that 
cycling can be a clean sport, albeit with better en-
forcement and increased penalties.  The overall con-
sensus, however, is that the UCI is not working hard 
enough to prevent doping in cycling.  All respondents 
agree that pressure to use performance enhancing 
substances is great for professional athletes; alt-
hough, that same pressure does not exist on an ama-
teur level, since amateur cyclists are not paid and 
are thus not under the same intense pressure to suc-
ceed.  Further, the overwhelming consensus of sur-
vey respondents felt the practice of allowing athletes 
that have been sanctioned for doping violations in 
the past to continue to compete affects the perception 
that the sport is fair.  Nearly all of the individuals 
surveyed believe that the lawsuits Armstrong is fac-
ing can be a good deterrent for doping in the future, 
with one stating that “it’s good to know there will lit-
erally be no long-term benefit from cheating”139 and 
another commenting about the visibility of a cyclist 
                                                             
136 Results of survey on file with the author. 
137 Interview with Josh Silva (Mar. 27, 2011). 
138 Interview with Charles Kao (Mar. 23, 2011). 
139 Interview with Kevin Wilde (Mar. 25, 2011). 
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and the risk of losing endorsement deals.140 
While the survey results are not surprising, 
they do reveal skepticism about the legitimacy of cy-
cling.  Sadly, the Armstrong admission only high-
lighted the problems facing the sport and the lax at-
titude of the UCI’s enforcement efforts.  Fortunately, 
it does not appear that the public has lost faith in the 
ability of the sport to become drug free, but to do so, 
governmental entities and the private business 
community must come together to make cheating 
unattractive from all angles. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The history of cycling reveals a sordid past of 
drug use and persistent cheating by many of the 
sport’s elite athletes.  The desire to win and push the 
boundaries of human ability to achieve impossible 
athletic endeavors is causing riders to seek out new 
and better ways to cheat the system.  Continued dop-
ing scandals in cycling contributed, in large part, to 
the creation of an independent body dedicated to 
eradicating the use of performance-enhancing sub-
stances in all forms of international sport.  Unfortu-
nately, despite the creation of WADA and increased 
efforts to ensure a fair playing field, doping scandals 
continue to tarnish the image of professional cycling 
today. 
While professional cyclists are sanctioned for 
violating anti-doping rules on an almost regular ba-
sis, the investigation and lifetime ban of Lance Arm-
strong, America’s greatest cycling legend, highlight-
ed the serious problems facing the sport.  The after-
math of Armstrong’s admission has led to bickering 
amongst the sport’s regulatory entities, leading the 
                                                             
140 Interview with Josh Silva, supra note 137. 
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general public to question whether the sport will ever 
recover from the events that have marred its past. 
The next few years will reveal whether cy-
cling’s regulatory groups can come together and en-
act a comprehensive plan to finally clean up one of 
the most “drug-soaked” sports in the history of the 
modern world.  However, it will take something more 
than increased sanctions and improved testing tech-
niques.  Private organizations that participate in the 
industry must also contribute to cleaning up the 
sport.  Professional teams should enact zero-
tolerance policies and refuse to sign riders with a 
history of drug abuse. 
Additionally, team sponsors should include 
stern anti-doping clauses in their contracts, so that 
riders will face large financial penalties for cheating.  
Perhaps cyclists will think twice about using perfor-
mance-enhancing substances if their financial fu-
tures are put in serious jeopardy.  The outcome of the 
many private lawsuits facing Lance Armstrong may 
prove to the cycling community that financial sanc-
tions are a powerful deterrent.  Maybe then, the in-
dustry will finally come together and work to shut 
down the “pharmacy on wheels.” 
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Abstract 
The Saint Louis Art Museum, known as 
SLAM, acquired the mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer in 1998. 
Eight years later, the Egyptian Supreme Council of 
Antiquities called for its return on the grounds that 
it had been stolen from the Egyptian Museum in 
Cairo.  SLAM refused.  In 2011, the case went before 
the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri to determine the ownership of the 
mask.  Perhaps to the surprise of many, the court de-
cided that the mask belongs in Saint Louis.  
This Article will explain how this case was 
properly decided, albeit on a legal technicality.  It 
will also discuss the law surrounding different kinds 
of repatriation claims, and how foreign patrimony 
laws apply within the United States legal system.  
Finally, it will discuss the ramifications of the Ka-
Nefer-Nefer decision.  Given that the black market 
for art is estimated to be the third largest in the 
world, behind drug trafficking and arms dealing, 
proper understanding of the United States laws in 
the field of art law is important. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Collectors and museums have favored Egyp-
tian antiquities since the time of the ancient Greeks.1  
In the fifth century BC, the Greek historian Herodo-
tus visited Egypt and sang its praises in his work, 
The Histories.2  The Roman Army took so many 
Egyptian obelisks during the Classical period that 
today more obelisks stand in Rome than in Egypt.3  
In the eighteenth century, Napoleon’s Army collected 
many objects from Egypt, including the famous Ro-
setta Stone.4  Europeans were so enthralled by Egyp-
tian motifs that they decorated entire rooms in an 
                                                             
1 See William Kelly Simpson, Preface to W. STEVENSON SMITH, 
THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF ANCIENT EGYPT, at vii-viii 
(1998) (discussing the scholars, museums, and excavations 
devoted to ancient Egypt in the last decades of the twentieth 
century); John Marincola, Introduction to HERODOTUS, THE 
HISTORIES, at xiv (Aubrey de Sélincourt, trans., Penguin Books 
1996) (450-420 BC) (discussing Greek culture’s fascination with 
Egypt). 
2  Marincola, supra note 1, at xiv. 
3 Stolen Treasures, SUPREME COUNCIL OF ANTIQUITIES, 
http://www.sca-egypt.org/eng/RST_MISS_MP.htm (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2014).  
4 MARJORIE CAYGILL, THE BRITISH MUSEUM: A-Z COMPANION 
272 (1999).  When the British defeated the Napoleonic armies, 
the French ceded the stone to King George III in the Treaty of 
Alexandria (1801).  King George placed it in the British 
Museum, where it has remained ever since.  Id. 
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Egyptian style and collectors sought Egyptian arti-
facts.5  
Smuggling artifacts out of Egypt occurs even 
today, and looting has increased since the Egyptian 
Revolution in February 2011.6  Because of this histo-
ry of looting, the Supreme Council of Antiquities in 
Egypt has called for European and American muse-
ums to return many objects to Egypt. 7  Recognizing 
the importance of protecting cultural heritage, the 
United Nations General Assembly passed a resolu-
tion in 1993 calling for the restitution of cultural 
treasures to their countries of origin.8 
Archaeological looting, a form of art theft and 
a major cause of unprovenanced9 antiquities, is a se-
                                                             
5 See T.G.H. James, Formation and Growth of the Egyptian 
Collections of the British Museum, in EDNA R. RUSSMAN, 
ETERNAL EGYPT: MASTERWORKS OF ANCIENT ART FROM THE 
BRITISH MUSEUM 49 (2001) (discussing the interest in Egyptian 
artifacts and Egypt); KRISTINA HERRMANN FIORE, GUIDE TO THE 
GALLERIA BORGHESE 52 (2008) (discussing the Egyptian Room 
at the Galleria Borghese and other Egyptian-themed rooms in 
Rome). 
6 See Carol Redmount, El-Hibeh: Archaeological Site Looted, 
AMERICAN RESEARCH CENTER IN EGYPT (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.arce.org/news/2012/03/u76/El-Hibeh-Archaeological-
Site-Looted.  
7 The Supreme Council of Antiquities  issued a general 
statement asking people to report  any information about 
possibly looted artifacts. They have also approached various 
museums and collectors about specific artifacts in those 
collections.  See Stolen Treasures, supra note 3. 
8 1 LEONARD D. DUBOFF, CHRISTIE O. KING, MICHAEL D. 
MURRAY, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW B-6 (2d ed. Supp. 2005). 
9 Provenance is an art historical term defined as “[t]he record 
of all known previous ownerships and locations of a work of art 
(as given in a catalogue raisonné).”  EDWARD KUCIE-SMITH, THE 
THAMES AND HUDSON DICTIONARY OF ART TERMS 154 (1984). 
Thus, an “unprovenanced” work is one in which the information 
about previous ownerships and locations is unknown. 
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rious problem.10  The black market for art has been 
ranked the third highest in volume, just under drug 
trafficking and the arms trade.11  More recently, the 
International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR) 
and the United Nations Educational, Social and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) estimated that it is 
the second most valuable illicit business.12  While in 
many cases, art theft has ties to organized crime,13 in 
some cases thieves take advantage of the relatively 
unregulated art market to sell to collectors and auc-
tion houses.14  The result is that many unprove-
nanced artifacts end up in museums.15  Some studies 
of auction house catalogues indicate that 85 to 90% of 
antiquities on the market have no associated prove-
nance. 16  Other studies of private collections on loan 
to prominent museums indicate that only 10% of the 
antiquities had provenance.17  Thus, the repatriation 
of antiquities has significant ramifications for muse-
ums, as many of their objects may be affected.  
With these facts in mind, any collector who is 
                                                             
10 Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of 
Museum Collections and the Fiduciary Obligations of Museums 
to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 446 (2003). 
11 Onimi Erekosima & Brian Koosed, Intellectual Property 
Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 809, 849 (2004). 
12 1 LEONARD D. DUBOFF, CHRISTY O. KING & MICHAEL D. 
MURRAY, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW C-3 (2d ed. Supp. 2005). 
IFAR reports that narcotics trafficking is the first.  Marion P. 
Forsyth, International Cultural Property Trusts: One Response 
to the Burden of Proof Challenges in Stolen Antiquities 
Litigation, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 197 (2007).  
13 1 DUBOFF, KING & MURRAY, supra note 12, at C-4. 
14 Gerstenblith, supra note 10, at 446. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 447.   
17 Derek Fincham, Towards A Rigorous Standard for the Good 
Faith Acquisition of Antiquities, 37 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 
145, 154 (2010). 
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presented with an Egyptian artifact for sale should 
be diligent in determining its provenance before ac-
quiring it.  It may not only be stolen from a collec-
tion, the artifact might also have been taken illegally 
from its country of origin.18 
In one such ongoing case, the Saint Louis Art 
Museum (SLAM) acquired the Ka-Nefer-Nefer19 
mummy mask in 1998.20  Eight years later, around 
2006, the Egyptian government requested the mask’s 
return and SLAM refused.21  
SLAM then took the preemptive step of filing 
for declaratory judgment on February 15, 2011.22  
                                                             
18 See 2 LEONARD D. DUBOFF, CHRISTIE O. KING & MICHAEL D. 
MURRAY, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW U-10 (2d ed. Supp. 2006). 
19 The transliteration of the Egyptian hieroglyphs for this 
name reads, “k3 nfr nfr.”  In English, the syllables would be ka, 
nefer, and nefer.  “Ka” means “spirit” or “soul,” and “nefer” 
means “beautiful” or “good.”  The name thus means, “doubly 
beautiful soul” (translation by the author).  The name can be 
written in English in numerous ways, with different 
capitalization and hyphenation.  The following are some 
examples: Ka-nefer-nefer (as on both museums’ websites), Ka 
Nefer Nefer (as in various pleadings in the case), and Ka-Nefer-
Nefer (as in the case name and opinion).  To avoid confusion, 
the name has been standardized throughout this article to Ka-
Nefer-Nefer. 
20 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 5, Art Museum 
Subdist. of the Metro. Zoological Park & Museum Dist. of the 
City of St. Louis & the Cnty. of St. Louis v. United States, No. 
4:11CV0091, 2011 WL 903377, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), 
ECF No. 1(stating that the museum bought the artifact from 
Phoenix Ancient Art, S.A. of Geneva, Switzerland). 
21 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture at 3, United States v. Ka-
Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV00504, 2011 WL 10714760, *2 (E.D. 
Mo. Mar. 16, 2012), ECF No. 1.  
22 Art Museum Subdist. of the Metro. Zoological Park & 
Museum Dist. of the City of St. Louis & the Cnty. of St. Louis v. 
United States, No. 4:11CV291 HEA, 2012 WL 1107736, at *1. 
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The District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri stayed the declaratory judgment action, “pend-
ing the outcome of the civil forfeiture action in Unit-
ed States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer.”23 
In response, the United States government 
filed for civil forfeiture on March 16, 2011.24  Howev-
er, the District Court granted SLAM’s 12(b)(6) mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.25  Conse-
quently, the U.S. government filed a notice of appeal 
on June 29, 2012 and the Eighth Circuit heard oral 
arguments on January 13, 2014.26 
This Article will address the legal issues in-
volved in deciding this case.  Part I will address the 
law pertinent to civil forfeiture, and it will explain 
how the courts have used this remedy with respect to 
stolen art.  It will also explore the National Stolen 
Property Act (NSPA), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-
2315, and the Egyptian patrimony laws, No. 215 and 
No. 117.  Part II will give a detailed analysis of the 
record of the case and the procedural history as it 
stands.  Part III will analyze whether the court 
properly dismissed the case and whether the pro-
posed amended complaint would have survived a mo-
tion to dismiss.  The final Part will conclude the Arti-
cle with the recommendation that SLAM is legally 
entitled to the mask, and makes a recommendation 
                                                                                                                             
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) [hereinafter SLAM Declaratory 
Judgment case]. 
23 Id. at *3. 
24 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 1. 
25 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 
HEA, 2012 WL 1094652, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) recons. 
denied, No. 4:11CV504 HEA, 2012 WL 1977242 (E.D. Mo. June 
1, 2012). 
26 Notice of Appeal at 1, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-
Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 (E.D. Mo. June 29, 2012), ECF No. 55; 
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/webcal/jan14stl.pdf, 6 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
Don’t Get SLAMmed into Nefer Nefer Land 
216 
for better ways to write a complaint of this nature.  
 
I.  APPLICABLE LAW 
This Article will primarily address the U.S. 
government’s civil forfeiture action.  The action is 
brought under the Customs Duties statute, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1595a.27 
Generally, cases citing this law as grounds for 
forfeiture allege another violation of law concomitant 
with it.28  Some examples have included the NSPA, 
18 U.S.C. § 545, and the patrimony laws of various 
foreign nations.29  This section will examine these 
statutes, and the Egyptian patrimony laws that are 
applicable to the Ka-Nefer-Nefer case.  
 
A.  Civil Forfeiture: 19 U.S.C. § 1595a 
Forfeiture is a procedure that allows the Unit-
ed States government to seize items that exist in vio-
lation of the law.30  Forfeiture can be punitive or re-
medial.31  When the government proceeds against an 
                                                             
27 See 77 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, Proof of a Claim 
Involving Stolen Art Antiquities § 19 (2004) (noting, for 
example, that the Cultural Property Implementation Act is a 
customs law because it is in Title 19 “Customs Duties,” not in 
Title 18, “Crimes and Criminal Procedure.”). 
28 See United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 
131, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (alleging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545); 
United States v. An Original Manuscript Dated November 19, 
1778, No. 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 97894, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 22, 1999) (alleging a violation of the CPIA); United States 
v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(alleging a violation of the NSPA).  
29 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 
(2012); 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2012) (titled “Smuggling goods into the 
United States”); United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing 
Lunar Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
30 United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 46 (2d Cir. 1993). 
31 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998). 
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individual in a criminal proceeding, the forfeiture is 
punitive.32  However, if the government sues the ac-
tual property, as in a civil case, the forfeiture is not 
intended as punishment of an individual for an actu-
al offense.33  Rather, when the government seizes an 
artifact in violation of a customs statute and launch-
es a proceeding against the object itself, the court 
considers the action remedial.34 
In a civil forfeiture case, the government files 
a verified complaint against the property (in rem) 
under the notion that the property itself is the 
“wrongdoer”.35  The owner then files an official claim 
to the property with the court.36  Thus, a typical civil 
forfeiture suit will involve three parties: the govern-
ment, the in rem property, and the claimant. 
A statute allowing for this procedure is 19 
U.S.C. § 1595a.37  This customs statute states in 
part, “[m]erchandise which is introduced or attempt-
ed to be introduced into the United States contrary to 
law shall be seized and forfeited  if it is stolen, smug-
gled, or clandestinely imported or introduced.”38  
While examining this law, the Second Circuit stated 
that the statute only requires, “that the property in 
question be introduced into the United States illegal-
ly, unlawfully, or in a manner conflicting with estab-
                                                             
32 Id. The Bajakajian case is an example of a punitive 
forfeiture; there the government proceeded against the 
individual criminally and then obtained forfeiture of the object 
(in this case, currency) to punish the convicted.  
33 Id. at 331. 
34 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2011); 
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 140 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
35 Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 46. 
36 FED. R. CIV. P. G(5)(a)(i). 
37 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (2012). 
38 Id. 
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lished law.”39  Thus, the government can seize cul-
tural property in a civil forfeiture action if someone 
imports that cultural property contrary to a law.40 
One question of significant importance is what 
burden of proof is necessary for the government to 
seize the object.41  Traditionally, the government on-
ly needed to show probable cause to seize property in 
a forfeiture.42  The burden of proof is established by 
19 U.S.C. § 1615, which states, “the burden of proof 
shall lie upon such claimant.”43  However, the Civil 
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) 
heightened the burden on the government to a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.44  Nevertheless, as late 
as 2003, courts have stated that the lesser standard 
of probable cause was sufficient in civil forfeiture 
proceedings under a customs statute, and the burden 
remained upon the claimant.45  Furthermore, cir-
cumstantial evidence is sufficient to determine prob-
able cause.46 
The Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and 
Maritime or Asset Forfeiture Actions determine the 
                                                             
39 Davis, 648 F.3d at 89. 
40 19 U.S.C. § 1595a. 
41 United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 46 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(noting the concern with the constitutional safeguards for 
innocent purchasers, given the ease with which the government 
can seize property). 
42 Jennifer A. Kreder, The Choice Between Civil and Criminal 
Remedies in Stolen Art Litigation, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 
1199, 1232 (2005). 
43 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (2012). 
44 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) 
(2012); Kreder, supra note 42, at 1231. 
45 United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar 
Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1377 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2003) 
(noting 18 U.S.C. § 983(i) specifically excludes actions under 
Title 19).  
46 Id. at 1378. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
Don’t Get SLAMmed into Nefer Nefer Land 
219 
particularity with which the complaint must plead 
probable cause.47  For an in rem action, the govern-
ment must state “circumstances . . . with such par-
ticularity that the defendant or claimant will be able, 
without moving for a more definite statement, to 
commence an investigation of the facts and to frame 
a responsive pleading.”48  For an asset forfeiture, the 
government must “state sufficiently detailed facts to 
support a reasonable belief that the government will 
be able to meet its burden of proof at trial.”49 
There are two possible defenses to this 
statute.50  The statute of limitations for civil 
forfeiture actions under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a is 
provided by 19 U.S.C. § 1621.51  This section states 
that barring any concealment, no one can bring an 
action five years after the offense was committed, or 
more than two years after the property was 
discovered.52  Another defense that claimants often 
use in cultural heritage cases is the doctrine of 
laches.53  This doctrine bars a claim if the plaintiff 
                                                             
47 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 
HEA, 2012 WL 1094658, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) recons. 
denied, No. 4:11CV504 HEA, 2012 WL 1977242 (E.D. Mo. June 
1, 2012). 
48 FED. R. CIV. P. E(2)(a). 
49 FED. R. CIV. P. G(2)(f). 
50 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012); Gerstenblith, supra note 10, at 
442-3. 
51 19 U.S.C. § 1621. “No suit or action to recover any duty 
under section 1592(d), 1593a(d) of this title, or any pecuniary 
penalty or forfeiture of property accruing under the customs 
laws shall be instituted unless such suit or action is commenced 
within five years after the time when the alleged offense was 
discovered, or in the case of forfeiture, within 2 years after the 
time when the involvement of the property in the alleged 
offense was discovered, whichever was later” 
52 Id.  
53 Gerstenblith, supra note 10, at 442-3. 
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unreasonably delayed in bringing the claim and the 
defendant suffers prejudice as a result of this delay.54 
The government has successfully seized ob-
jects of cultural property under § 1595a in two prom-
inent cases.55  In the first case, the Southern District 
of Florida held that the forfeiture of a moon rock was 
valid because it was stolen from Honduras and im-
ported into the United States.56  Honduran law re-
quired an act of Congress to authorize the alienation 
of the moon rock, and because they found no legisla-
tion to this effect, the court held that the rock was 
subject to forfeiture.57  
In the second case, the government successful-
ly seized a manuscript that had been stolen from the 
National Archives in Mexico and imported into the 
                                                             
54 Id.  
55 United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar 
Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2003); United 
States v. An Original Manuscript Dated November 19, 1778, 
No. 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 97894, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
22, 1999). 
56 Lucite Ball, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1369.  The complaint stated 
that the Consul General of Honduras had “identified the 
defendant property as patrimony of the Republic of Honduras 
and has stated that pursuant to Honduran law the defendant 
property could not be legally sold, or conveyed nor removed 
from Honduras unless expressly authorized by action of the 
National Congress.” Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in rem at 
9, Lucite Ball, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (No. 01-0116 CIV 
JORDAN), 2001 WL 34841870, at *4, ECF No. 1.  A court 
appointed expert on Honduran law determined that the 
Honduran government owned the moon rock when President 
Nixon donated it in 1973.  Lucite Ball, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.  
Honduras has had several regime changes since 1973, but the 
court deemed this immaterial under Honduran law; the moon 
rock was the patrimony of the state.  Id. at 1373. 
57 Lucite Ball, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1375-76 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
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United States.58  In that case, the Southern District 
of New York determined that the government made 
its showing of probable cause because Archives doc-
umented the manuscript as part of its collection and 
19 U.S.C. § 2607 makes it a crime to import an item 
belonging to the inventory of a foreign museum after 
the effective date of that chapter.59  
                                                             
58 Original Manuscript, No. 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 
97894, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1999).  The National Archives in 
Mexico City documented the manuscript as belonging to its 
collection in 1993.  Id.  The manuscript was purchased at a flea 
market for approximately $300.  Id.  It was imported into the 
United States, where it was sold in a hotel room for $16,000.  
Id. at *2. Later, a dealer in rare manuscripts saw the 
manuscript when Sotheby’s had it for auction and notified the 
Mexican National Archives that the manuscript might belong to 
them.  Id. at *2.  The National Archives confirmed it was 
missing from its collection and requested its return from the 
United States.  Id. at *2.  The court also found that the 
claimant was not an innocent owner given the suspicious 
nature of the transaction.  Id. at *7.  Therefore, the manuscript 
was subject to forfeiture.  Id. at *1. 
59 Id. at *6.  In 1970, United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) held the Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.  1 
DUBOFF, KING & MURRAY, supra note 8, at B-82.  The 
convention called for the signatory nations to prohibit the 
importation an object of cultural heritage that was stolen from 
another signatory country.  Id. at B-82.  The United States 
adopted the Convention in 1983.  Id. at B-83.  The resulting 
statute became known as the Cultural Property 
Implementation Act, or the CPIA, codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601 
et seq.  Id..  A relevant part of the Act reads:  
No article of cultural property documented as 
appertaining to the inventory of a museum or 
religious or secular public monument or similar 
institution in any State Party which is stolen 
from such institution after the effective date of 
this chapter, or after the date of entry into force 
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B.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315: National Stolen 
Property Act 
Congress signed the National Stolen Property 
Act (NSPA) into legislation in 1934 in order to ex-
pand the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act to include 
stolen property other than automobiles.60  The Act 
prevents the transportation of property valued over 
$5,000 across state lines.61  The NSPA was amended 
in 1986 to include transportation over the United 
States border and added the word “possession” to 
eliminate the defense that the property was no long-
er in interstate commerce and that the federal gov-
ernment could not prosecute it under the Commerce 
Clause.62  The passage of the NSPA pertinent to the 
recovery of stolen art reads: 
 
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, 
stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any 
goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or 
money of the value of $5,000 or more, or 
pledges or accepts as security for a loan any 
goods, wares, or merchandise, or securities, 
of the value of $500 or more, which have 
crossed a State or United States boundary 
after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or 
taken, knowing the same to have been sto-
len, unlawfully converted, or taken . . .  
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
                                                                                                                             
of the Convention for the State Party, whichever 
date is later, may be imported into the United 
States.  
Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2012). 
60 Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places: 
Unprovenanced Antiquities and the National Stolen Property 
Act, 40 N.M. L. REV. 123, 133 (2010). 
61 18 U.S.C. § 2314. 
62 Urice, supra note 60, at 134. 
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not more than ten years, or both.63 
 
In the text itself, the NSPA does not actually 
define what the term “stolen” means for purposes of 
the Act. The Ninth Circuit held in Hollinshead that 
the violation of a country’s patrimony law can mean 
stolen.64  The Fifth Circuit held in McClain that 
works of art imported in violation of a country’s pat-
rimony law  constitutes “stolen” property under the 
NSPA.65  In McClain, the court convicted five indi-
viduals of stealing Pre-Columbian artifacts from 
Mexico and trying to sell them in the United States 
to an undercover FBI agent.66  After tracing the his-
tory of laws in Mexico  concerning cultural property, 
the court noted that Mexico did not enact legislation 
claiming ownership of cultural property until 1972.67  
The court held “a declaration of national ownership 
is necessary before illegal exportation of an article 
can be considered theft, and the exported article con-
sidered ‘stolen,’ within the meaning of the National 
Stolen Property Act.”68  This holding became known 
as the McClain Doctrine.69 
However, the Second Circuit has held that in 
addition to enacting a patrimony law, the country of 
origin must enforce that law within its borders before 
an object can be considered stolen if it is brought into 
                                                             
63 18 U.S.C. § 2315.  
64 United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
65 United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
66 Id. at  991-92 
67 Id. at 1000. 
68 Id. at 1000-01 (citing Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154). 
69 Adam Goldberg, Comment, Reaffirming McClain: The 
National Stolen Property Act and the Abiding Trade in Looted 
Cultural Objects, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1031, 1042 (2006). 
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the United States.70  The court concluded, “the NSPA 
applies to property that is stolen from a foreign gov-
ernment, where that government asserts actual own-
ership of the property pursuant to a valid patrimony 
law.”71  The court further noted that there were “no 
exceptions” for private ownership for antiquities dis-
covered in Egypt after the effective date of the rele-
vant patrimony law, Egyptian Law No. 117 of 1983.72 
In an earlier opinion, the Second Circuit estab-
lished that the law allegedly violating NSPA must 
claim ownership, not merely regulate the items.73  In 
Long Cove Seafood, the court found that individuals 
who took clams in violation of an environmental law 
across state borders were not guilty under the NSPA 
because the environmental law only intended to reg-
ulate the clams.74  New York did not assert a posses-
sory interest in the clams, as evidenced by the fact 
the government did not assert a violation of the state 
larceny statute.75  Equally important, New York did 
not assume liability for any attacks by the wild ani-
mals regulated under the relevant environmental 
laws, whereas possessors of animals in New York 
were liable for attacks.76  Thus, the environmental 
law did not sufficiently describe state ownership of 
the clams for the court to consider them “stolen” un-
der the NSPA.77 
                                                             
70 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 406. In Schultz, two individuals looted Egyptian 
antiquities from archaeological sites and sold them as part of 
the fictitious “Thomas Alcock Collection.” Id. at 396. 
73 United States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159, 165 
(2d Cir. 1978). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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The government has used the NSPA in con-
nection with the civil forfeiture statute in several 
situations.  The government first asserted a claim of 
civil forfeiture against a work of art under the NSPA 
in 1999, but the court ultimately decided the case on 
other grounds.78  In cases where the NSPA has been 
the reason for forfeiture, the record clearly identified 
a particular thief.  In Portrait of Wally, the Second 
Circuit determined that the government met its bur-
den of showing probable cause for forfeiture because 
it had several letters indicating that a Nazi official 
had taken a painting without providing compensa-
tion to the owner.79  In another decision by the Sec-
                                                             
78 Ian M. Goldrich, Comments, Balancing the Need for 
Repatriation of Illegally Removed Cultural Property with the 
Interests of Bona Fide Purchasers: Applying the UNIDROIT 
Convention to the Case of the Gold Phiale, 23 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 118, 121 (1999).  In Antique Platter, the claimant 
purchased an Italian artifact from Sicily in 1991 for $1.2 
million.  United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 
131, 133 (2d Cir. 1999).  On the customs form, the claimant 
listed the Phiale’s country of origin as Switzerland and the 
purchase price as $250,000.  Id.  The Italian patrimony law 
stated that all archaeological items belonged to Italy unless the 
owner could prove private ownership before 1902.  Id. at 134.  
The Italian government contacted the United States and 
requested the Phiale’s repatriation.  Id.  The government filed 
an in rem civil forfeiture action, asserting both a customs 
violation under 18 U.S.C. § 545 and the NPSA.  Id.  False 
statements are forbidden on customs forms.  18 U.S.C. § 545. 
The court determined that claimant’s importation of the Phiale 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 545 because of the claimant misrepresented 
both the price and the country of origin on the customs form.  
Antique Platter, 184 F.3d at 134.  The court chose not to address 
the NSPA allegation.  Id.  
79 United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 256 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).  The court also stated that the purchaser did 
not do a good faith provenance search when he relied solely on 
the seller’s word even though he knew a Jewish woman claimed 
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ond Circuit, a witness testified to seeing the thief 
carry the painting out of the museum.80 
 
C. Egyptian Patrimony Laws No. 215 and No. 117 
The Republic of Egypt enacted Law No. 215 in 
1951.81  Article 4 provided that all immovable or 
movable antiquities or ancient land belonged to the 
Republic of Egypt, unless it belonged to a wakf (reli-
gious entity) or was private property under the law.82  
Article 22 outlined the exceptions under which a per-
son may privately own an antiquity.83  These excep-
tions included (1) antiquities found prior to the insti-
tution of Law No. 215, in antiquities markets or pri-
vate collections; (2) antiquities given to the finder by 
the Egyptian government; (3) antiquities the Egyp-
tian government sold; (4) antiquities imported by a 
stranger; (5) immovable antiquities; and (6) antiqui-
ties sold by museums.84  
Egyptian Patrimony Law No. 117 replaced 
                                                                                                                             
the portrait belonged to her family.  Id. at 267.  The court also 
insisted that it was not enough that the painting was stolen 
when it entered the country, but that the government must 
show that the museum in question knew it was stolen when it 
was imported.  Id. at 269.  The court also rejected the notion 
that laches could apply to a civil forfeiture action.  Id. at 275.  
80 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2011).  In 
Davis, the government brought a civil forfeiture action under 19 
U.S.C. § 1595a and the NSPA when Sotheby’s attempted to 
auction the Pissarro painting, Le Marche, after it had been 
stolen from a French museum in 1981.  Id. at 87.  This case 
determined that “stolen” meant the object was stolen at the 
time of importation to the US.  Id. at 91.  The court also 
established that there is no innocent owner defense.  Id. at 95. 
81 Law No. 215 of 1951 (Law on the Protection of Antiquities), 
31 October 1951, p. 1 (Egypt). 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 5. 
84 Id. at 5. 
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Law No. 215 in 1983.85  Law No. 3 amended Law No. 
117 in 2010.86  Article 24 of Law No. 117 expressly 
provides that anyone who finds an antiquity in Egypt 
must turn it over to authorities within 48 hours as it 
belongs to the Egyptian government, and Law No. 3 
did not amend this provision.87  The sale of antiqui-
ties is forbidden by Article 8; as amended by Law No. 
3, it also allows the board of directors the ability to 
restitute artifacts for compensation.88  Article 35 
claims ownership of any find made during an ar-
chaeological expedition made by foreigners, and re-
moves the 1983 provision that the Egyptian govern-
ment may give excavators some of their finds.89  
Egyptian authorities will fine anyone who smuggles 
an artifact out of Egypt between 100,000 and 
1,000,000 Egyptian Pounds, and that the object will 
be forfeited to the Egyptian authorities, pursuant to 
Article 41.90 
                                                             
85 Law No. 117 of 1983 (Law on the Protection of Antiquities), 
Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 11 August 1983, p. 4, (Egypt).   
86 Law No. 117 of 1983 as Amended by Law No. 3 of 2010 
(Promulgating the Antiquities Protection Law), 14 February 
2010, p. 8 (Egypt). 
87 Law No. 117 of 1983 (Promulgating the Antiquities 
Protection Law),  11 August 1983, p. 17, (Egypt); Law No. 117 of 
1983 as Amended by Law No. 3 of 2010 (Promulgating the 
Antiquities Protection Law), 14 February 2010, p. 22 (Egypt). 
88 Law No. 117 of 1983 as Amended by Law No. 3 of 2010 
(Promulgating the Antiquities Protection Law), 14 February 
2010, p. 15 (Egypt). 
89  Id. at p. 28; Law No. 117 of 1983 (Promulgating the 
Antiquities Protection Law), 11 August 1983, p. 24-25, (Egypt). 
90 Law No. 117 of 1983 as Amended by Law No. 3 of 2010 
(Promulgating the Antiquities Protection Law), 14 February 
2010, p. 32 (Egypt).  This is a substantial increase from the 
1983 amounts, which set the fine between 5,000 and 50,000 
Egyptian pounds.  Law No. 117 of 1983 (Promulgating the 
Antiquities Protection Law), 11 August 1983, p. 29 (Egypt). 
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II.  UNITED STATES V. KA-NEFER-NEFER 
In 1952, an expedition of the Egyptian Antiq-
uities Service working inside the funerary enclosure 
of Third Dynasty Pharaoh Sekhemket excavated the 
Nineteenth Dynasty mat burial of the noblewoman 
Ka-Nefer-Nefer.91 
 
  
Fig 1. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer92 and Profile93 
 
Her mummy mask is made of linen, wood, plaster, 
resin, and it is painted, gilded, and inlaid with 
glass.94  It depicts the face and upper torso of a wom-
an, and it measures approximately 21 and 1/16 inch-
                                                             
91 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 2.  
92 The Mask of Kanefernefer, SUPREME COUNCIL OF 
ANTIQUITIES, http://www.sca-
egypt.org/eng/RST_005Kanefernefer.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 
2014). 
93 Photograph of the profile of the Mummy Mask of the Lady 
Ka-nefer-nefer, SAINT LOUIS ART MUSEUM, 
http://www.slam.org/eMuseum/media/full/191998_2.jpg (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
94 Id.  
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es by 14 and 9/16 inches by 9 and 3/4 inches.95 
The provenance of the mask after its excava-
tion is in dispute.96  The Government alleged in its 
verified complaint that Egyptian Antiquities Service 
stored the mask at Saqqara until 1959, when it 
shipped the mask to the Egyptian Museum in Cairo 
for an exhibition in Tokyo that never reached frui-
tion.97  In 1962, the Egyptian Museum shipped the 
mask back to Saqqara in box number fifty-four.98  
The Egyptian Museum performed an inventory in 
1973, at which time museum authorities discovered 
that the mask was no longer in box fifty-four.99  The 
Egyptian Museum has no record of a sale or transfer 
for the mask during the period from 1966 to 1973.100  
On the other hand, the Saint Louis Art Muse-
um alleged that the mask was part of the Kaloterna 
private collection in the 1960s, when a Croatian col-
lector in Switzerland acquired it.101  The complaint 
stated that in 1995 this collector sold the mask to 
Phoenix Ancient Art, 102 and stated that SLAM pur-
chased the mask from Phoenix in 1998 for approxi-
mately $499,000.103  
                                                             
95 Id. at 1-2. 
96 Compare Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, 
at 2-3; with Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 
20, at 5. 
97 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 2. 
98 Id. at 3. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 5. 
102 Id. 
103 Notice of Verified Claim of Interest, Exhibit A at 1; Art 
Museum Subdist. of the Metro. Zoological Park & Museum Dist. 
of the City of St. Louis & the Cnty. of St. Louis v. United States, 
No. 4:11CV0091, 2011 WL 903377, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), ECF No. 8-1 
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Around 2006, the Egyptian Supreme Council 
of Antiquities discovered the location of the mask 
and called for its return.104  The museum denied 
these requests.105  In December 2010, the United 
States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of 
Missouri requested a meeting regarding the mask.106  
The parties met in January 2011, and the United 
States stated its intention to seize the mask.107 
 As a result of this meeting, each party insti-
tuted a suit against the other.  Part A will examine 
the declaratory judgment action by SLAM.  Part B 
will explore the civil forfeiture action by the United 
States government.  Part C will review the aftermath 
of the cases, specifically, the government’s motion to 
reconsider or amend.  
 
A.  Declaratory Judgment 
SLAM filed for declaratory judgment against 
the government for the mask on February 15, 
2011.108  SLAM stated that it conducted a “months-
long” provenance search, in which it contacted Mo-
hammed Saleh of the Egyptian Museum, the Art 
Loss Register, INTERPOL, the International Federa-
tion of Art Research, the Missouri Highway Patrol, 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.109  SLAM 
acknowledged receipt of several emails from Ton 
Cremers, of the Museum Security Network, begin-
ning in December 2005, alleging the mask was sto-
                                                             
104 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 
HEA 2012 WL 1094658, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF 
No. 11. 
105 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 3. 
106 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 9. 
107 Id. at 9-10. 
108 Id. at 2. 
109 Id. at 5-6. 
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len.110  Cremers had sent these emails to United 
States government officials, including the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security and the FBI.111  
Dr. Zahi Hawass, at that time the Director of 
the Supreme Council of Antiquities, contacted SLAM 
via email several times and provided inconsistent 
and inaccurate information asking for the return of 
the mask.112  SLAM stated it was willing to return 
the mask if it was provided verifiable proof that the 
mask was stolen.113  SLAM concluded that the Unit-
ed States had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
location of the mask and its questionable provenance 
for more than five years.114  Consequently, the stat-
ute of limitations for forfeiture had passed.115  
In addition, because Egyptian Law No. 215 al-
lowed private ownership of antiquities, SLAM did 
not import the mask into the United States in viola-
tion of this law and the mask should belong to it.116  
Therefore, the museum requested declaratory judg-
ment in its favor.117  SLAM argued that the declara-
tory judgment would settle the dispute between the 
relevant parties, because the only other valid poten-
tial claimant was the Republic of Egypt.118 
The government responded by filing a motion 
to dismiss the complaint or stay the action for de-
                                                             
110 Id. at 7. 
111 Id. at 7-8. 
112 Id. at 9. 
113 Id.   
114 Id. at 10. 
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 11. 
117 Id.  
118 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 2, SLAM Declaratory Judgment case, No. 
4:11CV00291, 2011 WL 1258264, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), ECF No. 14. 
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claratory judgment on March 16, 2011.119  The gov-
ernment stated that Title 19 and the Supplemental 
Rules established a procedure in civil forfeiture that 
would be superior to a declaratory judgment because 
it would be a final judgment for all possible par-
ties.120  Further, the government argued that the civ-
il forfeiture proceeding was more effective for this 
dispute, because the parties were the same in both 
the declaratory judgment action and the civil forfei-
ture.121  Should the government succeed in showing 
probable cause and win the forfeiture action, the 
mask would become the property of the United 
States, and the government would have the ability to 
decide whether to return the mask to Egypt, regard-
less of whether Egypt participated as a claimant in 
the civil forfeiture action.122  Thus, the court should 
stay the declaratory judgment action because it was 
unnecessarily duplicitous and hindered judicial econ-
omy.123 
 
 
                                                             
119 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings at 1, 
SLAM Declaratory Judgment case, No. 4:11CV00291, 2011 WL 
999458, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 8. 
120 Id. at 3.  The Museum’s primary basis for opposing the 
motion to stay was that it would open the mask up to frivolous 
claims from other parties and potentially expose the Museum to 
large litigation costs. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 7, supra note 118. 
121 Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Their Motion to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings at 2, 
SLAM Declaratory Judgment case, No. 4:11CV00291 (E.D. Mo. 
Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 16. 
122 Id.  
123 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to 
Dismiss or Stay Proceedings at 6, SLAM Declaratory Judgment 
case, No. 4:11CV00291 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 9. 
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B.  Civil Forfeiture 
On the same day the government filed its re-
sponse to the declaratory judgment complaint, it ini-
tiated an action for the civil forfeiture of the mask.124  
The complaint alleged that because the mask was 
missing from its box and there was no bill of sale or 
transfer in the records of the Egyptian Museum, the 
mask had been stolen and was subject to forfeiture 
under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c).125  In addition, the gov-
ernment sought an ex parte order restraining SLAM 
from moving the property.126  The court granted the 
restraining order.127 
A claimant in a civil forfeiture action must file 
a claim within 60 days of publication and then the 
claimant must file an answer or motion under Rule 
12 within 21 days.128  Pursuant to this requirement, 
SLAM filed a claim of interest in the mask on April 
20, 2011, in which it asserted that it had purchased 
the mask in good faith for $499,000 from Phoenix 
Ancient Art in Geneva, Switzerland after months of 
provenance research.129 
Shortly thereafter, on May 5, 2011, SLAM 
                                                             
124 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 1. 
125 Id. at 4. 
126 Ex Parte Application of the United States to Restrain 
Defendant Prop. at 2, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, 
No. 4:11CV00504 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 3. 
127 Order Restraining Defendant Prop. at 2, United States v. 
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV00504 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), ECF No.5. 
128 FED. R. CIV. P. 12; Declaration of Publication at 2; United 
States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV 504 HEA (E.D. 
Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 9. 
129 St. Louis Art Museum’s Verified Claim of Interest in the 
Defendant Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer at 3, United States v. Mask 
of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA  (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), ECF No.8. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
Don’t Get SLAMmed into Nefer Nefer Land 
234 
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.130  SLAM argued 
that the term “missing” does not mean “stolen,” and 
that the complaint therefore could not withstand the 
motion to dismiss.131  The museum further argued 
that the government did not allege when, where, 
how, or by whom the mask was stolen.132  Conse-
quently, the court should grant the motion to dismiss 
because the complaint did not provide details with 
sufficient particularity to satisfy Supplemental Rule 
G(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.133  Fur-
thermore, SLAM argued that the only Egyptian pat-
rimony law the United States recognizes is Law No. 
117, and because this law was enacted in 1983, it 
would not have been in effect at the time the mask 
left Egypt.134 
Moreover, SLAM argued that the statute of 
limitations had passed.135  The Egyptian authorities 
knew the mask was missing as of 1973 and did noth-
ing to recover it.136  At the very latest, Egyptian au-
thorities should have known the mask was in Saint 
Louis in 1998, when SLAM sent letters to the Direc-
tor of the Egyptian Museum.137  However, it was not 
until February 14, 2006 that Zahi Hawass contacted 
SLAM to ask for the return of the mask.138  The gov-
                                                             
130 St. Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss the 
Government’s Civil Forfeiture Complaint at 1, United States v. 
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA  (E.D. Mo. Mar. 
31, 2012), ECF No. 11. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 3. 
133 Id.at 4 
134 Id. at 6-7. 
135 Id. at 8. 
136 Id. at 10. 
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 13. 
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ernment could have been aware of the mask’s impor-
tation in 1998.139  At the latest, the government 
would have had reason to discover the location of the 
mask and file forfeiture proceedings in February 
2006 when it received emails from Ton Cremers, but 
the government did not file until March 2011.140  
Therefore, the five-year statute of limitations had 
passed.141  For the same reasons just listed, the mu-
seum argued that the doctrine of laches should bar 
the claim.142  
The government argued in response to SLAM’s 
motion that it was required only to show probable 
cause in its pleading.143  Further, 19 U.S.C. § 1615 
shifted the burden to SLAM to show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the mask was not stolen 
property.144  Because the mask was documented in 
Cairo in 1966, was missing in 1973, and no record 
indicates that it was sold, the government argued 
there is probable cause to believe that it was stolen 
and therefore imported in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1595a.145  The government argued that matters of 
foreign law should be proven at trial and so the court 
should not consider SLAM’s allegations regarding 
Egyptian Law No. 117 until that time.146  Moreover, 
the government urged the court to reject the motion 
because the statute of limitations and the defense of 
                                                             
139 Id. at 14. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 15. 
143 United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to Claimant St. 
Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss at 3, United States v. 
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 
31, 2012), ECF No. 18. 
144 Id. at 1. 
145 Id. at 4. 
146 Id. at 5. 
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laches were outside of the scope of a motion to dis-
miss.147 
The government also moved to strike SLAM’s 
claim for lack of standing.148  It argued that SLAM 
did not establish a colorable claim under Egyptian 
law, because that law “provides that antiquities like 
the Mask are property of the Republic of Egypt[.]”149  
Therefore, SLAM did not have colorable claim of 
ownership to the mask.150  The Government asserted 
that because none of the exceptions for private own-
ership under Egyptian Law No. 215 were possible, 
the mask would be contraband like a narcotic, and 
the museum should not be able to claim the mask.151 
SLAM countered by claiming that because the 
mask was in its exclusive possession and control for 
thirteen years, it had standing to claim the mask.152  
SLAM argued that its standing was based not just on 
possession, but also upon the fact that it paid value 
for the mask and would suffer injury if the mask 
                                                             
147 Id. at 6. 
148 United States’ Motion to Strike Claim by St. Louis Art 
Museum for Lack of Standing at 1,  United States v. Mask of 
Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA  (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), 
ECF No. 20. 
149 United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to Claimant St. 
Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 143, at 1. 
150 United States’ Motion to Strike Claim by St. Louis Art 
Museum for Lack of Standing, supra note 148, at 2. 
151 United States’ Memorandum in Support of its Motion to 
Strike Claim by St. Louis Art Museum for Lack of Standing at 
4, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 
HEA  (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 21. 
152 Claimant St. Louis Art Museum’s Memorandum in 
Opposition to the United States’ Motion to Strike the St. Louis 
Art Museum’s Verified Claim to the Mask at 4, United States v. 
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA  (E.D. Mo. Mar. 
31, 2012), ECF No. 24. 
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were forfeited.153 
The court issued its opinion on the declaratory 
judgment action, the motion to strike and the civil 
forfeiture action on the same day.154  The court de-
cided to stay the declaratory judgment because no 
parties would suffer prejudice.155  In addition, the 
court agreed with the government that civil forfei-
ture was procedurally superior because there was a 
specific statutory scheme for dealing with the mat-
ter.156  The court also denied the government’s mo-
tion to strike.157  Because the mask had been in con-
tinuous and open possession of the museum for thir-
teen years, the court determined that SLAM had 
standing.158 
However, the court granted the motion to dis-
miss the civil forfeiture action.159  Supplemental Rule 
                                                             
153 Claimant St. Louis Art Museum’s Sur-Reply to the United 
States’ Reply to the Museum’s Memorandum in Opposition to 
the Motion to Strike the Museum’s Claim for Lack of Standing 
at 4, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 
HEA  (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 30. 
154 SLAM Declaratory Judgment case, No. 4:11CV291 HEA, 
2012 WL 1107736, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012); United 
States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA, 2012 
WL 1094658, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) recons. denied, No. 
4:11CV504 HEA, 2012 WL 1977242 (E.D. Mo. June 1, 2012) 
(granting SLAM’s motion to dismiss the verified complaint); 
United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 HEA, 
2012 WL 1094652, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) (denying the 
government’s motion to strike the claim by SLAM for lack of 
standing). 
155 SLAM Declaratory Judgment case, No. 4:11CV291 HEA, 
2012 WL 1107736, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012). 
156 Id. at *2.  
157 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504-
HEA, 2012 WL 1094652, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012). 
158 Id. 
159 United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV504 
HEA, 2012 WL 1094658, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) recons. 
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G(2) governs civil forfeiture actions,160 and it re-
quires that the complaint must plead the facts with 
particularity.161  The court was not persuaded that 
the government would be able to meet its burden of 
proof at trial because the pleading only stated that 
the mask was “missing” and did not allege any facts 
indicating the time, place, or manner in which the 
mask was stolen.162  Further, the court noted that 19 
U.S.C. § 1595a specified that the merchandise be in-
troduced into the country “contrary to law,” and the 
government failed to note which law was violated.163  
 
C.  Motion to Reconsider or Amend  
the Complaint 
On April 6, 2012, the government filed a mo-
tion to seek leave to file a motion to reconsider and to 
amend the complaint.164  The government stated that 
the order dismissed the complaint, but did not ap-
pear to dismiss the underlying action and was there-
fore not a final judgment.165  On April 9, 2012, the 
court granted the motion to file a motion to reconsid-
er by May 7, 2012 but was silent as to when or if the 
government could file an amended complaint.166 
                                                                                                                             
denied, No. 4:11CV504 HEA, 2012 WL 1977242 (E.D. Mo. June 
1, 2012). 
160 Id. at *2. 
161 Id. at *1. 
162 Id. at *3. 
163 Id. at *3. 
164 Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Motion for 
Reconsideration and/or to Seek Leave to File Amended 
Complaint Prior to Entry of Judgment at 1, United States v. 
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV00504 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), ECF No. 35. 
165 Id. 
166 Docket Text Order at 1, United States v. Ka-Nefer-Nefer, 
No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 36. 
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As a result, the government filed a motion to 
reconsider or file an amended complaint,167  arguing 
that it need only demonstrate probable cause and 
that claimant had the burden of proof beyond a pre-
ponderance of the evidence to show lawful importa-
tion.168  It stated that probable cause should be more 
than mere suspicion, but it did not need to be a pri-
ma facie case.169  The motion noted that courts have 
construed “stolen” within the context of 19 U.S.C. § 
1595a liberally in other cases, such that the govern-
ment only needed show that the mask belonged at 
one time to someone other than the current owner; it 
did not need to show the time and manner of the 
theft or the identity of the thief.170  In addition, the 
plain language of the statute simply states, “stolen” 
and does not require a predicate law.171  Therefore, 
the Opinion is incorrect by asserting that “introduced 
contrary to law” and “stolen” are separate elements 
to be satisfied.172  
                                                                                                                             
The court entered the following information into the docket: 
“ORDERED: PLAINTIFF GRANTED UNTIL 5-7-12 TO FILE 
WHAT IT SUGGESTS IS A MOTION TO RECONSIDER HEA. 
(Response to Court due by 5/7/2012.). Signed by Honorable 
Henry E. Autrey on 04/09/12.” 
167 Motion of the United States to Reconsider Order and Op. 
Dismissing its Verified Complaint at 2, United States v. Mask 
of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), ECF No. 37. 
168 Memorandum of the United States in Support of its Motion 
to Reconsider Order and Op. Dismissing Verified Complaint at 
2, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 
HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 38. 
169 Id. at 3. 
170 Id. at 5. 
171 Id. at 7. 
172 Id. at 7.  The museum countered that the government 
should have alleged that a law was broken in addition to the 
forfeiture statute and the government did not allege the 
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The court denied the motion to reconsider be-
cause there was not so severe a mistake as to estab-
lish manifest error.173  Further, the court granted the 
government’s motion to extend time to file an appeal, 
but it was silent on whether the order was final.174 
On June 8, 2012, the government filed a mo-
tion for leave to amend its complaint.175  It argued 
that when a court grants a motion to dismiss, the 
dismissal is generally without prejudice and the 
plaintiff usually has an opportunity to amend the 
complaint.176  The government attached a proposed 
amended complaint that added information about 
how provenance can be laundered.177  It also added 
that because the Republic of Egypt did not authorize 
“any person to remove the Mask from box number 
                                                                                                                             
Egyptian patrimony law that would be in effect.  Claimant St. 
Louis Art Museum’s Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Government’s Motion to Reconsider Order and Opinion 
Dismissing Verified Complaint at 15, United States v. Mask of 
Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), ECF No. 40. 
173 Op., Memorandum, and Order at 3, United States v. Mask 
of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), ECF No. 48.  
174 Id. 
175 Motion of the United States for Leave to File First 
Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture at 1, United States 
v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. 
Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 49. 
176 Id. at 2 
177 First Amended Verified Complaint at 3, United States v. 
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. June 
8, 2012), ECF No. 49-1 (“Laundering the provenance of an 
artifact involves creating a fictitious history of the artifact’s 
ownership through the fabrication of documents or other 
accounts that misstate of the place or time of origin or discovery 
or falsely describe the transactions leading to its present 
ownership.”) (on file with the author and the Pace Intellectual 
Property, Sports & Entertainment Law Forum). 
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fifty-four at Saqqara” there was probable cause to be-
lieve the mask was “stolen by an unidentified indi-
vidual . . . between 1966 and 1973.”178  
The government also added information to the 
complaint about the necessary Egyptian law.179  The 
government stated that Egyptian Law No. 215 de-
fines the mask as an antiquity, and the mask does 
not fall into any of the exceptions for private owner-
ship carved out by that law.180  The amended com-
plaint also discussed the individuals who sold the 
mask to SLAM, pointing out that Egyptian authori-
ties convicted the sellers in 2004 for smuggling arti-
facts out of Egypt.181  
Finally, the complaint alleged that SLAM 
made inquiries in form only and did not provide any 
real information about how or when the mask was 
excavated to those it asked.182  The complaint point-
ed out that SLAM did not investigate the “unknown 
dealer” who held the mask in Brussels only one year 
after its excavation.183  While SLAM heard from the 
Art Loss Register that the mask was not reported 
stolen, it was also informed that the Art Loss Regis-
ter was not a complete list of stolen artifacts.184  
SLAM did not receive answers to its inquiries from 
the Missouri Highway Patrol, the International Fed-
eration of Art Research (IFAR), or INTERPOL.185  
SLAM did not provide important provenance or ask 
for verification of provenance from the Director of the 
                                                             
178 Id. at 4. 
179 Id. at 5. 
180 Id. at 5-6. 
181 Id. at 7. 
182 Id. at 9. 
183 Id. at 8. 
184 Id. at 9. 
185 Id. at 10. 
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Egyptian Museum.186  Because SLAM was aware of 
the Egyptian law controlling exports and did not per-
form their due diligence, clearly evidenced by the 
above, it was “willfully blind” to the true owner of the 
mask: Egypt.187  In 2006, when the Supreme Council 
of Antiquities sent letters to the museum asking for 
the return of the mask, SLAM should have known 
that the provenance provided by Phoenix Ancient Art 
was incorrect.188 
The government also alleged that SLAM vio-
lated several laws, including 19 U.S.C. § 1595a; 18 
U.S.C. §§ 545, 2314 and 2315; Egyptian Law No. 215; 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.080; and N.Y. Penal Law §§ 
165.52 and 165.55.189  The government included an 
affidavit signed by a customs official that everything 
contained within the complaint was true.190  
The government also argued that the court de-
cided the case following the burden of proof present-
ed in an intervening case.191  Therefore, the court 
should permit the government to amend its com-
plaint because it drafted the complaint before the 
publication of the case.192  
SLAM countered that the Order issued April 
9, 2012 effectively made the Opinion final and urged 
                                                             
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 11.  
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 13. 
190 Verification at 1, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, 
No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 49-5. 
191 United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2011). 
192 Memorandum in Support of the United States Motion for 
Leave to File First Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture 
at 1, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 
HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 50. 
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the court to strike the government’s motion.193  Be-
cause the court denied the motion to reconsider on 
April 9, 2012, SLAM argued that the government did 
not have recourse under Rules 59(e), 60(b)(1),  
60(b)(6) and 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.194  Rule 59(e) only extends the deadline 
for filing notice of appeal, not for filing an amend-
ment to a complaint.195  
For those reasons, the court denied the motion 
to amend the complaint and denied SLAM’s motion 
to strike as moot.196  The court merely stated, “[f]or 
the reasons outlined in the Court’s March 31, 2012 
Order of Dismissal, and for the reasons offered in its 
Order denying reconsideration, the Court denies the 
Government’s requested leave raised in its motion 
submitted on June 8, 2012 .”197  Undeterred by the 
result, the government boldly filed a Notice of Appeal 
on June 29, 2012 with the Eighth Circuit.198  The 
government’s brief was filed on June 24, 2013.199  
                                                             
193 Claimant Saint Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Strike the 
Motion of the United States for Leave to File First Amended 
Verified Complaint for Forfeiture at 2, United States v. Mask of 
Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), ECF No. 51. 
194 Id. at 4. 
195 Claimant St. Louis Art Museum’s Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion to Strike the United States’ Motion for 
Leave to File First Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture 
at 6, United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 
HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 52. 
196 Op., Memorandum and Order at 2, United States v. Mask 
of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 
2012), ECF No. 54. 
197 Id. 
198 Notice of Appeal, supra note 26.  
199 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, United States v. Mask of Ka-
Nefer-Nefer, No. 12-2578, 2013 WL 343390 (8th Cir. June 24, 
2013).   
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 This section will analyze the Mask of Ka-
Nefer-Nefer case in light of the law provided in Part 
II.  Part A will first examine whether the district 
court correctly decided that the original complaint 
failed to show probable cause.  Part B will examine 
whether the proposed amended complaint would 
survive to trial.  At trial, there is a possibility that 
the action could fail due to the statute of limitations. 
 
A.  The Original Complaint 
The court properly dismissed the civil forfei-
ture on the pleadings.  In its complaint, the govern-
ment failed to show probable cause that the mask 
was stolen.  Further, the government also did not al-
lege that SLAM or any other party violated a law, 
either a larceny statute or a patrimony law, to satisfy 
the “stolen” requirement of 19 U.S.C. § 1595a.200  
 The government must plead facts with enough 
particularity that the claimant may commence an 
investigation without asking for a more definite 
statement.201  SLAM might be able to ascertain from 
the complaint that it should investigate the prove-
nance of the mask between 1966 and 1973.202  That is 
not “particular”; it would require researching the en-
tire provenance of the mask.  For example, in Por-
trait of Wally, the government was able to allege a 
time, place, and manner of the theft.203 
                                                             
200 See Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21. 
201 FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. E(2)(a). 
202 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 3. 
203 United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 
256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  While the Davis case postdates the 
government’s pleading, it also alleged a specific thief and the 
time, place, and manner of the theft.  United States v. Davis, 
648 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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The pleading must also support a reasonable 
belief that the government can support its claim at 
trial.204  The government merely alleged that by 
1973, the mask was missing from its box and there 
was no bill of sale.205  There is no allegation that the 
Egyptian Museum considered the mask stolen, or 
that it filed a report to that effect.206  It simply states 
that officials noticed it was missing.207  Perhaps the 
Egyptian authorities thought another curator had 
misplaced it or relocated it.  Perhaps what is missing 
is the bill of sale.  In a 2006 interview, Zahi Hawass, 
then Director of the Supreme Council of Antiquities, 
stated that the Egyptian Museum did not have much 
documentation for the mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer be-
cause it kept poor records in that era.208  Without 
any other facts, it is just as probable that someone 
misplaced the bill of sale as it is that someone stole 
the mask.  While the government may use circum-
stantial evidence to support probable cause,209 prob-
able cause needs to be more than a mere suspicion.210  
The original complaint demonstrates only a suspicion 
that the mask was stolen. 
Certainly, the court found probable cause in 
an Original Manuscript when an object was missing 
                                                             
204 FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. G(2)(f). 
205 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 4. 
206 Id. at 3. 
207 Id.  
208 Egypt Demands Return of Mummy Mask, NBC NEWS (May 
2, 2006), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12598537/ns/technology_and_scienc
e-science/t/egypt-demands-return-mummy-mask/. 
209 United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar 
Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
210 Memorandum of the United States in Support of its Motion 
to Reconsider Order and Op. Dismissing Verified Compliant, 
supra note 167, at 3. 
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from a museum.211  However, the court decided that 
probable cause existed because the circumstances 
surrounding the purchase were extremely suspi-
cious.212  The government does not allege in the orig-
inal complaint anything other than that SLAM ac-
quired and currently possesses the mask; there is no 
allegation that it acted in bad faith during the pur-
chase. 213 
 In addition, the pleading did not assert a law 
predicate to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a.214  The Government 
claims that the Davis case changed this pleading re-
quirement from the model used in Lucite Ball.215  
However, this is not entirely true.  It is true that the 
government’s complaint did not allege a violation of a 
United States law.216  However, the complaint in Lu-
cite Ball did clearly indicate that the moon rock was 
taken in violation of the Honduran patrimony law, 
and this violation was why the importation was ille-
gal under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a.217  Thus, even using the 
standard that the government says was in existence 
at the time of the pleading, the government’s plead-
ing fails. 
 Therefore, the court properly decided that the 
pleading was not sufficient.  It does not show proba-
ble cause, either that the mask was actually stolen or 
                                                             
211 United States v. An Original Manuscript Dated November 
19, 1778, 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 97894, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 22, 1999). 
212 Id. at *7. 
213 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 3-4. 
214 Id. at 3. 
215 Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for 
Leave to File First Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, 
supra note 192, at 1. 
216 See Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21. 
217 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in rem, supra note 56, at 
9. 
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that SLAM acquired it in bad faith.  It does not plead 
the circumstances with sufficient “particularity” to 
support the notion it could succeed at trial.  Finally, 
the complaint does not assert a law under which the 
mask could be considered “stolen.”218 
 
B.  The Proposed Amended Complaint 
The proposed amended complaint does cure 
these defects.  First, it lists a number of laws predi-
cate to § 1595a, such as §§ 545, 2314, and 2315 of Ti-
tle 18; Egyptian Law No. 215; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
570.080; and N.Y. Penal Law §§ 165.52 and 
165.55.219  In addition, it alleges an actual theft,220 
and it alleges a matter of foreign law.221  Finally, it 
casts doubt on the good faith purchase of the muse-
um.222  The following subsections will analyze 
whether these allegations support a finding of proba-
ble cause. 
 
1.  Common Law Theft 
Common law doctrine insists that a thief can-
                                                             
218 The term “stolen” is also ambiguous under the NSPA. The 
court noted in Long Cove, “It would be anomalous that while a 
violator of the Environmental Conservation Law would not be 
subject to prosecution in New York for larceny, he should be 
held to have stolen property within the meaning of the NSPA.” 
United States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159, 165 (2d 
Cir. 1978). One could draw a similar analogy here; in order for 
something to be considered stolen, a law of some sort must have 
been broken. 
219 First Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 177, at 13. 
220 Id. at 4. 
221 Id. at 5. 
222 Id. at 10 (stating “[a]s such, the Museum either knew or 
was willfully blind to the fact that Phoenix’s purported 
provenance was fictional at the time the Mask was imported”). 
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not pass good title.223  Under common law, “stolen” 
has been defined as  
 
acquired or possessed as a result of a 
wrongful or dishonest act or taking whereby 
a person willfully obtains or retains posses-
sion of property which belongs to another, 
without or beyond any permission given, 
and with the intent to deprive the owner of 
the benefit of ownership, whether tempo-
rarily or permanently.224  
 
If the government could show probable cause 
that the mask was stolen according to common law, 
the forfeiture would be warranted.  The amended 
complaint still does not provide a manner of theft or 
a timeframe shorter than 1966 to 1973.225  It does 
suggest that an unidentified thief stole the mask.226  
However, a time, place, or manner, or any facts about 
how the theft could have occurred are still lacking 
from the complaint.227  Simply alleging an “unidenti-
fied individual” does not strengthen the original 
complaint’s assertion that because the mask was 
missing and no bill of sale exists, the mask must be 
stolen.  On the other hand, if the government could 
demonstrate a time that an unidentified individual 
broke into the Egyptian Museum, this would 
strengthen the argument.228  This statement alone 
                                                             
223 Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, 
and Antiquities, 36 HOW. L.J. 17, 21 (1993).   
224 77 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof of a Claim Involving 
Stolen Art or Antiquities § 2 (2004). 
225 First Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 177, at 4. 
226 Id.  
227 Id.  
228 Zahi Hawass stated that he believed the mask was stolen 
from a storage facility in the 1980s; however, the government 
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does not provide probable cause that the mask was 
stolen according to common law. 
However, the amended complaint reveals that 
Egypt convicted the sellers of the mask, the 
Aboutaam brothers, in 2004 for smuggling artifacts 
out of Egypt.229  A confession from the sellers that 
they stole the mask, while improbable, would go a 
long way to establishing probable cause to seize the 
mask.  If the Aboutaam brothers confessed to steal-
ing the mask, then the museum would not have title 
per the common law doctrine or under the NSPA, 
and the mask should be forfeited.  The amended 
complaint does not allege a confession.230  Thus, the 
complaint does not show probable cause on the alle-
gation of a common law theft.231  
                                                                                                                             
never made this allegation in the complaint.  Jeff Douglas, St. 
Louis Museum Won’t Return Egyptian Mask, WASHINGTON POST 
(May 12, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/12/AR2006051201046.html.  
Hawass also stated that the last known provenance in Egypt 
was documented in 1959, which is contrary to the government’s 
complaint that it was documented in 1966.  Note that a 1980s 
theft would allow a proceeding under the CPIA. 
229 First Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 177, at 7. 
230 Id. at 4. 
231 In addition, there is one way that the museum could 
receive good title even if the mask was stolen – the mask must 
be stolen when it enters the country.  United States v. Portrait 
of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  The 
museum purchased the mask in Switzerland.  Bill of Sale at 1, 
United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11CV0504 HEA 
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), ECF No. 8-2.  “Under Swiss law, a 
purchaser of stolen property acquires title superior to that of 
the original owner only if he purchases the property in good 
faith.”  Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. 
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400 
(S.D. Ind. 1989) aff’d sub nom. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox 
Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 
F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).  Swiss law presumes that a purchaser 
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2.  Egyptian Law No. 215 – Violation of National 
Patrimony Law 
However, it is not necessary to prove a com-
mon law theft if the Egyptian patrimony law suffi-
ciently criminalized the alienation of antiquities such 
that all sales were illegal.232  Unfortunately, the law 
does not do this. 
SLAM points out that Law No. 117 of 1983 is 
the only patrimony law the United States recognizes 
out of Egypt.233  It is true that it is the first patrimo-
ny law the United States recognized out of Egypt and 
that it replaced Law No. 215.  That does not indicate 
that the United States would not recognize Law No. 
215.  The court in McClain reviewed all laws since 
the 1890s relating to Mexican patrimony to find the 
one that claimed ownership.234  The court in Lucite 
Ball upheld Honduran law in spite of several regime 
                                                                                                                             
acts in good faith.  Id.  Therefore, the burden to show that the 
buyer did not act in good faith is on the claimant.  Id.  Thus, it 
is possible that the sellers transferred good title to the museum 
even if the mask had been stolen from Egypt, if the museum 
acted in good faith. 
232 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 406 (2d Cir. 
2003).  In Schultz, the defendant was convicted for selling 
antiquities in violation of the Egyptian patrimony law in spite 
of the fact that he had not “stolen” the antiquities from a person 
or entity in Egypt.  The court determined that the patrimony 
law clearly indicated all objects that were found in Egypt after 
the law was enacted belonged to the government, and could not 
be sold to another party.  Thus, if the government could prove 
that the mask belonged to Egypt in an unqualified manner, 
proof of a break in would not be necessary. 
233 St. Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss the 
Government’s Civil Forfeiture Complaint, supra note 130, at 6. 
234 United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 997 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
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changes.235  The mere fact that the United States has 
not officially recognized Law No. 215 as a patrimony 
law does not mean it would not do so if it were pre-
sented with a case dating from the time Law No. 215 
was in effect. 
The difference between the application of Law 
No. 117 in Schultz and Law No. 215 in the Ka-Nefer-
Nefer case is not the text of the law.  Law No. 215 
does claim ownership of antiquities found in 
Egypt.236  Like Law No. 117, it also allows privately 
owned objects in certain circumstances.237  The prob-
lem is that Schultz and his associates dug antiquities 
out of the ground and sold them.238  The Egyptian 
government under Law No. 117 owns all artifacts 
found in the ground in Egypt, without exception.239  
Thus, there is no way Schultz could have taken the 
objects out of Egypt without violating the law.  
On the other hand, in the Ka-Nefer-Nefer case, 
the artifact was already out of the ground and the 
Egyptian Museum owned it.  Under Law No. 215, the 
                                                             
235 United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar 
Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
236 Law No. 215 of 1951 (Sur la Protection de Antiquitiés), Al 
Waqa’i’ al-Misriyah or Journal official du gouvernement 
égyptien, 31 October 1951, p. 1 (Egypt).  Please note that this 
law is only available in French.  It was translated by the author 
and summarized by both parties in the following court 
documents.  See Saint Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss 
the Government’s Civil Forfeiture Complaint at 7, United 
States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, No. 4:11-CV-00504 (HEA) 
(E.D. Mo. May 4, 2011), ECF No. 11 (on file with the author and 
the Pace Intellectual Property, Sports & Entertainment Law 
Forum); First Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, 
supra note 177, at 5. 
237 Id. at 5. 
238 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 2003).  
239 Law No. 117 of 1983 (Law on the Protection of Antiques), 
Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 11 August 1983, p. 17 (Egypt). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
Don’t Get SLAMmed into Nefer Nefer Land 
252 
Egyptian government, the operator of the Egyptian 
Museum, is at liberty to sell antiquities.240  Thus, 
there are ways to take the mask out of Egypt without 
automatically violating the patrimony law, unlike 
the situation in Schultz.  
Regardless of this distinction, the government 
was correct in asserting that the trial court should 
properly decide matters of foreign law.241  Other 
courts have determined that merely alleging a mat-
ter of foreign law was sufficient to survive a motion 
to dismiss.242 
 
3.  Lack of Good Faith 
If the government cannot show probable cause 
that a common law theft occurred, then it must show 
that SLAM did not act in good faith.  Scienter is a 
necessary component of §§ 545, 2314, and 2315 of Ti-
tle 18; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.080; and N.Y. Penal Law 
§§ 165.52 and 165.55.243  Therefore, the government 
would need to show that SLAM either knew or was 
willfully blind to the fact that the mask was stolen 
from Egypt at the time of sale in order to forfeit the 
                                                             
240 Law No. 215 of 1951 (Sur la Protection de Antiquitiés), Al 
Waqa’i’ al-Misriyah or Journal official du gouvernement 
égyptien, 31 October 1951, p. 5 (Egypt). 
241 United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to Claimant St. 
Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 143, at 5. 
242 United States v. Pre-Columbian Artifacts, 845 F. Supp. 
544, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Therefore, alleging in a pleading that 
property is stolen under a foreign law is a sufficient pleading 
without providing the specifics of the foreign law.”). 
243 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315; 18 
U.S.C. § 545; MO. REV. STAT. § 570.080; N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 
165.52, .55.  All of these statutes require that the possessor 
knowingly possess, receive, or transport the stolen object.  
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mask under any of these statutes.244  
The government has been able to show proba-
ble cause in other cases because the circumstances 
surrounding the purchases were questionable.245  
There are a number of actions the court has consid-
ered evidence of bad faith.  These include a failure to 
research the item,246 failure to research the sellers or 
the original owner,247 paying an extremely low 
price,248 paying in cash,249 concluding the transaction 
very hastily,250 or conducting the transaction in an 
unusual place or at an unusual time.251 
First, the nature of the item for sale – an an-
tiquity from a country known for being looted – sug-
gests that a potential purchaser should proceed with 
caution.252  By providing ten paragraphs on illicit 
trading of antiquities, the amended complaint indi-
                                                             
244 United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 
269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
245 United States v. An Original Manuscript Dated November 
19, 1778, 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 97894, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 22, 1999); Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, Inc. v. O’Brien, 761 
F. Supp. 1222, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts 
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1402 (S.D. Ind. 1989) aff’d sub nom. 
Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & 
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990). 
246 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at 
1401. 
247 Id.; Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, 761 F. Supp. at 1224; 
Original Manuscript, 1999 WL 97894,  at *7. 
248 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at 
1401; Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, 761 F. Supp. at 1224. 
249 Original Manuscript, 1999 WL 97894  at *7. 
250 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at 
1402. 
251 Original Manuscript, 1999 WL 97894,  at *7. 
252 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at 
1401. 
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cates the need for due diligence in researching prov-
enance.253  The complaint demonstrates all the ways 
in which SLAM could have conducted a more thor-
ough provenance search.254  It is clear that it did a 
provenance search, as it sent requests to the Art Loss 
Register, INTERPOL, the International Federation 
of Art Research, the Missouri Highway Patrol, and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.255  However, the 
amended complaint notes that SLAM did not hear 
back from most of these sources, which does not indi-
cate a thorough search.256 
Nevertheless, SLAM did contact the Director 
of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo and provide a de-
scription and photos of the mask.257  To the un-
trained eye, many Egyptian artifacts look the same.  
However, to someone schooled in Egyptian art, the 
differences between objects are clear.  The director of 
the Egyptian Museum in Cairo should be versed well 
enough in Egyptian artifacts to distinguish one arti-
fact from another.  One would think that when pre-
sented with a description and pictures of an object, 
the director of such a museum would be able to de-
termine if the object was one that was missing from 
its collection.  Certainly, the Egyptian Museum’s col-
lection is vast,258 but if the mask was stolen and the 
Egyptian government truly wanted it back, the direc-
                                                             
253 First Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 177, at 8-9. 
254 Id. at 9-10. 
255 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 5-
6. 
256 First Amended Verified Complaint, supra note 177, at 10. 
257 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 5-
6. 
258 The Egyptian Museum, SUPREME COUNCIL OF ANTIQUITIES, 
http://www.sca-egypt.org/eng/MUS_Egyptian_Museum.htm 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2014)). 
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tor would conceivably have a list of some sort to com-
pare objects against when presented with the type of 
documentation the Saint Louis Art Museum provid-
ed.259 Thus, one can hardly fault the museum for con-
tinuing with the sale after the Director of the Egyp-
tian Museum did not object, and after the Art Loss 
Register reported the mask was not on its list. 
However, the courts have noted that it is im-
portant to take into consideration the sophistication 
of the buyer.260  In Schultz, the court observed that 
Schultz was an expert in the field of Egyptian Antiq-
uities and should know of Egyptian Law No. 117.261  
SLAM is also a sophisticated buyer and should know 
the difficulties of the art market, including the loot-
ing that occurs in Egypt.  It should have researched 
the matter very thoroughly.  
Second, the courts have noted that when buy-
ing art it is necessary to check the authority of the 
seller to sell the object or to research the original 
owner.262  The amended complaint notes that Egyp-
tian authorities convicted both sellers in 2004 for 
smuggling artifacts out of Egypt.263  It also notes that 
SLAM failed to contact the previous owners of the 
mask to determine whether it could be sold.264  
The former director of the Metropolitan Muse-
um of Art in New York has expressed disbelief that 
                                                             
259 The Supreme Council of Antiquities currently provides 
such a list, in some cases with photographs, of antiquities 
whose return it is seeking. See SUPREME COUNCIL OF 
ANTIQUITIES, supra note 7.  
260 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003). 
261 Id. 
262 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at 
1401; Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, 761 F. Supp. at 1224; Original 
Manuscript, 1999 WL 97894,  at *7. 
263 First Amended Complaint, supra note 177, at 7-8. 
264 Id. at 9. 
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anyone would purchase an artifact from the 
Aboutaam brothers because they were notoriously 
untrustworthy characters.265  Art historians in the 
United States have questioned the Aboutaam broth-
ers’ story of provenance, stating that it is extremely 
unlikely the Egyptian government would have given 
an object to one of its own excavators.266  The convic-
tion of the sellers and their notoriously circumspect 
reputation  casts doubt on the legitimacy of the prov-
enance for the mask, and consequently lends itself to 
establishing probable cause to investigate the pur-
chase further. 
Third, courts have noted that if the price of the 
object is too low, it should alert the buyers as to the 
possible illegality of the sale.267  The complaint does 
not allege that the price paid by the museum was 
unreasonably low.268  SLAM paid nearly a half mil-
lion dollars for the mask;269 this seems entirely rea-
                                                             
265 See Tristan McKinnon, Antiquities Wishlist Part One: The 
Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, LOOTING HISTORY (June 1, 2010, 1:27 
PM), http://looting-history.blogspot.com/2010/06/antiquities-
wish-list-part-one-mask-of.html. 
266 Id. However, Egyptian Law No. 215 is somewhat 
ambiguous on this possibility.  Note that Art. 22 of No. 215 
allows the government to give an artifact to its finder; but Law 
No. 117 specifies foreign expeditions as the ones who can 
receive a gift from the Egyptian government, and no provision 
is made for Egyptian finders.  See Law No. 215 of 1951 (Sur la 
Protection de Antiquitiés), Al Waqa’i’ al-Misriyah or Journal 
official du gouvernement égyptien, 31 October 1951, art. 22 
(Egypt); Law No. 117 of 1983 (Law on the Protection of 
Antiques), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 11 August 1983 (Egypt). 
267 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at 
1401; Leonardo Da Vinci’s Horse, 761 F. Supp. at 1224. 
268 First Amended Complaint, supra note 177, at 6-7. 
269 St. Louis Art Museum’s Verified Claim of Interest in the 
Defendant Mask of Ka-Nefer-Nefer, supra note 129, at 2.  
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sonable.270  Therefore, this price alone does not lend 
itself to finding probable cause.  
Fourth, the haste with which the parties com-
plete a transaction can raise suspicions.271  For ex-
ample, in Autocephalous, the transaction took place 
over three days.272 The amended complaint does not 
allege that the transaction was hasty.273  In fact, 
SLAM conducted a months-long provenance search 
before it decided to purchase the object.274  The 
transaction was in no way hasty or surreptitious. 
The transaction time does not weigh in favor of find-
ing probable cause. 
Finally, the time or place of the transaction 
can raise suspicions.275  In Original Manuscript, the 
transaction took place in a hotel room at night for 
cash.276  In contrast, SLAM prepared a contract and 
conducted itself in a businesslike manner.277Thus, it 
paid a reasonable price, took a reasonable time to 
conduct the transaction, and conducted the transac-
tion in a reasonable manner.  SLAM’s conduct does 
not rise to the level of bad faith exhibited in other 
cases.  
On the other hand, the amended complaint 
does suggest that SLAM’s research was substantially 
lacking. It failed to investigate the previous owners, 
                                                             
270 See generally, LEONARD DUBOFF & CHRISTY KING, ART LAW 
38 (2006) (discussing the rise of prices for art). 
271 Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 717 F. Supp. at 
1402. 
272 Id. 
273 First Amended Complaint, supra note 177, at 10. 
274 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 5. 
275 United States v. An Original Manuscript Dated November 
19, 1778, 96 CIV. 6221 (LAP), 1999 WL 97894, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 22, 1999). 
276 Id. 
277 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 7. 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
Don’t Get SLAMmed into Nefer Nefer Land 
258 
and it also failed to follow up with any of its inquir-
ies.278  These failures do suggest probable cause to 
investigate the purchase further, and to further de-
termine the industry practice at the time of the pur-
chase.  
However, unless the government is able to ar-
gue that the statute of limitations should be tolled 
from the beginning of the declaratory judgment ac-
tion, the civil forfeiture could fail due to an affirma-
tive defense.  The statute of limitations established 
for civil forfeiture by 19 U.S.C. § 1621 is five years, or 
two years from the point of discovery.279  SLAM 
properly noted that its importation of the mask in 
1998 should have alerted United States authorities 
to its presence.280  At the latest, the February 14, 
2006 letter of Zahi Hawass should have alerted the 
government to the possibility that the mask was sto-
len.281  In spite of that, the government waited until 
March 16, 2011 to file a complaint for civil forfei-
ture.282  This is five years and one month beyond the 
point discovery, and too late to file a claim.  Because 
SLAM had the mask on display for thirteen years, 
the government cannot argue that the museum con-
cealed the mask and that the statute of limitations 
should be tolled.283   
                                                             
278 First Amended Complaint, supra note 177, at 9-10. 
279 19 U.S.C. § 1621. 
280 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 20, at 10. 
281 St. Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss the 
Government’s Civil Forfeiture Complaint, supra note 130, at 13. 
282 Verified Complaint for Forfeiture, supra note 21, at 1. 
283 19 U.S.C. § 1621. The statute of limitations states that it 
will run “except that . . . any concealment or absence of the 
property, shall not be reckoned within the 5-year period of 
limitation.”  Id. 
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 SLAM also asserted a defense of laches.284  
However, the Southern District of New York has de-
termined that the doctrine of laches does not apply to 
a civil forfeiture case.285  The same court determined 
that the doctrine of laches was outside the scope of a 
motion to dismiss.286  Because laches is so fact-based, 
the court typically decides whether it is applicable, 
and it is therefore not appropriate for a pre-trial mo-
tion.287 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The court properly dismissed the original 
complaint.  It failed to show any probable cause that 
the mask was stolen from Egypt and it did not cite a 
predicate law to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a.  The proposed 
amended complaint added a number of predicate 
laws.  It also shows probable cause by noting that the 
antiquities trade is questionable, the sellers of the 
mask were notoriously circumspect, and under Egyp-
tian patrimony law, Egypt may have been the owner 
of the mask. 
Therefore, if the government wants to survive 
a motion to dismiss in a case like this one, it must 
show probable cause.  It can do this in a number of 
ways.  It can identify a thief or a break in.  It can al-
lege that the patrimony laws of a foreign country 
prohibit the ownership of the kind of object in ques-
tion.  Failing these, the government must be able to 
show that the circumstances surrounding the trans-
                                                             
284 St. Louis Art Museum’s Motion to Dismiss the 
Government’s Civil Forfeiture Complaint, supra note 130, at 14. 
285 United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 
275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
286 Id.  
287 77 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof of a Claim Involving 
Stolen Art and Antiquities § 32 (2004). 
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action clearly indicate bad faith on the buyer’s part. 
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Abstract 
Most law review articles are very serious, and 
with good reason.  They discuss important, world-
changing matters like the role and magnitude of ex-
ecutive power, the limits of Constitutional rights, the 
boundaries of international law, and the vagaries of 
civil procedure.  This Article has no such world-
changing or reverent pretentions; it instead takes a 
light-hearted view of a fairly marginal legal topic: 
arm wrestling.  To provide a spine for the discussion, 
the Article leans heavily on the 1980s movie Over the 
Top – a movie about arm wrestling, trucking, and 
child custody - to provide examples of arm wrestling 
content with legal implications.  As the Article devel-
ops background on the topic, it discusses types of tort 
liabilities likely to apply to arm wrestling, the func-
tional import of waivers in the arm wrestling con-
text, and the possible liabilities of third parties who 
host or organize arm wrestling bouts.  A later part of 
the Article confronts an employer’s possible liabilities 
for employees’ arm wrestling while on the job.  Some 
discussion is even devoted to the possibility of arm 
wrestling against a machine.  Yet lest the Article’s 
use of occasionally silly pronouncements and irrever-
ent movie references mislead, the content is intended 
to be legally sound. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article begins near a story’s end, under 
blinding spotlights in a Las Vegas arena, where two 
men are about to lock in struggle in front of thou-
sands of boisterous spectators.  From a distance, the 
match would seem unfair – pitting a 300-pound five 
time world champion against an unknown, roughly 
100 pounds lighter.  The differences between the 
competitors do not end there.  The larger man, 
named Bull Hurley, is brash and arrogant, generous-
ly heaping obscenities and threats on his smaller op-
ponent, as his eyes blaze and arena lights dance and 
pool on the sweat coating his shaved head.  The 
smaller man, Lincoln Hawk, is more reserved and 
methodical in his comportment.  He utters no taunt, 
makes no face at his opponent; he simply rotates the 
bill of his trucker cap 180 degrees away from his 
forehead, as he always does before such bouts.  
Yet for all the disparities in size and confi-
dence confronting Hawk, the smaller man does not 
back down in the face of his challenge.  As the strug-
gle approaches, Hurley plants his right elbow on the 
table between the two competitors and fires off an-
other harangue.  Hawk, still not baited by his oppo-
nent’s taunts, places his right elbow on the table only 
at the urging of the referee.  Once each competitor 
has positioned his arm, the two men lock right 
hands, and prepare for battle.  When the signal is 
given, each man begins exerting as much force as he 
can in an attempt to pin his opponent’s right wrist to 
the table. These men are arm wrestling1 - not just for 
                                                             
1 In the unpublished opinion of Jamison v. Arm World 
Promotions, No. F058008, 2010 WL 3307462, at *2 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Aug. 24, 2010), the court defined arm wrestling as “a 
competitive endeavor in which two opponents exert pressure 
against each other’s hands to determine which competitor has 
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pride, but for the title of world’s greatest arm wres-
tler.  
The match initially does not proceed well for 
Hawk. Hurley is able to use his Christmas ham arm 
to wrench Hawk’s hand into a highly disadvanta-
geous position, close to the table’s surface and an at-
tendant defeat.  Yet at his son’s excited exhortation, 
Hawk musters enough strength to escape the threat 
and reestablish equilibrium with Hurley nearer to 
their starting point.  With the threat of defeat not yet 
averted, Hawk catches a break in the match, as his 
hand slips free from Hurley’s grasp.  This stoppage 
sends Hurley into a frothy rage, as the match must 
be restarted in the original starting position.  Given 
Hawk’s proximity to defeat prior to the hand slip, 
Hurley may believe Hawk intentionally loosened his 
grip.2  As the competitors retake their positions, their 
demeanors remain as they have throughout the con-
test – with an over-charged Hurley bouncing taunts 
into the blank face of Hawk.  The primary differences 
in their second attempt at the world title are the 
presence of an arm wrestling strap to secure their 
hands, and – in addition to the insults hurled at 
Hawk’s face – a sucker punch delivered by Hurley as 
the opponents’ hands are tied. 
When the second attempt at the world cham-
pionship match begins, a bloodied Hawk strains 
against Hurley as the match oscillates between surg-
es in each opponent’s favor.  And just as things seem 
                                                                                                                             
greater arm strength. Each competitor must keep their elbow 
on the table, with the goal of forcing their opponent’s hand to 
touch the table.” 
2 Which would qualify as a foul under the rules of arm 
wrestling.  See ARMWRESTLING RULES & REGULATIONS, Art. XII, 
§ B, r. 21 (Am. Armsport Ass’n Rules 2012), available at 
http://www.armsport.com/rules.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
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most dire for Hawk, his hand perilously approaching 
the point of defeat, Hawk is able to readjust his grip, 
bringing his fingers directly over the top of Hurley’s.  
The wild claims of Hurley that have peppered the 
match to this point are converted to a banshee’s wail, 
as Hawk begins an improbable comeback.  
And… the narrative must end there, for its 
continuation would spoil the end of the movie, Over 
the Top.3  That movie features Sylvester Stallone in 
the role of Lincoln Hawk testing his fictional arm 
wrestling prowess against Hurley, portrayed by the 
late Rick Zumwalt, an actual five time world arm 
wrestling champion.  Prior to the world champion-
ship match, the film chronicles Hawk’s life as a 
trucker, and his attempt to reconnect with his es-
tranged son over the course of a cross-country haul.  
During that trip, the film clarifies that when Hawk 
is not on the road (and even at times when he is on 
it), he enjoys working out and engaging in impromp-
tu arm wrestling matches at various truck stops.  
(And when Hawk is not doing that, he is vaguely in-
vested in a battle for custody of his son against the 
boy’s maternal grandfather.)  
This Article begins with a description of a sce-
ne from Over the Top – not just because it is a great 
movie4 – but because this Article is on the topic of 
arm wrestling as it intersects with the law.  Over the 
Top serves a worthwhile purpose in support of this 
topic as the only big-budget Hollywood film to focus 
on arm wrestling.  And as the story in Over the Top 
unfolds, a number of scenes, including the one just 
described – provide legally salient material that 
speaks to how arm wrestlers might encounter the 
                                                             
3 OVER THE TOP (Warner Brothers 1987). 
4 A point some might dispute. 
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law. 
One example of such material comes in the 
form of the injury that an arm wrestler might sus-
tain during a match.  For all the glory and accolades 
that may follow from an arm wrestling victory, the 
sport is not without risk of serious bodily harm.5  As 
participants wrench their arms to try to pin an oppo-
nent’s wrist, this rotational force applies potentially 
significant shearing and torque loads to the upper 
arm.  Human arms are not always able to withstand 
such forces; as a consequence demonstrated amply by 
most of the case law discussed below, arm wrestling 
participants place themselves at risk of serious spiral 
fractures to the humerus.  Indeed, Over the Top does 
not sugarcoat this reality, as the film dedicates sev-
eral frames to an injury occurring in the lead-up to 
the Hurley-Hawk tournament final.  With such risk 
of serious injury come potential costs arising out of 
both short-term medical treatment and long-term 
consequences associated with imperfectly healed in-
juries.  From such injuries follows the question of 
who should bear the cost as between the victim, the 
victim’s opponent, or even a third party.  In most re-
al-life scenarios, it is just such a third party that will 
face this legal risk – where an arm wrestling injury 
occurs on the job or at an arm wrestling tournament, 
for example, the injured party may seek compensa-
tion against an employer or tournament organizer.  
In its quest to provide guidance and back-
ground on the legal implications of arm wrestling in 
cases such as these, this Article reviews the legal 
                                                             
5 Jamison, 2010 WL 3307462, at *2 (“A known risk of arm 
wrestling is that a competitor’s arm might break under the 
strain of competition. Broken arms occur despite rules that 
govern arm wrestling in the attempt to limit injuries.”). 
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risks attendant on arm wrestling from a few differ-
ent perspectives.  Part I of the Article discusses the 
legal implications of arm wrestling as a general mat-
ter. This discussion includes an overview and extrap-
olation of general sports tort law to the arm wres-
tling table specifically.  Primarily included in the dis-
cussion are the torts that apply to the risk of injuries 
sustained during a match and the possibility of miti-
gating such risk by resort to waivers.  Part II delves 
into the richest source of case law on arm wrestling – 
the occurrence of arm wrestling in the employment 
setting, and the associated repercussions for workers’ 
compensation liability.  Part III discusses yet anoth-
er specific case of potential legal risk arising from 
arm wrestling – the match pitting an arm wrestler 
against a machine.  
 
I. ARM WRESTLING AND TORT LIABILITY GENERALLY 
Little is known about the invention or early 
history of arm wrestling.  This is presumably the 
case due to the sport’s age, as arm wrestling requires 
no more than two people with arms and machismo, 
things that have never been in short supply in hu-
man history.  Yet for the probably lengthy tradition 
surrounding the sport of arm wrestling, there is very 
little case law on the topic at all, and what case law 
does exist involves suits against third parties that 
organize, host, or employ the competitors.  In other 
words, my search of case law has not uncovered a 
single published opinion arising out of a suit brought 
by an injured arm wrestler against an opponent.  Yet 
the legal duties or liabilities between one arm wres-
tler and another represent a fundamental locus of 
conflict, the projection of the primordial fight into the 
less physical judicial forum, on which further discus-
sion of the liabilities of non-participants may be con-
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structed. 
In view of the limited case law on the topic, 
the likely treatment of arm wrestling by courts must 
be predicted based on courts’ treatment of torts in 
other athletic contexts.  When torts arise between 
participants in the athletic context, they are typically 
brought under one of three theories, presented in or-
der of decreasing level of intent: intentional tort such 
as assault or battery, reckless misconduct, or negli-
gence.6  These causes of action are not available in 
all jurisdictions in the context of athletic competition.  
As one commentator noted, “early sports cases lim-
ited recovery to intentional torts: recovery on a neg-
ligence theory was ‘out of the question.’”7  This par-
simonious traditional view of tort law has relaxed 
over time. Most jurisdictions now also permit recov-
ery for reckless misconduct, and some go so far as to 
permit negligence claims in the context of athletics.8  
Ultimately, then, an arm wrestler’s ability to seek 
relief for damages will depend on a combination of 
the harm claimed and whether the jurisdiction in 
question recognizes that type of harm in the athletics 
context.  Yet as each of the three primary sources of 
tort liability will all apply to arm wrestling torts in 
some jurisdictions, each merits further individual 
discussion.  
Regardless of the jurisdiction, commission of 
an intentional tort will give rise to liability for the 
                                                             
6 See Glenn R. Grell, Case Note, Hackbart v. Cincinnati 
Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), 84 DICK. L. REV. 
753, 758-60 (1980).  
7 Id. at 760. 
8 See, e.g., Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 501 
N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis. 1993) (finding negligence “sufficiently 
flexible” to be used in a case involving an injury sustained 
during a recreational soccer match). 
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arm wrestling tortfeasor.  An arm wrestler could 
conceivably commit an intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress against another participant, or falsely 
imprison that participant, but such torts would seem 
highly unlikely.  Taunting from one arm wrestler to 
another might call into question the strength, size, or 
value of a competitor, but it is unlikely to be so “ex-
treme and outrageous” as to qualify as an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.9  Nor, for that matter, 
is an arm wrestler likely to confine an opponent in 
any meaningful way during a match such that the 
opponent would be falsely imprisoned.  Rather, the 
most likely intentional tort to occur during an arm 
wrestling match is the tort of battery.  Battery tradi-
tionally requires offensive bodily contact that the de-
fendant intended to cause.10  Beyond the gripping of 
hands required for an arm wrestling match, the sport 
of arm wrestling does not require any other contact 
between the competitors.  Contact beyond the hand-
on-hand grip satisfying the definition of battery dur-
ing a match would be actionable as such.   
The final scene in Over the Top offers a clear 
example of just such a battery committed during an 
arm wrestling match.  Just as Bull Hurley and Lin-
coln Hawk re-engage for a second attempt at their 
world championship match, Hurley unexpectedly 
forces both his and Hawk’s hand into Hawk’s face.11  
This contact leads to light, almost stylized bleeding 
from Hawk’s nose, an indication of some degree of 
injury.12  This satisfies all elements of the tort – first, 
the bodily contact between the interlocked hands and 
                                                             
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
10 See, e.g., Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441, 444 
(2d Cir. 1976). 
11 OVER THE TOP (Warner Brothers 1987). 
12 Id. 
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Hawk’s face is offensive, certainly inasmuch as it in-
jures Hawk.  Additionally, Hurley intends to bring 
about the contact by forcing the competitors’ fists in-
to Hawk’s face.  This intent may be inferred from a 
number of sources.  Hurley’s incessant taunting and 
raging arrogance is suggestive of someone who might 
intentionally harm another, a suggestion only rein-
forced by Hawk’s slip in grip which Hurley likely 
viewed as depriving him of victory.  But the strongest 
indicator of Hurley’s intent is the sheer improbability 
that such contact would ever occur outside of an in-
tent to cause it.  At the time of the offensive contact, 
the competitors’ arms were at rest in preparation for 
the match, so no significant force of any kind should 
have been exerted at that moment.  And even if the 
competitors were to exert a force, arm wrestling dic-
tates that lateral force be applied between the com-
petitors.  A force of that magnitude exerted directly 
at an opponent under these circumstances would on-
ly occur intentionally.  In view of this, Hurley could 
have been found liable for a battery. 
Lest the probative value of another’s 
arrogance or taunting in arm wrestling be 
overstated, Over the Top also teaches that the 
expression of an intent to cause serious harm is not 
always fulfilled in any obvious way.  Throughout the 
film, the number of serious threats lofted at a 
competitor before a match is fairly striking.  When 
an overcharged character named Smasher challenges 
Hawk to an impromptu arm wrestling match at some 
greasy spoon/truck stop, Smasher explicitly brags to 
Hawk, “I’ve got a thousand [dollars] that says I can 
tear your arm off.”13  Hawk accepts the challenge, 
but lest he have failed to appreciate the brutish 
                                                             
13 Id. 
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nature of his opponent, Smasher loudly proclaims, “I 
wanna show this guy something . . . break his arm 
off.”14  Yet once the arm wrestling between the two 
begins, Smasher does nothing unusual, least of all 
attempt to separate Hawk’s arm from his torso.  The 
two just arm wrestle.  
That isn’t the only occasion of threatened vio-
lence at an arm wrestling table.  In a documentary-
style interview spliced into the tournament final 
footage, Bull Hurley boldly states, “I drive trucks, 
break arms, and arm wrestle.  That’s what I love to 
do, and it’s what I do best.”15  In the same interview, 
he says of Hawk, “All I want is to try to hurt him, 
cripple him . . . so he never dares to try to compete 
against me again.”16  Yet once again, Hurley does not 
fulfill his violent threats nearly as well as he strings 
together infinitives.  Outside the match’s punching 
incident, which does not involve a broken arm or 
crippled victim, Hurley’s actions simply do not align 
with his stated intent. Instead, threatening insults, 
from Hurley or any other competitor, appear part 
and parcel of the larger testosterone-fueled culture of 
arm wrestling.  Such insults might help show an in-
tent to harm, but they are far from dispositive in an 
case of an intentional tort. 
 If a defendant’s level of intent in an athletic 
venue does not rise to the level of an intentional tort, 
a plaintiff may find it necessary to allege the tort of 
reckless misconduct.  Reckless misconduct is charac-
terized by a harmful action where the actor “knows 
his act is harmful, but fails to appreciate the extent 
                                                             
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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of the potential harm.”17  To be found liable for reck-
less misconduct, the wrongdoer must recognize that 
the risk generated is “‘in excess of the risk of a negli-
gent act.’”18  In other words, reckless misconduct rep-
resents the mid-point on the scale of wrongdoer’s in-
tent among the three tort varieties discussed here.  
The wrongdoer’s intent and knowledge need not be 
as well-formed as in the case of an intentional tort, 
but it must exceed that of simple negligence.   
 As a matter of tort liability in athletics, many 
– and possibly most – jurisdictions hold that a 
wrongdoer’s intent must at least reach the level of 
reckless misconduct for a plaintiff to recover.19  The 
policy behind this flows from cases like Nabozny v. 
Barnhill,20 involving a recreational soccer player’s 
over-aggressive pursuit of a back-pass to the goal-
keeper.21  After the goalkeeper had gathered the ball, 
the defendant struck the goalkeeper’s head, causing 
serious injuries.22  In order to provide lower courts a 
standard to assess the merits of claims like the 
plaintiff’s, the Illinois Appellate Court developed a 
standard more generally applicable to sports.  While 
the court acknowledged that “some of the restraints 
of civilization must accompany every athlete onto the 
                                                             
17 Grell, supra note 6, at 760. 
18 Id. 
19 Ulysses S. Wilson, Comment, The Standard of Care 
Between Coparticipants in Mixed Martial Arts: Why 
Recklessness Should ‘Submit’ to the Ordinary Negligence 
Standard, 20 WIDENER L.J. 375, 382 (2011) (“In the 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, an injured sports 
participant wishing to recover damages must prove to the fact 
finder that the other participant’s act was reckless or 
intentional.”). 
20 Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
21 Id. at 259. 
22 Id. at 260. 
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playing field,”23 it also expressed concern about plac-
ing “unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous 
participation in sports.”24  To strike a balance be-
tween these opposing policy objectives, the court es-
tablished a test whereby:  
 
when athletes are engaged in an athletic 
competition; all teams involved are trained 
and coached by knowledgeable personnel; a 
recognized set of rules governs the conduct 
of the competition; and a safety rule is con-
tained therein which is primarily designed 
to protect players from serious injury, a 
player is then charged with a legal duty to 
every other player on the field to refrain 
from conduct proscribed by a safety rule.25  
 
If the use of “duty” language would seem to permit a 
cause of action for simple negligence, the court prac-
tically interpreted its test as concluding “that a play-
er is liable for injury in a tort action if his conduct is 
such that it is either deliberate, wilful or with a reck-
less disregard for the safety of the other player so as 
to cause injury to that player.”26  Barnhill, then, re-
quires at least reckless misconduct on the part of a 
defendant to permit a successful cause of action by 
an injured participant in applicable athletics.  
 “Applicable” is the operative word in the pre-
vious sentence, as courts have seen fit to reject the 
Barnhill standard where not all prongs of the test 
are satisfied.  Take Novak v. Virene,27 where the 
                                                             
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 260-61. 
26 Id. at 261. 
27 Novak v. Virene, 586 N.E.2d 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
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same Illinois Appellate Court considered a claim re-
lated to a skiing accident.  The court distinguished 
the facts in Barnhill from the claim before it based 
on the fundamentally different nature of the sports 
in the two cases.  Where soccer involves “virtually 
inevitable” contact with other players, a skier “does 
not voluntarily submit to bodily contact with other 
skiers[.]”28  The court did not believe that reckless 
misconduct was required to serve the interest in vig-
orous participation in skiing in the way that the 
Barnhill court required that standard of a contact-
based team sport such as soccer.  The Novak court 
instead permitted the application of a claim of ordi-
nary negligence to the skiing accident before it.29 
Reasoning similar to the Novak court’s view of 
skiing could be applied reasonably well to arm wres-
tling.  First, it bears mention that the Barnhill test’s 
requirement of a team sport does not apply to arm 
wrestling, a sport cast in the fires of individual desire 
and glory.  And if arm wrestlers must consent to con-
tact to their opponent’s hand and, possibly, wrist, no 
other contact is envisioned by the sport.  From that 
perspective, arm wrestling resembles less contact-
oriented individual sports such as skiing or running.  
Notably absent are the frequent and unpredictable 
collisions attendant on a sport like soccer or football.  
If presented with the question of the level of intent 
sufficient to support a cause of action for an arm 
wrestling injury, a court could conclude that ordinary 
negligence should suffice in that context. 
With that in mind, and by way of defining a 
third intent standard after intentional torts and 
reckless misconduct, it is important to understand 
                                                             
28 Id. at 580. 
29 Id. 
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what “negligence” means both generally and when 
applied to arm wrestling.  Under a typical definition, 
negligence is “a failure to exercise the degree of care 
in a given situation that a reasonable person under 
similar circumstances would employ to protect others 
from harm.”30  To be successful, a negligence claim 
must show four items: the existence of a duty be-
tween the defendant and plaintiff, a breach of that 
duty by the defendant, an injury sustained by the 
plaintiff, and a causal relationship between the de-
fendant’s breach of duty and the plaintiff’s injury.31 
Over the Top furnishes a few examples of the 
sort of duty whose breach might amount to negli-
gence.  As one example, the organizers of the cham-
pionship arm wrestling tournament may owe a duty 
to the participants to have appropriate medical staff 
on hand in the event of an injury.  They would equal-
ly owe a duty to provide well-constructed arm wres-
tling tables.  The presence of qualified referees would 
also be part of their duty.  As the film reveals, each of 
these duties at least appears to be satisfied.  
Where legal duties seem to be satisfied at the 
world championship tournament, the film’s protago-
nist Hawk is far more content to breach duties of 
care towards his son, Michael.  In one scene, this 
negligence takes the form of Hawk allowing 13-year-
                                                             
30 City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 161 P.3d 1095, 
1095 (Cal. 2007). 
31 Some commentators and courts break the four-part test into 
five parts, which is also fine for purposes of the Article.  See 
generally Estate of French v. House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 554 
(Tenn. 2011) (noting that the elements of common law 
negligence include “(1) a duty of care owed by defendant to 
plaintiff; (2) conduct below the applicable standard of care that 
amounts to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause 
in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, cause.”). 
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old Michael to drive Hawk’s big rig unaided and 
without the niceties of training or a commercial driv-
er’s license.  In a scene more relevant to the topic at 
hand, Hawk forces Michael to arm wrestle an older, 
stronger adolescent despite Michael’s apparent arm 
wrestling inexperience, the opponent stridently 
threatening, “I’m gonna break your arm, punk.”  Due 
to his inexperience and age, Michael is in no position 
to appreciate the risk of injury presented by arm 
wrestling, nor is he particularly able to disobey his 
father’s will.  Had Michael sustained injury during 
the subsequent match (fortunately, he does not), his 
father would almost certainly have been negligent in 
allowing the injury to occur.  He knowingly exposes 
his son to a risk of injury that only he, as the father 
and experienced arm-wrestler, appreciated, in breach 
of a duty of care for his son.  His son would have been 
injured as the direct result of this negligence, as he 
would otherwise not have arm-wrestled the larger 
adolescent.  All elements of a negligence claim would 
have been present. 
A related cause of action for negligence might 
also arise in arm wrestling due to what is known as 
“break-arm” position.32  This position occurs when a 
competitor’s elbow is planted at a point outside the 
                                                             
32 See SITDOWN & STANDING ARMWRESTLING TECHNICAL 
RULES, Competition Fouls, Item 6(d), (World Armwrestling 
Fed’n Rules 2007), available at 
http://www.armwrestling.com/000rulesandregulations.html 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (“When a competitor starts to put 
themselves in a “break arm” or “dangerous position”, [sic] the 
referee will caution the competitor loudly so that the competitor 
understands the caution.  Referee will instruct the competitor 
to face their competitive arm, so as to keep the hand, arm and 
shoulder in a straight line.  Competitors must never force their 
shoulder inwards, ahead of their arm or hand, towards the 
table.”). 
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frame of his or her shoulder.  In other words, if a line 
were to be drawn directly away from the point where 
the elbow is planted, it would not intersect the com-
petitor’s body.  In this position, the competitor is at 
increased risk of suffering a spiral humerus fracture.  
A knowledgeable arm wrestler continuing in an at-
tempt to win a match – despite knowledge that the 
other participant is in “break-arm” position – could 
be liable for negligence if the other participant’s arm 
does in fact break.  In practice, however, this type of 
claim is unlikely to be successful due to the assump-
tion of risk doctrine.  
 Where a plaintiff arm wrestler brings a cause 
of action for negligence, the assumption of risk doc-
trine could stand as a bar to the plaintiff’s case.  As-
sumption of risk is the “traditional belief that a par-
ticipant assumes the dangers inherent in the sport 
and is therefore precluded from recovery from an in-
jury caused by another participant.”33  Under this 
rationale, a participant in a soccer match assumes 
the risk of being struck by a kicked ball during the 
normal course of play; a football player carrying the 
ball on offense assumes the risk of being tackled; 
therefore, an arm wrestler arguably assumes the risk 
of an arm injury inflicted during a typical match.  
These examples generally correspond to the 
branch of the doctrine known as “primary assump-
tion of risk.”  Primary assumption of risk applies to 
“those instances in which the assumption of risk doc-
trine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no du-
ty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plain-
                                                             
33 Paul Caprara, Comment, Surf’s Up: The Implications of 
Tort Liability in the Unregulated Sport of Surfing, 44 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 557, 561 (2008). 
PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.1 (2014) 
“Meet Me Halfway”: Arm Wrestling and the Law 
278 
tiff from a particular risk.”34  Under a different type 
of assumption of risk, called “secondary assumption 
of risk,” the plaintiff knowingly courts a risk of harm 
at the hands of the defendant despite the existence of 
a duty between the parties.35  Had the Smasher 
character in Over the Top said that he wanted to 
show Hawk something by negligently jostling his 
arm (in contrast to his original declaration that he 
would break Hawk’s arm, Hawk would have as-
sumed the risk of such “jostling” under a secondary 
assumption of risk.  Something gets lost in the trans-
lation of the taunt to negligence only, though, so it’s 
fairly unsurprising that Smasher did not express 
himself that way. 
Therein lies one of the primary limits to the 
scope of the assumption of risk doctrine.  The doc-
trine only applies to actions in negligence, as athletes 
are not generally deemed to assume the risk of an-
other participant’s reckless misconduct or intentional 
tort.36  Assumption of risk is also limited in its par-
tially subjective view of the party assuming the risk. 
When the plaintiff skier was injured in Seidl v. 
Trollhaugen, Inc.,37 the court found “no evidence that 
plaintiff had knowledge of that particular risk prior 
to the time of injury or even that she knew such a 
risk to be one of the ordinary inherent risks of ski-
                                                             
34 Id. at 567. 
35 Id. at 567-68. 
36 Martin v. Luther, 642 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996) (“It is well established that [voluntary sports] 
participants may be held to have consented, by their 
participation, to injury-causing events which are known, 
apparent or reasonably foreseeable, but they are not deemed to 
have consented to acts which are reckless or intentional.”). 
37 Seidl v. Trollhaugen, Inc., 232 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1975). 
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ing.”38  The court did not consider what an ordinary 
skier would have known under the circumstances, 
but what the plaintiff knew.  Similar thinking would 
limit the type of risk that a child assumes in athlet-
ics, as compared to the risk assumed by a more expe-
rienced adult.39 
 If assumption of risk only covers negligent acts 
whose likelihood the plaintiff should have appreciat-
ed, protection from liability for arm wrestling inju-
ries can be expanded somewhat if either an arm 
wrestler or organizer of the match compels competi-
tors to sign a waiver prior to participation.  Such a 
waiver effectively protected Arm World Promotions 
in Jamison v. Arm World Promotions.40  In that case, 
the plaintiff Jamison sustained a spiral torque frac-
ture during an arm wrestling tournament organized 
by the defendant.41  Prior to participation though, 
Jamison executed a waiver which stated in abbrevi-
ated form, “I hereby waive all claims against the 
State of Calif., Arm World Promotions (AWP), . . . 
Operators or Sponsors . . . for injuries that I may 
sustain.”42  The California Court of Appeal noted that 
waivers may effectively eliminate a legal duty if they 
contain language that is sufficiently “clear, unam-
biguous, and explicit in expressing the intent of the 
                                                             
38 Id. at 241. 
39 Survey, Sports Law in the State of Wisconsin, 15 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 425, 437-38 (2005) (summarizing Little v. Bay 
View Area Red Cats, No. 80-1801, 1981 WL 139187 (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 15, 1981) for the proposition that “children lack the 
maturity and experience to make responsible decisions, and the 
jury should consider this when determining a child’s proportion 
of negligence.”). 
40 See Jamison v. Arm World Promotions, No. F058008, 2010 
WL 3307462, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2010). 
41 Id. at *1-2. 
42 Id.  
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parties.”43  As the language of the Arm World release 
was sufficiently clear,44 it was held to release the de-
fendant’s liability towards Jamison. 
                                                             
43 Id. at *4. 
44 Id. at *6.  As the Jamison court also noted, waivers are 
unenforceable if they implicate the public interest.  This occurs 
when the multi-factor test set out in Tunkl v. Regents of 
University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1963), is 
satisfied.  The test states that “the attempted but invalid 
exemption involves a transaction which exhibits some or all of 
the following characteristics.  It concerns a business of a type 
generally thought suitable for public regulation.  The party 
seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great 
importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical 
necessity for some members of the public.  The party holds 
himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of 
the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming 
within certain established standards.  As a result of the 
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the 
transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive 
advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the 
public who seeks his services.  In exercising a superior 
bargaining power the party confronts the public with a 
standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no 
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable 
fees and obtain protection against negligence.  Finally, as a 
result of the transaction, the person or property of the 
purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the 
risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.”  Tunkl, 383 
P.2d at 445-48. In the original Tunkl case, this test invalidated 
a waiver of negligence liability in the hospital context. It has 
also been applied to invalidate a waiver for injuries arising out 
of interscholastic sports.  Wagenblast v. Odessa School District, 
758 P.2d 968, 970 (Wash. 1988) (finding that a waiver in for 
participation in interscholastic athletics violated all 6 Tunkl 
factors).  Discussion of the Tunkl test is limited to a footnote 
here as arm wrestling is not likely to trigger Tunkl.  The sport 
of arm wrestling is simply not a necessary incident of life in the 
same way a hospital’s services are.  Nor, to my knowledge, is 
arm wrestling offered as an interscholastic sport such that it 
would come under Wagenblast. 
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 The principle that waivers may eliminate lia-
bility for simple negligence has a flip side – waivers 
generally cannot eliminate liability for gross negli-
gence or intentional torts.  As the Supreme Court of 
California noted in City of Santa Barbara v. Superior 
Court, “the vast majority of decisions state or hold 
that . . .  agreements releasing grossly negligent con-
duct generally are void on the ground that public pol-
icy precludes enforcement of a release that would 
shelter aggravated misconduct.”45  In other words, 
courts do not want to allow parties who show a com-
plete lack of care for others to stand behind a piece of 
paper to deflect any charge of wrongdoing. 
 Based on the foregoing discussion, some gen-
eral trends become evident in the law likely applica-
ble to arm wrestling.  First, unless a jurisdiction has 
established reckless misconduct as the minimum 
level of intent necessary to bring an athletics-based 
civil action, courts will likely reason that negligence, 
reckless misconduct, and intentional torts are all ac-
tionable in arm wrestling.  Practically speaking, 
however, negligence will be fairly unusual and diffi-
cult to show in most arm wrestling cases, as the most 
common risk associated with arm wrestling – the 
fractured arm – will be deemed a risk assumed by a 
knowledgeable participant.  However, slim the 
chance of such liability, arm wrestling participants 
may – and to a greater extent, arm wrestling tour-
nament organizers will – want to obtain a clear, ex-
plicit waiver from other participants to limit their 
liability for negligence.  Arm wrestling plaintiffs will 
be more likely to succeed on an intentional tort or 
reckless misconduct theory, provided the alleged 
                                                             
45 City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 161 P.3d 1095, 
1103 (Cal. 2007). 
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wrongdoer’s misconduct rises to the level of such 
torts.  Additionally, such torts will not be susceptible 
to protection by waiver in most jurisdictions as a vio-
lation of public policy. 
 
II.  ARM WRESTLING AT WORK 
If someone really likes arm wrestling as a rec-
reational pastime, it may only be logical for that per-
son to want to get practice in the sport whenever 
possible.  That could mean arm wrestling strangers 
in truck stops; it could mean using the intermission 
of a Broadway play to arm wrestle; and it certainly 
could mean arm wrestling at work.  Nearly all pub-
lished judicial opinions on arm wrestling flow from 
just this latter case, where an arm wrestler injured 
on the job seeks workers’ compensation from an em-
ployer (or employer’s insurance) for the injury.  Due 
to the limited likelihood of success of a negligence ac-
tion against an arm wrestling opponent, workers’ 
compensation represents the only viable outlet for 
liability where an arm wrestling match occurs at 
work.  But just as a case for negligence would be hy-
pothetically difficult for an injured arm wrestler, 
courts have proven practically averse to granting re-
lief to arm wrestlers injured on the job,46 even where 
that employee is traveling for work.  Normally, such 
cases find that arm wrestling either falls under a 
statute expressly prohibiting recovery or remains 
                                                             
46 See Quinones v. P.C. Richard & Son, 707 A.2d 1372, 1372 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (arm wrestling falls under the 
New Jersey skylarking statute, accordingly outside the scope of 
employment); Saunders, 57 Van Natta 796 (Or. Work. Comp. 
2005) (arm wrestling injury excluded from workers’ 
compensation claim by statute); Fitzpatrick, 64 Van Natta 174 
(Or. Work. Comp. 2012) (finding arm wrestling outside the 
scope of employment).  
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outside the scope of employment protected by work-
ers’ compensation.  
If the plot of Over the Top strains credibility to 
its breaking point, at least one case at the intersec-
tion of employment and arm wrestling lends a grain 
of verisimilitude to the movie.  That case is Hackney 
v. Tillamook Growers Co-op., and it actually involves 
trucking and arm wrestling.47  The workers’ compen-
sation claimant, a long distance trucker, was alter-
nating driving shifts with his supervisor at the time 
of the incident giving rise to his claim.48  During 
their trip, the supervisor and the claimant had an 
overnight layover in Jacksonville, Florida, where 
they initially passed the time drinking and watching 
football at a motel bar.49  With alcohol in his system 
and examples of testosterone-fueled behavior parad-
ing before his eyes, the supervisor proposed a (fairly) 
predictable projection of these stimuli – by challeng-
ing the claimant to an arm wrestling match.50  The 
claimant initially refused the challenge, but eventu-
ally accepted without coercion.51  During the ensuing 
arm wrestling match, he suffered a broken arm.52  
The claimant sought workers’ compensation for his 
injuries, a claim initially denied by the Oregon 
Workers’ Compensation Board.53   
Claimant appealed the denial to the Oregon 
Court of Appeals, which reached the same conclusion 
as the Workers’ Compensation Board.  The Court of 
                                                             
47 Hackney v. Tillamook Growers Co-op, 593 P.2d 1195 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1979). 
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 1196. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
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Appeals found the case to turn on a single issue: 
whether the injury occurred within the scope of the 
claimant’s employment.54  The Court began by ac-
knowledging that employees engaged in travel-
intensive lines of work are usually held to be within 
the scope of their employment throughout their trav-
el.  The nexus between the trip and the scope of em-
ployment is broken, however, where the employee 
makes “a distinct departure on a personal errand.”55  
The Court found just such a departure in the case 
before it, concluding, “the claimant’s injury arose af-
ter 5 1/2 hours of delay and the consumption of ‘three 
or four’ beers.  Claimant’s arm wrestling had no rela-
tionship to his employer’s business.”56  As the arm 
wrestling match was outside the scope of the claim-
ant’s employment, the Workers’ Compensation 
Board’s initial denial was deemed proper.57 
At least one case has found in favor of a work-
ers’ compensation claimant in an arm wrestling-
related incident occurring on the job, but the case is 
probably not particularly probative.  In Varela v. 
Fisher Roofing Co., the claimant Varela repeatedly 
challenged a co-worker to an arm wrestling match 
after Varela had been teased for carrying a lighter 
bucket than his co-workers.58  At some point as the 
participants were either preparing for, or engaging 
in, the agreed-upon arm wrestling match, Varela 
slipped on a skylight and severely fractured his an-
kle.59  The trial court found that Varela’s injury was 
                                                             
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1196-97. 
58 Varela v. Fisher Roofing Co., Inc., 572 N.W.2d 780, 781 
(Neb. 1998). 
59 Id. 
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sustained within the scope of his employment, a de-
cision not reversed on appeal by either a review pan-
el of the Worker’s Compensation Court or the Court 
of Appeals.60 
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s conclusion fell 
in line with the decisions of the lower courts.  As a 
basis for its decision, the Court adopted the Larson & 
Larson test to determine the bounds of the “scope of 
employment.”  That test finds injuries sustained on 
the job eligible for workers’ compensation where the 
deviation from employment is insubstantial and the 
deviation does not “measurably detract from the 
work.”61  The Court concluded that each of these 
prongs was satisfied, as “the work stoppage was of 
momentary duration, the injury happened at the 
very outset of the horseplay, this was not the sort of 
incident which carried a significant risk of serious 
injury, and the incident was a trifling matter, at 
least in its intention by the two employees.”62  In 
view of this, the Court concluded that workers’ com-
pensation was properly awarded.63  
While breaking from the overwhelming trend 
of cases that have found arm wrestling on the job 
outside the scope of employment (and workers’ com-
pensation protection).64  Varela is probably not very 
significant.  For one thing, the Court’s explanation of 
its decision places explicit reliance on some timing 
oddities particular to Varela’s arm wrestling bout.  
That bout could only be lumped in with the rest of 
Varela’s employment because the stoppage was mo-
                                                             
60 Id. at 782-83. 
61 Id. at 783. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 784. 
64 See City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 161 P.3d 1095, 
1103 (Cal. 2007). 
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mentary, and the injury occurred at the outset of the 
match, possibly even before the arm wrestling had 
commenced.  According to this understanding of the 
facts, the incident fell close to the boundary between 
employment and non-employment activities; the 
Court simply chose to view it on the employment side 
of the line.  Had the arm wrestling lasted longer, or 
even begun, for that matter, the Court likely would 
have been compelled by its own reasoning to reach a 
contrary decision. 
But beyond the case’s fairly liminal set of 
facts, the bigger reason that the Varela decision 
should be afforded limited weight is the weakness of 
its analysis.  As the dissent in Varela noted, the 
boundary between activities within and outside of 
the scope of employment coincided with the moment 
that Varela set his work aside to arm wrestle.  As of 
that moment, Varela was “no longer serving his em-
ployer’s interests;” quite to the contrary, he was une-
quivocally contravening a written policy prohibiting 
“boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace.”65  
According to the dissent, failing to treat an arm 
wrestling contest occurring “on a slippery roof under 
construction” as outside the scope of employment 
would render the scope of employment requirement 
“essentially meaningless.”66  This reasoning is per-
suasive – rather than losing the forest for the trees 
by focusing on the fortuitous timing of the injury in 
relation to the extracurricular activity, the dissent 
recognized that the very activity of arm wrestling on 
a non-arm wrestling job moves the participant’s con-
duct outside the scope of the employment.  
                                                             
65 Varela, 572 N.W.2d at 785 (Neb. 1998). 
66 Id.  One may observe slippery slope logic applied to a literal 
slippery slope. 
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Given both the majority of decisions finding 
against arm wrestling workers’ compensation plain-
tiffs and the weakness of the single case to buck that 
majority, the employee who decides to explore his or 
her passion for arm wrestling at the workplace is 
likely doing so at his or her own risk.  Unless a 
worker is employed to arm wrestle, that worker is 
not likely to be acting within the scope of employ-
ment when arm wrestling.  From the perspective of 
employers, the risk that an arm wrestling injury’s 
costs fall on their shoulders may be mitigated by 
clear policies prohibiting such conduct.  The employ-
er should also affirmatively instruct employees not to 
arm wrestle on the job as soon as the employer is 
aware of such activities.  These steps will limit the 
likelihood that the employer will be found to have 
acquiesced in the arm wrestling.67   
 
III.  ARM WRESTLING AGAINST A MACHINE 
In this penultimate Part, let’s take a short 
break from Over the Top to consider the story of John 
Henry, one of the classic squares in the quilt of 
American folklore.  Inasmuch as the story is uncon-
tested, it recounts the life of an African-American 
steel-driver plying his trade in support of railroad 
construction in the second half of 19th century.68  The 
                                                             
67 No such concerns troubled our protagonist Lincoln Hawk. 
As an independent, self-employed trucker, Hawk was a sort of 
new American cowboy, arm wrestling where he liked and 
answering to no one. All risk of injury, and all potential for 
acclaim, remained on him. 
68 See generally ROARK BRADFORD, JOHN HENRY (1931); SCOTT 
REYNOLDS NELSON, STEEL DRIVIN’ MAN: JOHN HENRY, THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF AN AMERICAN LEGEND (2008); RAMBLIN’ JACK 
ELLIOTT, Ballad of John Henry, on THE LOST TOPIC TALES: ISLE 
OF WIGHT 1957 (Hightone 2004); VAN MORRISON, John Henry, 
on THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE (Polydor 1998). 
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task of the steel-driver consisted of hammering a 
steel spike into a rock face to create a hole where an 
explosive could be implanted for detonation.  The 
detonation, in turn, would clear a path for further 
railroad bed or tunnel construction.  At the time 
when John Henry supposedly drove steel, technology 
had advanced to a point where, for the first time, 
steel-driving could begin to be mechanized.  As man-
ual labor’s grip on the steel-driving hammer weak-
ened, John Henry was enlisted to make a final stand 
against mechanization, in the form of a race against 
a mechanical steel-driver.  As the legend goes, John 
Henry won the race, but exerted himself so thorough-
ly that he died at the race’s end.  Poets, musicians, 
and novelists have subsequently latched on to the 
John Henry story as a fountainhead of literary inspi-
ration. 
One may wonder what the legend of John 
Henry has to do with arm wrestling.  Well, at pre-
sent, an arm wrestling enthusiast can personally en-
joy a modern spin on John Henry’s story – without 
the same risks – by testing his arm wrestling prow-
ess against an arm wrestling machine.  In this mod-
ern man versus machine combat, gone are many of 
the deeply symbolic and historically notable aspects 
of John Henry’s steel-driving race, as well as ques-
tions related to the process of mythmaking, but in 
their place is more arm wrestling, which almost 
evens the overall balance. 
I say “almost,” because what made John Hen-
ry’s legendary feat so impressive is far less applicable 
in the context of a modern bout against an arm wres-
tling machine.  Where John Henry was called upon 
to demonstrate the value of human strength against 
the oncoming tide of machinery, human arm wres-
tling machines are making no such grand display.  
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And where John Henry was working at his maxi-
mum capacity to defeat the best technology available 
at the time, modern technology could very easily out-
strip any human’s arm strength, with as little as a 
simple adjustment of the arm wrestling machine’s 
settings.  In this way, challenging an arm wrestling 
machine does not demonstrate very much, and ex-
poses the participant to the risk of injury due to the 
machine’s malfunction. 
Yet an arm wrestling enthusiast might still 
want to accept this challenge.  Perhaps that person 
cannot find a human participant to arm wrestle, in 
which case a machine could serve as a surrogate.  Or 
maybe the arm wrestler just loves the sport so much 
as to want to take on all comers, be they man or ma-
chine.  If these, or other reasons, drive an arm wres-
tler to take on a machine, this Part discusses some of 
the legal issues surrounding this specific class of con-
test. 
As noted in the part on arm wrestling general-
ly, the savvy operator of an arm wrestling machine 
will likely require any user of the machine to sign a 
waiver.  A well-designed waiver can help shield the 
machine operator from causes of action related to the 
operator’s negligence. 
Not all waivers disclaiming liability associated 
with an arm wrestling machine will be found en-
forceable, however.  The case of Macek v. Schooner’s 
Inc.69 is didactic on this point.  In that case, the 
plaintiff visited a bar where an arm wrestling contest 
involving a machine was taking place.70  After con-
sulting with the machine’s operators on its safety 
                                                             
69 Macek v. Schooner’s Inc., 586 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991). 
70 Id. at 443. 
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and testing its functionality, plaintiff agreed to par-
ticipate in the arm wrestling contest.71  Before he 
was allowed to do so, however, the machine’s opera-
tors required plaintiff to sign a form broadly waiving 
“any and all right and claim for damages . . . for any 
and all injuries” sustained by plaintiff during the 
arm wrestling contest.72  The waiver then contained 
a representation that the person signing was in good 
health.73  Plaintiff signed the waiver without reading 
it, and proceeded to take part in the contest, where 
he suffered a spiral fracture of his humerus and sub-
sequent long-term impairment in the injured arm’s 
flexion and extension.74  The plaintiff filed suit 
against the tavern and machine operators alleging 
breach of warranty, negligence in setting up the ma-
chine, and a claim that the machine was defective 
and dangerous.75  The trial court dismissed each of 
these claims on the ground that the waiver released 
the defendants from liability for injury.76 
The Appeals Court reversed the dismissal and 
remanded for further consideration of the waiver’s 
meaning.  In so doing, the Appeals Court commented 
that Illinois state law requires that a waiver contain 
“clear, explicit, and unequivocal language” to serve 
as an effective release.77  Included in that rule is the 
further requirement that the waiver clearly articu-
late what activities are covered by its terms.78  Due 
to its breadth, the exculpatory clause in Macek was 
                                                             
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 444.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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found ambiguous as to its scope, an ambiguity only 
exacerbated by the representation of the partici-
pant’s health.79  That representation, the Appeals 
Court concluded, muddied the meaning of the waiver 
by allowing for two readings of its terms – one in 
which the waiver was of effect broadly and another 
where the waiver only applied where the partici-
pant’s health caused the harm.80  Due to this ambi-
guity, summary judgment was deemed inappropri-
ate, and the case was remanded to the trial court.81 
The Macek case provides some general guid-
ance as to how a waiver should be structured by an 
operator of an arm wrestling machine.  First, the 
waiver should disclaim any warranties made in rela-
tion to the machine, particularly including any war-
ranties of fitness for purpose. As previously noted in 
Part I, the document’s terms should also explain 
what activities are within its scope in clear, conspic-
uous language.  But that should not be the entirety 
of risk-mitigation that an arm wrestling machine op-
erator undertakes.  It is fair to wonder in the Macek 
case whether the Appeals Court was persuaded by 
the particular facts of the case, where the operators 
of the machine seem to have made statements as to 
the machine’s safety completely contrary to the ma-
chine’s operation in practice.  That combination of a 
misrepresentation and a dangerous machine only 
gives courts more reason to find a waiver unenforce-
able for one reason or another.  Arm wrestling ma-
chine operators should accordingly limit any state-
ments that they make guaranteeing the functionality 
of their machine, and otherwise take all reasonable 
                                                             
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 444-45. 
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steps to ensure that their machine functions proper-
ly.  Exercising that level of care will increase the 
likelihood that a waiver exculpating the machine’s 
operator will be held enforceable.   
Of course, as already noted, even the best 
drafted waivers are likely of no protection in cases 
where the party signing the waiver is the victim of 
gross negligence or an intentional tort.  Surprisingly, 
the Macek court did not mention this possibility, alt-
hough it is possible that the plaintiff did not raise the 
argument.82 
For lack of an enforceable waiver – or any 
waiver at all, the cost of harm caused by an arm 
wrestling machine is much more likely to fall on the 
arm wrestling machine operator than it would in 
cases of injury during a simple human-against-
human arm wrestling match.  While both of these 
activities involve fundamentally similar physical mo-
tions to demonstrate strength and earn well-
deserved social approval, the insertion of a machine 
changes the character of the activity.  No longer is an 
arm wrestling match a struggle subject to the unpre-
dictable hazards of sport and the whims of Fortuna; 
it is instead converted into a predictable match in 
which the machine should produce a controlled and 
predictable force throughout its motion.  Deviation 
from that predictability is no longer a strategic or 
random incident of human athletic struggle; it is po-
tentially a malfunction of the machine.  
Such malfunctions could serve as the basis for 
myriad legal causes of action.  A malfunction could 
be the result of negligence, gross negligence, or even 
intentional misconduct.  Anything the machine oper-
ator says related to the functionality of the machine 
                                                             
82 See id. 
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could constitute a warranty of fitness for purpose 
that would be breached by a subsequent malfunction.  
And unlike human arms, arm wrestling machines 
are products likely subject to standard products lia-
bility law.  That could trigger a duty for the operator 
to warn users of the machine of any unsafe condi-
tions.  It equally could expose the machine’s manu-
facturer and operator to claims for strict liability for 
any injury resulting from the machine’s malfunction. 
The trade-off for arm wrestlers challenging a 
machine, then, is an increased likelihood of recovery 
in the case of injury, but a different risk of injury due 
to potential mechanical malfunction.  Arm wrestlers 
desirous of contending with a machine might instead 
choose to limit their contests to human opponents 
who consider themselves machines.  As Over the Top 
demonstrates, there is apparently no shortage of 
such arm wrestlers.  One participant in the world 
championship tournament brags, “My whole body is 
an engine,” and then, indicating his wrestling arm, 
“This is the fireplug, and I’m going to light him up.”83  
Even Hawk is not immune to such self-promotion, as 
he notes that turning his hat backwards before a 
match makes him feel “like a different person, like a 
truck, a machine.”  Such blurring of the line between 
man and machine may not have any basis in reality, 
but it does present the possibility of a simulacrum 
combat against a machine.  And somewhere, the 
ghost of John Henry is either proud or completely 
sickened. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to provide a gen-
eral overview of how the law would likely treat the 
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pastime of arm wrestling.  In the first part of the 
overview, the type of torts likely applicable in the 
arm wrestling context were extrapolated from the 
law of other areas of athletics.  That investigation 
revealed that the legal standards applicable to arm 
wrestling would likely require a participant to exer-
cise a duty of care towards an opponent.  Failure to 
exercise such care might theoretically expose the 
negligent arm wrestler to liability for negligence.  
Practically, however, such claims are not likely to 
succeed where an experienced participant can be 
found to have assumed the risk of any injuries fore-
seeable in a typical match.  The risk of such claims 
may be further mitigated by the participants’ or 
match organizer’s use of effective, unambiguous 
waivers.  Tort liability in the world of arm wrestling 
may be more probable, then, in the more limited area 
of intentional tort and reckless misconduct.  That 
said, these general guidelines should not be viewed 
as bright-line rules; tort liability for arm wrestling 
injuries will be dependent on both the circumstances 
of the case and the state laws applicable to a cause of 
action.  
 In its final two parts, the Article considered 
arm wrestling in two specific contexts – at the place 
of employment and against a machine.  The liability 
risks for third parties in these two cases diverged.  
Where the third party employer would not be likely 
to be found liable for a claim for workers’ compensa-
tion arising out of an employee’s arm wrestling inju-
ry suffered while on the job, the operator of an arm 
wrestling machine runs much greater risks across a 
wider swath of torts – from products liability and 
breach of warranty to gross negligence and even or-
dinary negligence. 
As a backstop to this overview, the Article has 
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leaned heavily on events occurring in the 1987 mov-
ie, Over the Top.  Such reliance on a Hollywood ac-
tion-drama – particularly one involving late-80s Syl-
vester Stallone – should be taken with more than a 
grain of salt.  After all, this is a movie that depicts 
arm wrestling competitors slapping each other in the 
face and (apparently) drinking motor oil to prepare 
for a match.  The motor oil drinker is even willing to 
extinguish a lit cigar prior to a match by eating it as 
a ploy to intimidate his opponent.  Needless to say, a 
certain suspension of disbelief is in order when 
watching the movie, and an even greater suspension 
of disbelief is required when trying to generate legal 
analysis from such a movie.  Yet the law itself has 
been presented here in a more serious manner, leav-
ing the author to echo the request embedded in the 
title of Kenny Loggins’ theme song to Over the Top – 
“meet me halfway.”84 
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